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At Law No. CL94000100 
SECOND AMENDED MOTION POR JUDGMENT 
COME NOW plaintiffs Bill Greever Corporation ("BGC") and Bill 
B. Greever Sr. ("Mr. Greever"), by counsel, and for their claim 
against defendants Tazewell Nation~l Bank ("TNB") and Citizens Bank 
of Tazewell ("CBT") state as follows: 
PART XES 
1. Plaintiff BGC is a Virginia corporation formerly engaged 
in the construction of pre-engineered metal buildings with its 
principal place of business located in North Tazewell, Virginia. 
Mr. Greever is a resident of Bluefield, West Virginia and is the 
President and sole shareholder of BGC. 
2. Defendant TNB is a Virginia banking corporation with its 
principal place of business located in Tazewell, Virginia. 
Defendant CBT is a Virginia banking corporation with its principal 
1. 
place of business located in Tazewell, Virginia. 
PACTS 
(TNB) 
3. on February 8, 1985, BGC and Mr. Greever executed a 
commitment letter issued by TNB ("the TNB Agreement") which 
provided that TNB would lend $175,000 to BGC and Mr. Greever 
secured by a credit line deed of trust on three parcels of real 
estate owned by Mr. Greever. Exhibit A. The TNB Agreement 
provided: "The loan balance may be increased or decreased as 
desired by the Bill Greever Corporation for a period of two (2) 
years after which the Bank may at any time require that the balance 
be placed on a ten-year (10) amortized repayment schedule." Exhibit 
A. On February 8, 1985, Mr. Greever and his wife Elizabeth L. 
Greever ("Mrs. Greever") also executed a Credit Line Deed of Trust 
by which they placed three parcels of land in trust in connection 
with the TNB Agreement ("Deed of Trust"). 
4. Pursuant to the TNB Agr~ement, on July 3, 1985, BGC and 
·~ 
Mr. Greever executed a Collateral Note and Security Agreement 
whereby they borrowed $175,000 from T.NB. On July 1, 1988, they 
renewed the note and agreement by executing another Collateral Note 
and Security Agreement (hereinafter both of the collateral notes 
and security agreements are referred to collectively as "the TNB 
Note"). Mr. Greever executed each of these documents in his 




s. The plaintiffs never breached their obligations to TNB. 
They always made timely payments of interest pursuant to the TNB 
Note and payments of principal according to their oral agreements 
with TNB. on each occasion on which the plaintiffs foresaw some 
difficulty in making payments of principal or interest, Mr. Greever 
telephoned or visited TNB or Premier Bankshares Corporation, TNB's 
holding company, prior to the due date and obtained approval to 
postpone or skip the payment. Except as provided above, BGC and 
Mr. Greever always made their payments when due through the first 
quarter of 1.992. 
6. During the end of 1.991 and into the first few months of 
1992, the plaintiffs and TNB entered into negotiations to place the 
outstanding amount due under the TNB Note on a ten-year amortized 
schedule in accordance with the TNB Agreement as orally modified. 
Charles Paschall ("Paschall"), TNB's Senior Vice President -
Lending, acting on behalf of TNB, instructed the plaintiffs to pay 
the interest due at the end of th! first quarter of 1.992 pursuant 
-· 
to the TNB Note, but stated that they need not make a principal 
payment at that time because the parties would be structuring a ten 
year payment plan some time during the ensuing month. 
7. BGC and Mr. Greever paid the interest as agreed. 
8. By letter dated March 20, 1992, TNB sent a proposal to 
BGC and Mr. Greever which laid out the terms for amortizing the 
loan over a ten-year period. Exhibit B. However, as an express 
condition of agreeing to the amortization schedule, TNB required 
Mr. Greever's wife to execute all the loan documents even though 
3 
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Mrs. Greever was neither employed by nor a shareholder of BGC. In 
fact, her only relation to BGC and Mr. Greever at that time was 
that she was the wife of Mr. Greever. Nevertheless, the proposal 
letter expressly stated that the bank would "demand payment in 
full" if Mrs. Greever did not execute the documents. Exhibit B. 
9. By letter dated March 26, 1992, John w. McClintock, Jr., 
acting on behalf of BGC and Mr. Greever accepted all the terms of 
TNB's March 20, 1992 proposal except that term compelling Mrs. 
Greever to execute the loan agreement and emphasized that "at no 
time was her executing the renewal note ever a part of the 
agreement to later amortize this demand note." Exhibit c. 
10. By letter dated April 24, 1992, Paschall made two other 
proposals to BGC and Mr. Greever; however, both of these options 
also required Mrs. Greever to execute the loan documents. Exhibit 
D. The letter provided that if BGC and Mr. Greever did not agree 
to such terms, TNB would proceed on May 1, 1992 to foreclose on the 
property securing the TNB Note. ~. 
11. When Mrs. Greever refused to sign the loan documents, TNB 
initiated foreclosure proceedings against the real estate which 
secured the loan, even though the loan was not in default. In 
fact, TNB had never declared the loan to be in default. Mr. 
Greever was forced to seek bankruptcy protection in order to 
prevent his property -from being seized because he could not obtain 
a loan elsewhere as a result of TNB's actions. 
12. In 1991 and early 1992, prior to the institution of the 
foreclosure proceedings, BGC and Mr. Greever had solicited other 
4 
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banks to lend them the money necessary to pay off the TNB loan 
because TNB was acting hostilely. Specifically, James R. Wheeling, 
the current chairman of the board of TNB and former president of 
TNB, had sworn he would get BGC and Bill Greever, when Mr. Greever 
refused to sell his boat to a friend of Wheeling at what Wheeling 
deemed a "reasonable" price. 
13. Because the value of the real estate which secured the 
loan exceeded the outstanding principal balance due under the loan 
by several thousand dollars, each of the banks to which the 
plaintiffs applied initially expressed interest in lending them the 
money. However, each of the banks subsequently turned down the 
loan application. 
14. Several of the officers at those banks stated their 
reason for suddenly turning down the application was based upon 
slanderous statements TNB was making about the credit reputation of 
BGC and Mr. Greever. 
15. As a result of TNB's f~lse, misleading and slanderous 
statements, the plaintiffs could not obtain a loan from any bank to 
which they applied, in Virginia or elsewhere. 
COUNT I 
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS EXPECTANCY - TNB) 
. 
16. The preceding numbered paragraphs are incorporated herein 
by reference as if fully set forth. 
17. Knowing that it would continue to receive each day 
several bid solicitations for which it was qualified and upon which 
it could bid, BGC possessed a business expectancy that it could 
5 
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successfully obtain several of those projects and benefit 
economically therefrom. 
18. TNB knew that BGC successfully qualified for and obtained 
bids in the past and that it expected to continue to obtain bids. 
19. TNB realized that BGC could not continue to accept bids 
if the credit of BGC and Mr. Greever was destroyed. 
20. TNB intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully and improperly 
and/or with conscious disregard for the rights of plaintiffs 
interfered with BGC's expectations of business and profits by 
initiating foreclosure proceedings against Mr. Greever's property 
and by making defamatory statements about the credit of BGC and Mr. 
Greever. 
21. By initiating foreclosure proceedings against the 
property owned by Mr. Greever when the plaintiffs were not in 
default, TNB knew it could wrongfully: 1) obtain the signature of 
Mrs. Greever against her will; 2) seize the property securing the 
TNB Agreement; or 3) force Mr~ Greever to seek bankruptcy 
protection. 
22. The initiation of foreclosure proceedings injured Mr. 
Greever's credit and drove Mr. Greever to .seek bankruptcy 
protection. The bankruptcy severely harmed the strength of his 
signature as a co-obligor or guarantor of BGC's obligations. TNB 
knew BGC relied upon Mr. Greever as a co-obligor or guarantor of 
its debts and that injury to Mr. Greever's credit would hurt BGC 
and its ability to obtain credit. 
6 
23. In drivinq Mr. Greever into bankrUptcy and injurinq the 
ability of BGC and Mr. Gr~ever to obtain credit, TNB intended to, 
and did, interfere with and disrupt BGC's prospective contracts, 
business relationships and economic qains. 
24. After TNB's actions, BGC no lonqer possessed the 
financial capability to undertake projects for which it received 
.bid solicitations. Without the ability to undertake these projects 
and without the ability to acquire additional credit, the company 
was severely injured. 
· 25. It is reasonably certain that absent the wronqful actions 
of TNB, BGC would have obtained many projects from which it would 
have realized a profit. 
26. The resultinq harm to BGC's business forced Mr. Greever 
.. ~ . to d1scharqe debts BGC would have otherw1se satisfied because BGC 
lacked the financial ability to do so. 
27. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of T.NB, 
plaintiffs have and will continue~o suffer damaqes. 
WHEREFORE, as a result of TNB 1 s wronqful initiation of 
foreclosure proceedinqs and .its damaqe to the ability of BGC and 
Mr. Greever 'to.obtain credi~, BGC's business was damaged and Mr. 
Greever must now pay the obliqations that BGC would otherwise have 
paid, and plaintiffs are entitled to an award of compensatory 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial, punitive damages in 
the amount of $350,000.00 each, interest as permitted by law, 





(BREACH OF CONTRACT - TNB) 
28. The preceding numbered paragraphs are incorporated herein 
by reference as if fully set forth. 
29. Pursuant to terms of the TNB Agreement, as orally 
modified, TNB was permitted to initiate foreclosure proceedings 
against the property securing the TNB Note only in the event that 
the plaintiffs defaulted on their obligations to TNB. Because the 
plaintiffs were not in default when TNB initiated its foreclosure 
proceedings, TNB breached its obligations to the plaintiffs by its 
actions. 
30. Pursuant to the terms of the TNB Agreement, TNB could 
choose the time at which to place the TNB Note on a 10 year 
·I' 
amortJ.zed payment schedule; however, the TNB Agreement did not 
permit TNB to add any additional conditions to placing the TNB Note 
on such a payment schedule. TNB breached the TNB Agreement by 
requiring the signature of Mrs. G~eever as a condition to placing 
the TNB Note on such a payment schedule. 
31. TNB knew that the initiation of foreclosure proceedings 
would damage the credit of Mr. Greever and BGC. It also knew that 
the bankruptcy of Mr. Greever would injure the credit of Mr. 
Greever and BGC. 
3 2 • As a direct and proximate result of TNB' s breaches of the 
contract, the plaintiffs have and will continue to suffer damages. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial, interest as permitted by 
8 
8 
law, costs and such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate. 
comrr :r:r:r 
(BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH - TNB) 
33. The preceding numbered paragraphs are incorporated herein 
by reference as if fully set forth. 
34. Pursuant to § 8.1-203 and Title 8. JA of the Code of 
Virginia, TNB owed the plaintiffs a duty of good faith in the 
performance and enforcement of its obligations under the loan 
documents. 
35. Pursuant to § 8.1-203, 11good faith" is defined as honesty 
in fact. 
36. TNB breached its duty of good faith by wrongfully sending 
default letters and initiating foreclosure proceedings against the 
plaintiffs for certain missed payments when TNB had previously 
given the plaintiffs permission to skip those payments. As a 
result, Mr. Greever was forced to seek bankruptcy protection to 
prevent the wrongful seizure of _his property. The foreclosure 
.. 
proceedings and subsequent bankruptcy of Mr. Greever injured the 
credit and business of Mr. Greever and BGC, which relied upon Mr. 
Greever's cosignature and guarantee in entering into agreements. 
TNB also breached its duty of good faith by disseminating 
information about the plaintiffs which it knew to be false for the 
purpose of destroying the plaintiffs' ability to obtain a loan 




37. TNB also breached its duty of good faith pursuant to Va. 
Code § 8. 3A-103 ( 4) by failing to observe reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in its efforts to enforce the TNB Note 
after January 1, 1993. 
38. As a direct and proximate result of TNB's breach of its 
duty of good faith, the plaintiffs have and will continue to suffer 
damages. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial, interest as permitted by 
law, costs and such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate. 
COURT IV 
(EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT VIOLATION- TNB) 
39. The preceding numbered paragraphs are incorporated herein 
by reference as if fully set forth. 
40. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA11 ), found at 15 
usc § 1691, et seq. and Regulation B ("Reg. B") promulgated 
thereunder by the Board of Governo~s of the Federal Reserve System 
at 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 et seq., prohibits a creditor . from 
discriminating against an applicant in a credit transaction on the 
basis of marital status. 
41. TNB violated ECOA when it required Mrs. Greever to 
execute the plaintiffs' loan documents as a condition to 
restructuring the loan, as previously described herein. TNB, which 
is a creditor for purposes of the act, required BGC and Mr. 
Greever, who are applicants under the act, to provide Mrs. 
Greever's signature simply because she was the wife of Mr. Greever. 
10 
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Mrs. Greever was not a joint applicant, nor did she volunteer to 
sign. Her only connection to the loan was based upon her status as 
Mr. Greever's wife. The bank never offered to accept any other 
signatures or other collateral in lieu of Mrs. Greever's signature. 
42. BGC and Mr. Greever were credit-worthy in their own right 
and the value of the collateral securing the TNB Note exceeded the 
value of the amounts due under the loan by several thousand 
dollars. TNB's actions were in reckless disregard of the rights of 
BGC and Mr. Greever. 
43. Given the fact that TNB had crippled plaintiffs' 
borrowing power, the only choices of the plaintiffs were to allow 
Mr. Greever's property to be seized, to force Mrs. Greever to 
execute the loan documents against her will or to have Mr. Greever 
-~ 
seek bankruptcy protection. 
44. As a direct and proximate result of TNB's violation, BGC 
and Mr. Greever have and will continue to suffer damages. 
WHEREFORE, as a result of TUB's refusal to restructure the 
loans to the plaintiffs without the signature of Mrs. Greever-, BGC 
and Mr. Greever are entitled to an award of compensatory damages in 
an amount to be determined at trial, punitive damages not to exceed 
$10,000.00 each, interest as permitted by law, costs, attorneys' 
fees and such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate. 
COUN'l' V 
(PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL - TNB) 
45. The preceding numbered paragraphs are incorporated herein 
by reference as if fully set forth. 
11 
11. 
46. TNB gave BGC and Mr. Greever permission to miss certain 
payments that were otherwise due and promised the plaintiffs that 
it would not foreclose upon the property serving as collateral for 
the TNB Note based upon said non-payments. 
47. Reasonably relying upon TNB's representation that it 
would not initiate foreclosure proceedings, the plaintiffs did not 
make those payments. 
48. The plaintiffs relied upon TNB's representations to their 
detriment in that TNB nevertheless initiated foreclosure 
proceedings against the property securing the TNB Notes. 
49. Due to the promise by the bank that it would not initiate 
foreclosure proceedings based upon those missed payments, the bank 
was estopped from seizing any assets of BGC or Mr. Greever or 
.,. 
taking any other action against the interest of the plaintiffs as 
a result of those missed payments and is liable to the plaintiffs 
for all damages the plaintiffs have and will incur as a direct and 
proximate result of TNB's wrongful actions. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial, interest as permitted by 
law, costs, attorneys' fees and such other relief as the court may 
deem appropriate. 
(CBT) 
so. BGC and Mr. Greever executed three notes with CBT in the 
original principal amounts of $10,012.00 (Loan No. 5200 dated May 
30, 1989) ("Note 1"); $26,284.91 (Loan No. 5742 dated February 9, 
1990) ("Note 2"); and $35,000.00 (Loan No. 5949 dated May 10, 1990) 
12 
1.2 
("Note 3") (all of the foregoing and each renewal thereof being 
referred to collectively hereafter as "the CBT Notes"). These 
notes were renewed every three months for a three month period: 
. 
Note 1 was last renewed on May 24, 1992 with a maturity date of 
August 22, 1992: Note 2 was last renewed May 19, 1992 with a 
maturity date of August 17, 1992: and Note 3 was last renewed on 
May 24, 1992 with a maturity date of August 22, 1992. 
51. BGC and Mr. Greever made timely payments of principal and 
interest under the CBT Notes. 
52. In the summer of 1992, Mr. Greever filed for bankruptcy 
protection and CBT discontinued its correspondence to BGC and Mr. 
Greever concerning the CBT Notes even though the CBT Notes were not 
in default. 
,,. 
53. Between September and November 1992, BGC and CBT entered 
into negotiations concerning the repayment of the CBT Notes. 
Proposals included offers by BGC and Mr. Greever to consolidate all 
the loans into a single loan which would be amortized over a ten or 
fifteen year period. 
54. In November 1992, Monte Rife ( "Rife11 ) , the CEO and 
Executive Vice President of CBT, told Mr. Greever that they should 
not worry about creating a payment plan because it would be best to 
wait and consolidate the loans (or to establish some other payment 
plan) after Mr. Greever's Chapter 11 Bankruptcy case was closed in 
order to avoid the trouble of restructuring the agreement to comply 
with an order of the bankruptcy court judge. At that time, Mr. 
Greever's personal bankruptcy was expected to be closed in December 
13 
1.3 
1992. (The plaintiffs had kept Rife well informed of their 
difficulties with TNB and the harm TNB was causing them since at 
least March of 1992.) At that same meeting the plaintiffs also 
paid all the interest owed under the CBT Notes and requested that 
the bank resume sending them notice of each interest payment on the 
CBT Notes as it became due. CBT stated it would comply. 
55. The plaintiffs received no further notices of payment due 
from CBT. 
56. On Thursday, July 1, 1993, BGC made a deposit of 
approximately $23,224.00 to its account at CBT. 
57. On Friday, July 2, 1993, without any prior notice to BGC, 
CBT confiscated all the proceeds in BGC's account, totalling 
$23,325.00. 
·sa. On July 6, 1993, before receiving notice of CBT's 
wrongful act, BGC deposited more money into its account. CBT 
immediately seized $1,425.00 of those funds. CBT also seized four 
vehicles which served as collate~al for the CBT Notes, including 
two vehicles which were regularly used and necessary for the 
continued operation of the business. 
59. Soon after BGC learned of these seizures, it determined 
that it should take whatever remedial actions possible. BGC 
quickly notified individuals to whom it had written checks, 
including suppliers, that the checks would bounce if cashed and 
placed stop payment orders on over fifty (50) checks· it had 
previously written. Several checks did bounce but without BGC's 
rapid action over eighty (80) checks would have been dishonored by 
14 
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CBT. Nevertheless, the numerous suppliers and others learned that 
BGC's account had been seized - which damaged the company's credit 
and reputation. 
60. CBT failed to give BGC any prior notice of its belief 
that BGC was in default, that it sought immediate payment or that 
it intended to seize BGC's assets. BGC did not receive any 
correspondence from CBT until it received notice that the accounts 
and vehicles had been seized. 
61. The actions of CBT injured BGC's business, reputation and 
credit and caused damages to Mr. Greever who was forced to satisfy 
many of the obligations of BGC when BGC was unable to do so. 
COtJ:NT VZ 
(BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH - CBT) 
.,. 
62 • The preceding numbered paragraphs are incorporated herein 
by reference as·if fully set forth. 
63. Pursuant to §§ 8.3-203 and 8.1-103(4) of the Code of 
Virginia, CBT owed plaintiffs ~ duty of good faith in the 
performance and enforcement of its obligations under the. loan 
documents. 
64. Under Virginia law, "good faith" is defined as honesty in 
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing. 
65. CBT breached its duty of good faith to plaintiffs by (1) 
wrongfully leading the plaintiffs to believe that it would 
restructure the plaintiffs' loans once Mr. Greever's bankruptcy 
case was closed when it in fact had no intention of doing so, (2) 
15 
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falsely promising that it would give plaintiffs notice of the 
amount of interest due, thus ilnplying that it would not seek 
immediate payment without giving notice thereof, (3) never giving 
any notice or making any statement that it sought payment under the 
CBT Notes or intended to seize BGC's assets so that the plaintiffs 
would place additional money into their accounts with CBT, and (4) 
seizing the proceeds of BGC's account after BGC's July 1, 1.993 
deposit, seizing the proceeds of the account again the following 
week and seizing the four vehicles securing the CBT Notes. 
66. As a direct and proximate result of CBT's breach of its 
contractual duty of good faith, plaintiffs have and will continue 
to suffer damages. 
WHEREFORE, .as a result of CBT's breach of its duty of good 
faith; plaintiffs are entitled to an award of compensatory damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial, interest as permitted by 
law, costs and such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate. 
COtnrl' VJ::I 
(WRONGFUL DISHONOR - CBT) 
67 • The preceding numbered paragraphs are incorporated herein 
by reference as if fully set forth. 
68. By its refusal to honor checks presented to it for 
payment from BGC's account on or about July of 1993 as described 
above, CBT intentionally and wrongfully dishonored those checks in 




69. CBT's actions in dishonoring BGC's checks and in forcing 
BGC to stop payment on numerous other checks were intentional, 
wrongful, malicious and/or in disregard of the rights of 
plaintiffs. 
70. As a direct and proximate result of CBT's wrongful 
dishonor, plaintiffs have and will continue to suffer damages. 
WHEREFORE, as a result of CBT's wrongful dishonor, plaintiffs 
are entitled to an award of compensatory damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial, punitive damages in the amount of $350,000.00 
each, interest as permitted by law, costs, attorneys' fees and such 
other relief as the Court may deem appropriate. 
cotmtr VJ:J::I 
(PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL - CBT) 
-~ 71. The preceding numbered paragraphs are incorporated herein 
by reference as if fully set forth. 
72. Rife, on behalf of CBT, misled the plaintiffs to believe 
that CBT would restructure their loans once Mr. Greever's 
bankruptcy case was closed when it had no intention of doing so. 
Rife also told the plaintiffs that CBT would give them notice of 
the interest payments due and never gave them any indication that 
CBT believed that the CBT Notes were in default or that CBT sought 
immediate payment under said notes. 
73. Receiving no notice that payments were due and reasonably 
relying on CBT's representations, plaintiffs continued to transfer 
funds and to make deposits to that account. 
17 
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7 4 • Without any notice to the plaintiffs, CBT wrongfully 
seized $23,325.00 from BGC's account on July 2, 1993, an additional 
$1,425.00 from that account the following week and four vehicles 
which served as collateral to the CBT Notes. 
75. As a direct and proximate result of plaintiffs' 
reasonable reliance on CBT's representations, plaintiffs have and 
will continue to suffer damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages in 
an amount to be determined at trial, interest as permitted by law, 
costs, attorneys fees and such other relief as the court may deem 
appropriate. 
COUNT IX 
{TORTIOUS INTE~ERENCE WITH BUSINESS EXPECTANCY - CBT) 
16. The preceding numbered paragraphs are incorporated herein 
by reference as if fully set forth. 
77. Knowing that it would continue to receive each day 
several bid solicitations for whic~ it was qualified and upon which 
... 
it could bid, BGC possessed a business expectancy that it .could 
successfully obtain several of those projects and benefit 
economically therefrom. 
78. CBT knew that BGC successfully qualified for and obtained 
bids in the past and that it expected to continue to obtain bids. 
79. CBT realized that BGC could not continue to accept bids 
if it did not have any working capital. CBT also knew that the 
working capital of BGC and Mr. Greever had been harmed due to the 
wrongful actions of TNB. 
18 
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so. CBT intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully and improperly 
andjor with conscious disregard for the rights of plaintiffs 
interfered with BGC's expectations of business and profits by 
seizing all of BGC's working.capital and several of its vehicles. 
81. It is reasonably certain that absent the wrongful actions 
of CBT, BGC would have obtained many projects from which it would 
have realized a profit. 
82. In seizing all of BGC's working capital and four of its 
vehicles, CBT intended to, and did, interfere with and disrupt 
BGC's prospective contracts, business relationships and economic 
gains. 
83. After CBT's actions, BGC no longer possessed the 
financial capability to undertake projects for which it received 
bid solicitations. Without the ability to undertake these 
projects, the company was destroyed because it could not generate 
revenue. 
84. The resulting demise of ~C's business forced Mr. Greever 
to discharge debts BGC would have otherwise satisfied because BGC 
lacked the financial ability to do so. 
85. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of CBT, 
plaintiffs have and will continue to suffer damages. 
WHEREFORE, as a result of CBT's wrongful taking of BGC's 
working capital and four of its vehicles, BGC's business was 
destroyed and Mr. Greever must now pay the obligations that BGC 
would otherwise pay, and plaintiffs are entitled to an award of 
compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial, 
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punitive damages in the amount of $350,000.00 each, interest as 
permitted by law, costs, attorneys' fees and such other relief as 
the Court may deem appropriate. 
comr.r x 
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS EXPECTANCY - CBT AND TNB) 
This Count is pled in the alternative to Counts I through IX. 
86. Paragraphs 1-15 and 50-61 are incorporated herein by 
reference as if fully set forth. 
87. Knowing that it would continue to receive several bid 
solicitations each day for which it was qualified and upon which it 
could bid, BGC possessed a business expectancy that it could 
successfully obtain several of those projects and benefit 
economically therefrom. 
SS. TNB and CBT knew that BGC successfully qualified for and 
obtained bids in .the past and that it expected to continue to 
obtain bids. 
89. In injuring the ability.of BGC and Mr. Greever to obtain 
credit and in seizing nearly all of BGC's working capital without 
notice and in breach of its representations, T.NB and CBT, 
respectively, intended to, and did, interfere with and disrupt 
BGC's prospective contracts, business relationships and economic 
gains. 
90. After TNB injured the ability of BGC and Mr. Greever to 
obtain credit and after CBT wrongfully seized nearly all of BGC's 
working capital, BGC no longer possessed the financial capability 
to undertake the projects for which it received bid solicitations. 
20 
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Without the ability to undertake projects, the company had no way 
of generating revenue, and thus its business was destroyed. 
91. In engaging in such conduct, the defendants 
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully and improperly andjor with 
conscious disregard for the rights of BGC interfered with BGC's 
expectations of business and profits. 
92. It is reasonably certain that absent TNB's destruction of 
the borrowing power of Mr. Greever and BGC and the seizure by CBT 
of BGC's working capital, BGC would have obtained many projects 
from which it would have realized a profit. 
93. The resulting demise of BGC's business forced Mr. Greever 
to discharge debts BGC would have otherwise satisfied because BGC 
lacked the ability to do so. 
§4. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of TNB 
and CBT, plaintiffs have and will continue to suffer damages. 
WHEREFORE, as a result of TNB's destruction of the ability of 
Mr. Greever and BGC to obtain credit and CBT's seizure of BGC's 
.. 
working capital, the banks destroyed BGC's business and plaintiffs 
are entitled to an award of compensatory damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial, punitive damages in the amount of $350,000.00 
each from each defendant, interest as permitted by law, costs, 
attorneys' fees and such other relief as the Court may deem 
appropriate. 
21 
BILL GREEVER CORPORATION 
BILL B. GREEVER, SR. 
By Counsel 
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B. Durrette, Jr. ( B #04719) 
Arn d c. Moore, Jr. (~ B #36774) 
DURRETTE, IRVIN & BRADSHAW, P.C. 
600 East Main Street, 20th Floor 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Telephone: (804) 780-0505 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Second Amended Motion for 
Judgment was mailed first-class, postage prepaid, to Robert F. 
Brooks and Jack R. Wilson, III, Hunton & Williams, Riverfront 
Plaza, East Tower, 951 East Byrd Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219-
4074, and to Stephen M. Hodges, Penn, Stuart, Eskridge & Jones, 
Post Office Box 2288, Abingdon, Virginia 24212-2288, on this~~ 
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TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK'S GROUNDS OF DEFENSE 
TO THE SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
The defendant, Tazewell National Bank ( 11 TNB") states the 
following as its grounds of defense to the second amended motion 
for judgment: 
1. TNB admits the allegations of paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
the second amended motion for judgment except that TNB is without 
-
sufficient information to admit the residency of Mr. Greever or his 
ownership of the stock of BGC, and calls for proof of same. 
2. The allegations of paragraphs 3 and 4 are admitted 
except that the allegations of paragraph 4 are incomplete in 
describing the terms of the collateral note and security agreement · 
documents of 1985 and 1988. Among other provisions, these notes 
were payable on demand. 
3. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 5, TNB 
states that the plaintiffs did not meet their obligations of 
repayment of the collateral note and security agreement. Mr. 
Greever discussed his and the corporation's inability to pay as 
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required with bank personnel and no enforcement action was taken on 
the note until 1992. There were no "oral agreements," but there 
was forbearance. 
4 • Responding to._ the allegations of paragraph 6, it is 
admitted that in late 1991 and early 1992, TNB requested that the 
loan be structured so as to be amortized over a ten-year period. 
It is denied that Mr. Paschall told the plaintiffs that they need 
not make principal payments at the end of the first quarter of 
1992. In fact, Mr. Paschall told the plaintiffs that they must 
complete the paperwork and sign the same to effect the restructur-
ing of the loan no later than March 27, 1992. Greever and BGC 
failed to do so. 
5. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 7, it is 
admitted that BGC and Greever paid interest on the loan at the end 
of the first quarter of 1992. Otherwise, paragraph 7 is denied. 
6. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 8, it is 
admitted that TNB wrote the letter dated March 20, 1992 which is 
Exhibit B to the second amended motion for judgment. It is denied 
that TNB required Greever's wife to execute all loan documents. It 
is unknown . to TNB whether Mrs. Greever was employed by or a 
shareholder of BGC or her relationship with BGC. TNB denies all 
allegations of paragraph 8 that would characterize Exhibit B, 
beyond its express terms as set out. 
7. Responding to paragraph 9, TNB admits it received a 
letter dated March 26, 1992 from Mr. McClintock, in the form 
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attached as Exhibit c. TNB denies all characterizations of Exhibit 
c beyond its express terms as set out. 
8. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 10, TNB 
admits it wrote Exhibit D t~ Mr. Greever but denies the character-
izations of Exhibit D, beyond its express ·terms as set out. 
9. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 11, TNB 
admits it began the process to initiate foreclosure proceed~ngs 
against the collateral after Greever and BGC failed to restructure 
their loan. The loan was a demand loan and was in default at the 
time the foreclosure proceedings were initiated. It is denied that 
Greever was "forced" to seek bankruptcy protection, and it is 
denied that Greever's inability to obtain a loan was 11 a result of 
TNB's actions." 
10. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 12, TNB is 
not informed about BGC's or Greev~r's attempts to borrow money, and 
calls for proof. All other allegations of paragraph 12 are denied. 
11. TNB is not informed about the allegations of 
paragraph 13 and calls for proof. 
12. TNB is not informed about the allegations of 
paragraph 14. and calls for proof. TNB denies it made any "slander-
ous statements" about BGC or Greever. 
13. The allegations of paragraph 15 are denied. 




15. The allegations of paragraphs 17 through 2 3 are 
denied. 
16. Responding to paragraph 24, TNB does not know the 
financial status of BGC ~d calls for proof. TNB denies its 
actions caused any decline in the fortunes of BGC. 
17. The allegations of paragraphs 25 through 27 and the 
prayer of Count I are denied. 
18. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 28, TNB 
incorporates its previous responses. 
19. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 29, the 
loan was past due. Plaintiffs were in default. Their loan had 
been called for payment and was unpaid at the time TNB took action 
to collect. 
20. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 30, TNB 
states that Exhibit A to the sepond amended motion for judgment 
speaks for itself. TNB denies that TNB "required the signature of 
Mrs. Greever" except upon the deed of trust, and states that 
requesting Mrs. Greever to sign legal documents did not violate any 
contract among the parties or the ECOA. Mrs. Greever did not sign 
any documents in 1992. 
21. The allegations of paragraphs 31, 32 and the prayer 
of Count II are denied. 
22. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 33, TNB 
incorporates its previous responses. 
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23. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 34, TNB 
admits that § 8.01-203 and Title 8.3A are parts in the Code of 
Virginia. TNB denies that those sections pertain to the transac-
tions described in the secapd amended motion for judgment. 
24. The allegations of paragraph 35 are admitted. 
25. The allegations of paragraphs 36, 37, 38 and the 
prayer of Count III are denied. 
26. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 39, TNB 
incorporates its previous responses. 
27. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 40, TNB 
admits that the statute (ECOA) and regulation cited therein are a 
part of the law of the United States and have the general purpose 
alleged. 
28. TNB denies the allegations of paragraph 41. 
29. The allegations of paragraphs 42, 43, 44 and the 
prayer of Count IV denied. 
30. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 45, TNB 
incorporates its previous responses. 
31. The allegations of paragraphs 46, 47, 48, 49 and the 
prayer of Count V are denied. 
32. The allegations of paragraphs 50 through 85 do not 
pertain to TNB and require no response from it. 
33. Responding to the allegations of paragraph 86, TNB 
incorporates its previous responses. 
27 
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34. The allegations of paragraphs 87, 88, and 89 are 
denied. 
35. Responding to paragraph 90, TNB does not know the 
financial status of BGC, an~ calls for proof. TNB denies that its 
activities caused BGC's business decline. 
36. The allegations of paragraphs 91, 92, 93, 94 and the 
prayer of Count X are denied. 
37. All allegations throughout the second amended motion 
for judgment not expressly admitted are denied. 
38. Counts I, III, IV and X are barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
39. In June, 1992, Bill B. Greever, Sr., filed a petition 
under the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the ·Western District of Virginia. The 
petition ultimately resulted in a confirmed plan of reorganization 
pursuant to Chapter 11. All claims asserted against TNB in this 
action, if valid, would be assets of Greever's bankruptcy estate. 
Greever never listed these claims as assets, never disclosed them 
to his creditors or otherwise mentioned them in any way throughout 
his protrac~ed bankruptcy proceedings. Greever lacks standing to 
bring the claims asserted in the second amended motion for judgment 
and the claims are now barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 
40. The contracts alleged by the plaintiffs lack consideration. 




42. Neither plaintiff has sustained compensable losses in 
the amounts claimed. 
43. TNB's activities were not the cause of any of the 
alleged losses to either p~~intiff. 
TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK 
By Counsel 
,..~ By~~~~~--~~--------~~---
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing has 
been mailed to Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr., Esq. and Jack R. Wilson, 
III, Esq., this 7th day of February, 
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TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK'S SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 3:18 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia, the defendant, Tazewell National Bank ("TNB"), moves 
the court for summary judgment in its favor upon the following 
grounds: 
1. One of the plaintiffs, Bill Greever, Sr., sought and 
received a discharge of all debts under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code after the occurrence of the events set out in the 
amended motion for judgment without disclosing the claims to the 
court or his creditors. See Exhibit A, attached, Plaintiffs' 
Response to TNB' s Second Request for Admissions. The claims 
asserted in this suit are barred under principles of ~ judicata, 
because they were not asserted or even disclosed in the bankruptcy 
case. 
2. All of the claims asserted by Mr. Greever result from 
the failure of Bill Greever Corporation ("BGC") • Mr. Greever 
alleges that he is the president and sole shareholder of BGC. BGC 
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seeks $523,740 damages under the theory that the activities of the 
two defendant banks caused a complete failure of BGC, rendered it 
worthless, and caused it a loss of profit. See Exhibit B, 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Answers to Tazewell National Bank's 
First Set of Interrogatories. 
In addition to the damages sought by BGC, Mr. Greever 
personally seeks damages of $481,342, for BGC's debts that he says 
he is obligated to pay. See Exhibit B. All of the claims derive 
from the financial failure of BGC. 
Mr. Greever has no standing to sue for the consequences 
of the failure of BGC. Any claims resulting from the failure of 
BGC belong to BGC, not Mr. Greever, its sole shareholder. 
Recoveries by both BGC and Mr. Greever on the claims asserted would 
result in a double recovery. 
3 • TNB relies upon the pleadings and the plaintiffs' 
responses for TNB's interrogatories and requests for admission, 
Exhibits A and B. There is no genuine issue of material fact 
bearing on any issue raised by this motion. 
4. TNB is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on 
all claims. 
Wherefore TNB moves for summary judgment in its favor. 
31. 
TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK 
By Counsel 
PENN, STUART, ESKRIDGE & JONES 
P.O. Box 2288 
Abingd~Virginia 24212 
By~~·~ teenM: Hodges 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing has 
been mailed to Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr., Esq. and Jack R. Wilson, 
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At Law No. CL94000100 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO TNB 1 S SECOND REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
Plaintiffs, Bill Greever Corporation and Bill B. Greever, 
Sr., by counsel, and respond to Defendant Tazewell National Bank's 
second request for admissions as follows: 
1. Bill Greever, Sr. never disclosed to the bankruptcy court 
or to his creditors the nature or existence of any of the specific 
claims asserted in this case against TNB. 
RESPONSE: Admitted. Bill Greever, Sr. specifically stated in 
his plan that he was preserving all of his causes of action. 
2. Bill Greever, sr. 's Chapter 11 plan of reorganization was 
confirmed by the bankruptcy court and a discharge was granted by 
the order attached entered March 21, 1994. 
RESPONSE: Admitted. 
BILL GREEVER CORPORATION AND 






Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr. (VSB 
Arnold c. Moore, Jr. (VSB 
Durrette, Irvin & Bradsh 
Twentieth Floor 
Main street Centre 
600 East Main Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Telephone: (804) 780-0505 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that Plaintiffs' Response to TNB's Second 
Request for Admissions was mailed first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, to Robert F. Brooks and Jack R. Wilson, III, Hunton & 
W~lliams, Riverfront Plaza, East Tower, 951 East Byrd Street, 
Richmond, Virginia 23219-4074, and to Stephen M. Hodges, Penn, 
Stuart, Eskridge & Jones, Post Office Box 2288, Abingdon, Virginia 
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TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF ITS SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I ' 
The defendant Tazewell National Bank ("TNB") has moved 
for summary judgment on the grounds that the claims asserted by 
Bill Greever, Sr. ("Greever") are barred under principles of res _ 
judicata because they were not asserted or dis~losed in Greever's 
bankruptcy case, and on grounds that Greever lacks standing to 
assert the claims, and that Greever's personal claims are an 
attempt to secure a double recovery. This memorandum is in support 
of TNB's motion. 
Facts 
Greever filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code on June 3, 1992. See Notice of Commencement of 
Case under Chapter 11 attached as Exhibit A. The debt owed by Bill 
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Greever Corporation ("BGC") to TNB was listed as a secured claim on 
Schedule D of Greever's bankruptcy petition. See Schedule D -
Creditors Holding Secured Claims attached as Exhibit B. The debt 
to TNB was not contested and payment of the debt was dealt with in 
the Chapter 11 proceeding. Plaintiff's Answers to TNB's Second Set 
of Interrogatories, No. 7. 
Paragraph 20 of Schedule B to Greever's bankruptcy 
petition required him to identify "other contingent and 
unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax refunds, 
counterclaims of the debtor, and rights to setoff claims." Greever 
answered that he had no assets that fell within this category. See 
Schedule B Personal Property attached as Exhibit c. 
Additionally, Greever has admitted that he never disclosed to the 
bankruptcy court or to his creditors the nature or existence of any 
of the specific claims asserted in this case against TNB. 
Plaintiff's Response to TNB's Second Request for Admissions, No. 
Greever's Chapter 11 plan of reorganization·was·confir.med 
by the bankruptcy court and a discharge was g~~nted by an order 
entered March 21, 1994. Plaintiff's Response to TNB' s Second 
1. Greever says that he "stated in his plan that he was 
preserving all of his causes of action." 
2 
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Request for Admissions, No. 2. This action was filed on April 22, 
1994. 
The claims asserted by Mr. Greever result from the 
failure of BGC. Mr. Greever alleges that he is the president and 
sole shareholder of BGC. BGC seeks $529,000 damages in this action 
under the theory that the activities of the two defendant banks 
caused a complete failure of BGC and rendered it worthless. 
In addition to the damages sought by BGC, Mr. Greever 
personally seeks damages of $481,341, for BGC's debts that he says 
he is obligated to pay. He also seeks $60,931 for bankruptcy costs 
and alleged losses. All of the claims derive from the financial 
failure of BGC. 
Argument and Authorities 
1. All claims are barred by ~ judicata. 
All lender liability c1aims that could have been raised 
during ~he pendency of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, but were not, 
are barred under principles of res judicata·; Sure--Snap Com. v. 
State Street Bank and Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869. (2nd Cir. 1991); 
Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3rd 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 967 (1988); Eubanks v. Federal 
Deposit Ins. Corp., 977 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Howe, 913 
F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1990); Southmark Properties v. Charles House 
Corp., 742 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1984); Sanders Confectionery 
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Products, Inc. v. Heller Financial, Inc., 973 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); Heritage Hotel Limited 
Partnership I v. Valley Bank of Nevada, 160 B.R. 374 (Bankr. 9th 
Cir. 1993), aff'd 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15600 (9th Cir. 1995); and, 
Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
Res judicata has the following elements: 
1. A final decision on the merits by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
2. Both suits must involve the same parties, or their 
privies. 
3. The second action must involve the same cause of 
action or claim as the first action. 
Sanders Confectionery, 973 F.2d at 480; Howe, 913 F.2d at 
1143. 
An "order confirming a plan of reorganization is a 'final 
j udgmen:t on the merits' for purposes of res judicata." In re 
Grimm, 168 B.R. 102, 110 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994). "[C]onfirmation 
of a plan acts to bar attempts by the parties to Felitigate any of 
the matters that could have been raised during the bankruptcy 
proceedings." Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 
848 F.2d 414, 417 (3rd Cir. 1988). Thus, the March 21, 1994 order 
entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western 
District of Virginia confirming Greever's reorganization plan was 
4 
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a final judgment on the merits that satisfies that the first 
element of res judicata. 
Greever was the debtor in the bankruptcy action and is a 
plaintiff in this action. TNB was a creditor in Greever's 
bankruptcy case. ~though BGC was not a party to the bankruptcy 
action, its claims in this action are also barred by reS judicata 
because it is in privity with Greever. Sanders Confectionery, 973 
F.2d at 480; Southmark Properties, 742 F.2d at 870. 
Greever was the sole shareholder and president of BGC. 
Much of the debt that was listed by Greever was debt owed by BGC 
and personally guaranteed by Greever. The plaintiffs claim that 
the finances of Greever and BGC were intertwined. 
The bankruptcy severely harmed the strength of 
his [Greever's] signature as a co-obligor or 
guarantor of BGC's obligations. TNB knew BGC 
relied upon Mr. Greever as a co-obligor or 
guarantor of its debts and that injury to Mr. 
Greever's credit would hurt BGC and its 
ability to obtain credit. 
Second ~ended Motion for Judgment, ! 22. 
[A]s a result of TNB's wrongful initiation of 
foreclosure proceedings and its damage to the 
ability of BGC and Mr. Greever to obtain 
credit, BGC' s business was damaged and Mr. 
Greever must now pay the obligations that BGC 
would otherwise have paid . • . . 
Seconded Amended Motion for Judgment, page 7. 
Greever and BGC allege that the ~foreclosure proceedings 
and subsequent bankruptcy of Mr. Greever injured the credit and 
business of Mr. Greever and BGC, which relied upon Mr. Greever's 
5 
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signature and guarantee in entering into agreements." Second 
Amended Motion for Judgment, ~ 36. The plaintiffs also claim that 
"[a]fter TNB injured the ability of BGC and Mr. Greever to obtain 
credit and after CBT wrongfully seized nearly all of BGC's working 
capital, BGC no longer possessed the financial capability to 
undertake the projects for which it received bid solicitations." 
Second Amended Motion for Judgment, ~ 90. 
As can be seen, the plaintiffs have repeatedly staked out 
the position that their financial affairs are intertwined. This is 
fatal to their case because of Greever's failure to assert his 
claims in bankruptcy. 
In bankruptcy, "a non-party is adequately 
represented where a party in a prior suit is so closely aligned to 
her interests as to be her virtual representative." Eubanks v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 977 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992). BGC 
and Greever have the same overall.interest in this case and in the 
bankruptcy. BCG is, therefore, a privy of Greever, and is barred 
from bringing this action by ~ judicata. 
In Sure-Snap Corp. v. State Street Ba~k and Trust Co., 
948 F. 2d 869 (2nd Cir. 1991), the court analyzed whether the 
bankruptcy action and the lender liability action were based on the 
same cause of action or claim. Sure-Snap borrowed money from State 
Street. Even though Sure-Snap was not in default, State Street 
terminated the loan and requested immediate payment. Sure-Snap 
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filed bankruptcy, and its plan for reorganization was confirmed. 
Later Sure-Snap filed a lender liability action alleging breach of 
contract, interference with corporate governance and tortious 
interference with business relationship. 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's 
dismissal on res judicata grounds, holding that the lender 
liability claims could have been litigated in the bankruptcy 
proceedings, and that the two claims arose from the same 
transaction. "Sure-Snap's very allegation that [State Street's] 
tortious conduct negatively influenced their business' health, 
makes it hard-pressed to explain how the two causes of action - the 
plan of reorganization and the lender liability claim - did not 
comprise the same essential matter ... Sure-Snap, 948 F.2d at 875. 
The plaintiffs in this case are just as hard-pressed. 
The lender liability claims asserted in this action were 
not scheduled as an asset of Greever's bankruptcy estate, nor were 
they disclosed in the plan of reorganization or disclosure 
statement. The plan specifically treated Greever's debt to TNB as 
an allowed secured claim. Greever did not object to TNB's claim. 
In fact he acknowledged its validity. 
All of the elements of res judicata are present in this 
action, and all claims against TNB are barred. 
7 
41. 
2. Bill Greever, Sr. lacks standing and 
asserts claims that, if sustained, would 
result in a double recovery.· 
Although in some of the counts Greever alleges direct 
wrongs against him, with one exception, all of the losses for which 
compensation is sought are losses of BGC. If BGC is awarded the 
damages sought, complete compensation will be had. For the most 
part, Greever's personal claims are an attempt to gain a double 
recovery. 
The plaintiff's Fourth Supplemental Answers to Tazewell 
National Bank's First Interrogatories tell the story. Exhibit B to 
TNB's second motion for summary judgment. There it is disclosed 
that the damages claims are the same for all five counts against 
TNB. They consist of the following elements: 
Alleged devaluation (~destruction") 
of BGC 
Alleged lost profits of BGC 
Alleged payments of BGC debt 
by Mr. Greever (paid and 
unpaid) 
Alleged costs and losses in 






As can be seen, only the bankruptcy loss claims are 
independent of the alleged losses of BGC. 
Only a corporation has standing to sue for losses to the 





Keepe v. Shell Oil Co., 220 Va. 587, 260 S.E.2d 722 
Mr. Greever is the sole shareholder and co-signer for 
BGC. He claims that TNB's actions caused harm to "BGC's business" 
which "forced Mr. Greever to discharge debts BGC would have 
otherwise satisfied because BGC lacked the financial ability to do 
so." Second Amended Motion for Judgment, CJI 26. 
This case vividly illustrates why corporate claims belong 
to the corporation and not its owners or guarantors. Any other 
rule would invite the "double dip" that BGC and Greever are 
attempting in this case. 
BGC says that TNB's and CBT's actions caused its complete 
financial collapse, rendering it worthless. It says its "before" 
value was $480,900, and that its "after" value was zero. It asks 
to be awarded this amount as compensatory damages. On top of BGC's 
claim for complete "destruction," Greever seeks $484,342 for 
expenses of BGC he says he has paid or will pay, mostly the latter. 
If awarded, Greever's claims would be a double dip. If the total 
value of BGC is awarded to it, all losses are compensated. As the 
plaintiffs admit, BGC would have paid its debts if not for its 
"destruction" for which it seeks full compensation in this case. 
9 
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In short, BGC effectively sues for all losses when it 
sues for its full market value. 2 A corporation's market value 
encompasses all of its positive and negative features, including 
debt. BGC would not be entitled to judgment for its complete 
market value ~ its debt, as the latter is subsumed in the 
former. 
BGC and Greever cannot compound claims in a manner 
forbidden to BGC. Economically, Greever, the owner, will be fully 
compensated if the corporation is fully compensated. His asset, 
the corporation, is enhanced dollar for dollar by any recovery to 
BGC in this case. Th~ recovery the corporation seeks would be a 
complete recovery. The restoration of the economic status gyQ of 
BGC answers all claims related to the corporation, including 
Greever's claims. 
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment should be 
granted in favor of TNB for all -claims asserted by Bill Greever, 
Sr., other than the alleged costs and losses in his bankruptcy. 
2. For the same reason, the claims for loss of total 
value ~nd lost profits are a separate double dip asserted by BGC, 




For the foregoing reasons, the court should grant TNB's 
second motion for summary judgment and dismiss all claims against 
TNB. 
PENN, STUART, ESKRIDGE & JONES 
P.O. Box 2288 
TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK 
By Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing has 
been mailed to Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr., Esq. and Jack R. Wilson, 
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FORH 89£ United States Bank"4ltcy Court NOTICE OF CQKI'.ENCEMENT Of CASE UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE 
6/90 WESTERN DISTRitT VIRGINIA BAHKRUPTCY CXOE, MEETING Of ~EDITORS, AND FIXING OF DATES 
case ,.l.llber: 92·013 HPA-11 (Individual or Jo1nt Oebtor Case) 
Addressee: Address of the Clerk of the Bank~tcy Court 
210 CHURCH AVE. SV 
P .0. BOX 2390 
ROANOKE, VA 24010 
llaae enc:t Address of Trustee 
• DEBTOI Ill POSSESSION 
FILING CLAIMS 
If .the court seta a deadlfne for fllfna a proof of clal•, you "Ill be notified. 
. . · .. ~ .. .:;. : .. 
Telephone lh . aber 
COMKENCEKENT OF CASE. A petltl . anfzatlon uder chapter U.of the Blnk~tcy Code has been filed fn this court by or 
against the person or ~rsons named above as the debtor, end an order for re\lef has been entered. You wilt not receive notice 
of aU docuall:nts filed In thla case. All docuDents flleCI "lth the court1 tnclu:llng l tats of the debtor's property, debts, and property claimed as ex~t are available for Inspection at tho office or the clerk of the ~tcy court. 
CREDITORS MAY .. OT TAKE CERTAIII ACTIONS. A creditor fa ~ to lflaa the debtor owes money or property. ·lkder the Bank~tC) 
Code, the debtor Is granted certain protection asalnst creditors. Ccamon exaq»les of prohibited actions by creditors are •. 
contacting the debtor to demancS ,..yment, taking action against the debtor .to collect money CKHd to creditors or to take 
property of the debtor, end starting or contlnJina foreclosure actions, repossessions, or wage deductions. If ~.muthorlzed 
actlans are ·taken by a creditor against a debtor, the court lilY ~Uze that creditor. A creditor who Is considering takfna 
action against the debtor or the p~~ of th,e debtor should revlev I 362 of the Bankrq)tcy Code and may wish to seet lesat 
advice. The staff of the clerk of the ba~tcy court Ia not peraitted to 1ive legal edvlce. 
IIEETING OF CREDITORS. The debtor (both husbancl and "ffe In a Joint case) fs required to appear at the meeting of creditors en 
the date ancS at t&e place set forth above for the .~e of bel~ uaaalned uxier oath. Attendance by creditors at the meetlnsa 
fs welcc:aed, 1M: not ~fred. At the meeting, the crldltors may aaine ·the debtor. end transact such ather business as eay 
~rly come before the ~eetlna. The meetlng.~~ay be contlru:d or ecljoumed fi"OII tf11e to time by notice at the meeting, lrithout 
further ~~rftten notice to the creditors. 
EXEMPT PROPERTY. UncSer state and federal law, the debtor Is ~raltted to keep certain money or property as exeapt. If a creditor 
believes that an exeaptlan of money or ~rty Is not authorized 1rt law, the creditor my file en obJection. An cbjectlon lUSt 
be filed not later than 30 days after· the eonclusfon.of the meeting of creditors. • . 
DISCHARGE OF DEBTS. ':rhe debtor my seek a discharge of debts. A discharse meMS that certain debts ere lade ~nenforceable 
against the debtor personally. Creditors •ose clef• asalnst the debtor are disCharged may never take action against the debtor 
to collect the diseharsed debts. If a creditor believes that the debtor should not.recelve a discharge Ln:ler 1 1141(d)(3)(C) of 
the Banl:n.,tcy Code, timely actJon ast be. taken In the bank~~ court In accordance "lth Bantn.,tcy Rule 4004Ca). If a credf· 
tor believes that a debt oiled fo' the creditor Is not dischar;eible u.ier I 523(.11)(2)1. (4), or (6) of the.Bankn.,tcy Code, timel) 
·action mst be taten·tn the ~tcy court W the deadl fne set forth above In the Dox labeled IIOischarge of Debts.• Creditors 
considering taking such action -.y wish to •eek te;al edvfce. • . . · . : · · 
PROOF OF CLAIM. Schedules of creditors have been or will be filed p.nuant to B~tc:Y Rule 1007. Arrt credftor holdj~ a 
scheduled clal• ..talch fa not Usted as disputed,. conttnsent; or t.nU~Idated as to arDOW"at may, but Is not required to, file a 
~f of clala In this case. Creditors ld1ose claim are not acheckaled or W.ose clalras are Uated as disputed, contingent, or 
U\ll~ldated as to amcu\t end lilo desire to participate In the case or share fn any distribution mst file their proofs of 
clal•. A creditor ..tao desires to rely on the schedules of creditors has the responsibility for detenalning that the ctal11 Is 
listed accurately. The place to file a proof of clal111 either In J»erson or by mil, Ia the office of the clerk of the bankn.ptc, CCU"t. Proof of ctala fon:s are a*i table In the clen:•s office of wrt bantn.ptcy court • 
. IURPQSe: OF.cfcAPm 11 FILING. Chlq)ter 11 of the a8nk~tcy Code enables a debtor to reoriantze pursuant to • plan. A plan fs not 
effectivi c.1lesa approved by the court at a confirmation hearing. Creditors will be given -notice concemlns eny pliWl, or In the 
event 'the case Is dismissed or· eonverted to another. chapter .of the Bant~tcy Code. The debtor will remain In possession of Its 
prC!()erty enc:llffU contlhJO to operate any business u.tess a trustee Is ~~RX»inted. 
IIOTI~ OF DI~ISSAL· FOR FAILURE 0~ DEBTOR TO APPEAR AT THE "341 MEETING VILL BE ANNOUNCED AT THE 341 MEETING. 
PROOF Of CLAIMS AltB-r TO 8~ fiLED. UITH .THE CCURT AND A COPY MUST AL~ BE fiLED VITH THE TRUSTEE NAMED: ABOVE. 
Forthet~=------~~~JM~N~V~·~t~·~Q~A~IG~.~~~~~~i ____ __ 












1D re: BILL GREEVER 
c ,...-... f . 
Case No.: 
...tJ!. SCHEDULED· CREDITORS HOLDING SECLJ~t CLAIMS -
... . ' 
-· 
Creditor' a name aNI complete mamn, addlas JDc:1w11nc zlp mde ~· .. Amount ol cla1m wUhout dedactlng Wlue ol caDatml 
Date dalm was ~named. mtme of Ben. ad descdpticn 
and awket value ol pmpaty subject to the 11m 
Unseazrecl portScn. Jf any 
Acco111lt aamber: 
CITIZENS BANK 
FOUR WAY SBOPPDIG CENTER Liable: Debtor 
~AZEWELL, ·VA 24651 . • • 
Natare of ba: LOAN ::-' . · ... 
aaJm Is: Contingent and un~iquidated. 
31,600.0 
16,600.0 
CoDataaldescdptloll:1987 LDtCOLN, 1988 ~ERBIRD, 2 1982 DODGE VANS 
CoDateral market value: 151 ~0 0. 0 0 
Accoat aamber: 
FXRST NATIONAL BANK 
500 FEDERAL Deb. t 
BLUEFIELD, WV 24701 Uable: or 
Claim Is: Fixed and liquidated. 
CoDate.ral descdptfo~t: STEEL BUILD:ING 
CoDateralmaiket ~ue: 2 00 1 000. 00. 




Acco111lt aamber: Amoat ~ c1alm: · 163 1 500. Ot 
~AZEWELL NATIONAL _BANX Uasecared: O.Oc 
P.O. BOX 909 . Uable·Debtor 
~AZEWELL,; VA 24651 • 
(703) 988-7511 
Nature of ba: DEED OF TRUST LOAN 
aa1m Is: contingent and unliquidated. 
CoDa~ descdptlo~t:REAL ESTATE BOND 
CoDateralmarket value: · . 17 5 1 0 0 0. 0 0 
-·· 
•. 











1D ze: BILL GREEVER 
I ·~ 
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Case No.: 




·. ·. ·:.· .-.:·.·.~~- :_~ -~ 
L--!""'-~~:=.=:::~::.::::=::.::~:.t=::l--------1--"---·madzt--value--ol-de_btm __ 's_JDterest __ ~Jn-·-pz-ot»t_tv_· __ ~l- .. =~., ~~ r-., WStboat cSecludlllg any securecl damm ~ aNI JocatScn ol property 1. C..l&oa!raL ....... •.· .::: : .. 
'~ .. · . 
CASH .·· 
Owller:Dehtor . ·~ Debtol'alllt.aat: · ·< .. ;. · .1, 000 • 00 . 
··.... . 
Total cle!Jt aa propedJ. .. . ~ ~:~ ~ :. · · · · .-· ~ .. 0. 00 ·.: :·~· 
· · l..ocatloa.:In debtor's possession. : ·":_.· . · .,.:.··~ · · . . ~,,~:=~~~~:··:·-·=··:··>'-:::::· .. ··<· ··· 
2. C!aeclrfnC. ...... •o«Mr'==clal~ca • ,catUICat.;.,~.-•'--k.__,..._._.-~-dldft.•idL!bic 
..atoa. _.tOm ••CUll .. odd .. , •a.llt ate.., .......... -..... • ooopmdlt-. 
·NONE 
a. Secadtr tlepodD wltla paWic adlltla, tet.,~aoae compala,lafllocU, ......... 
-NONE . · . 
4. 
THE REGULAR HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND P'tJRHJ:SBIHGS 
Owzaer:Debtor Debtoia lllterest: 
• Total clebt Oil propertr. 




5. Boob, plc:t111a, _. other art o~, adqaa, etamp, coiD,I'eCCd, tape. compact .U.c, ad ot!M:r coUecUODJ • coDectiWa. 
NONE ' 
6.w--.....-. 
.. THE REGULAR WEARING .APPAREL 
Owner: Debtor Debtoia lllterest: 
.. Total debt oa propertr. 
Locauon:In debtor's possession. 
7. Pan a4)eweh,. 
NONE 
8. Plranu _.lp0rt8, pllotop&pld~ IID4 odaer laoW., -.alpmat. 
GtJN. COLLECTION 
"" Owuer:Debtor Debtoia lllterest: 
Total debt Oil property: 
l..ocaUoa:In debtor's possession. 




- - ; - . ~ 













~ re: BILL GREEVER Case No.: 
J:RA 
~Debtor De~ofs~~ 
Total de~ 011 propezty: 
Po.aealoa: :tn debtor's possession. 
STATE FARM XNSTJRAHCE 
853 FDlCASTLE 
~EWELL, VA 24651 
12. Stock _.lllt••t.la ~..a ""'val'pCfttecl ._la••• 
~Debtor 'Debtoi• llltaest: 
:'Total debt ma propedg: 
Poaellloa: zn debtor's posseSsion. 
BILL GREEVER ·coRP. 
ROtJTE 5 BOX 268 ·. 
HORTa TAZEWELL, VA.24651 
i 
13. JatawetaiD pat:Daalalpe - Jolat ....... 
NONE 
15. Accocmte receha1de. 
.NONE 
16. Allmoar, m•1n•-•nce. eapport. -a pnpe:rlJ Httlaaaaalo w1alc1a tJae tle\t« Ia or mar .. adldeL 
NONE 
1o,·o~o 
· .. ~~o 
·!·.;::.:. 
. ·:~ ~::. 
.. ·.· .. ;.·.:·. 
. : 
18. Eqalt&W. or fatwoe lnta.t.,llfe atata, ud daJat8 or powen aadaa\t.lor dae Madlt of the tle\tor otlaer dian. tlaoH i 
Ia ScWale of Ral Paopatr. · 
NONE 
19. Coatmpat ai DOIICOQtlaaat batenet. Ia atate of a tlecciat. tlada HDdlt plan. life --.c. pollcr, or trait. 
NONE . 
-·· 20. OtMr coatlnaeat.u4 .Uqala.tell cWm. of Cft1J aatwe.lacla.llaa ta refaDM, coatac:Jalme of tbe tlebtor, .a dPD · 
Htolf clabu. 
NONE "" 
21. Pataa, ~. _. oda.lntellcctul propatr. 
NONE 
22. ucca.., ~racw ... _. ocJaer sCMDJ ~-
. :: __,.__ -· - ::. NONE 
,. . 
- . 





Owaer:Debtor. Debtois IDtereSf: 6,000. 
.· . ·. 
: -~. : 
:·. 
49 
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c r 0 
JD re: BILL GREEVER Case No.: 
Total debt Oil property: 
LocaUoD:Xn debtor's possession. 
1988 THONDERBIRD 
-O.Uer:Debtor Debtoia IDte.rat: 
Total debt Oil property~ 
Locaaoa:In debtor's possession. 
24. Bo&ta, aoton, _. acc.e~ 
NONE 




27. Mac:laiDar.~.-.a~....-. ... nppu..wec~lll1aatiMM. NONE . 
28. ~aat..,. 
NONE 
29 • .w.at. .. 
NONE 
SO. Crop.-~ orlaanat..t. 
NONE 
31. Fumlzli eqalpmat ad Imp~.,. 
NONE 
33. Other pcnoul p1opatr of_, Jda&laot alna4r U.tccl. 
NONE 
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BILL B. GREEVER, SR. , 
Plaintiffs, 
v. At Law No. CL94000l.OO 
TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANX, 
a Virqinia banking corporation 
and 
CITIZENS BANK OF TAZEWELL 
a Virqinia banking corporation 
Defendants. 
RBSPQ!JSB TO 'l'!fB Is SBCQ:tm HO'J:];OI lOB StJHQBY JUDGMENT 
Bill Greever Corporation ("BGC") and Bill B. Greever Sr. ("Mr. 
Greever") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), by counsel, respectfully 
request that this Court deny the SEtcond Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by Tazewell National Bank ("T.NBn). As set forth below, TNB 
is erroneously attemptinq to relitiqate a final order of the 
bankruptcy court. It is also wronqfully claiminq that it is not 
liable for the injuries it intentionally caused Mr. Greever. 
PAQTB 
The Disclosure Statement Relating to Bill Greever and Plan 
Pursuant to Chapter 11 states: 
[H]othing in this plan would waive any and all 
of the debtors riqhts to hrinq in [sic] action 
against any party or parties which the debtor 
believes may be indebted to the debtor for any 
causes of action that may exist pre-petition. 
The purpose of this Chapter ll plan is not to 
51. 
settle or waive any of those causes of action 
but to preserve all of those if bringing the 
same is determined by the debtor to be 
necessary in the future. 
at 14-15. ·A copy is attached as Exhibit A. 
The Plan of Reorganization of Bill Greeyer ("Confirmation 
Plan") states: 
Any adversary proceeding presently pending or 
to be commenced in the future against various 
individuals or entities shall remain as a 
property right of the debtor and shall in no 
way be waived or affected by the Plan or 
Disclosure Statement filed herewith. 
I,g. at 9. A copy is attached as Exhibit B, along with amendments 
to the plan. The Confirmation Plan was confirmed by order of the 
bankruptcy court dated March 21, 1994. A copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit c. 
As set forth in the Second Amended Motion for Judgment, TNB 
intentionally sought to injure both BGC, a corporation, and Bill 
Greever, an individual. As delineated in Plaintiffs' Fourth 
supplemental Answers to TNB's Interrogatories, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit D, the damages suffered by Mr. Greever are 
injuries to him, not injuries to the property of BGC or injuries to 
him in his capacity as a shareholder of BGC. 
Summary judgment is a "drastic remedy" which is available 
only where there are no material facts genuinely in dispute. Slone 
v. General Motors Corp., 249 Va. 520, 522 (1995) (emphasis added). 
Upon consideration of such a motion, the Court must ••state the 
2 
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facts and adopt inferences from those facts in :th~ liqht most 
favorable to ( ] the non-moving party, •• unless the inferences are 
strained, forced or contrary to reason. ,Ig. Where the evidence is 
in conflict, it is for the jury, not the court, to resolve the 
conflict. Five Lakes. Inc. v. Bandall. Inc., 214 Va. 4, 5 (1973). 
;apQIJMBNi' 
1. P1ainti~~•' a1aims are aot ba.rre4 b7 rea judicata. 
TNB can not relitigate in this action the provisions of the 
confirmation Plan of Mr. Greever which expressly provide for the 
preservation of all of Mr. Greever's claims. By federal statute, 
the provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any entity 
issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property 
under the plan, and any creditor, equity security holder, or 
general partner in the debtor. 11 o.s.c. § 1141(a). An order 
confirming a plan ·of reorganization is a "final judgment on the 
merits.H In re Grimm, 168 B.R. 102, 110-111 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1994). ~ TNB's Memorandum in SUpport of its Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment ( 11TNB Memo11 ) at 4. Thus, TNB is barred from 
relitigating the provisions of the Confirmation Plan. 
The court in In Re Penn-Dixie Industries. Inc., 32 B.R. 173 
(S.D.N.Y 1983), held that res judicata and estoppel bar a creditor 
from trying to relitiqate issues in a later action where it failed 
to object to the provisions of the plan addressing the issues and 
failed to appeal the confirmation order. ~. at 177. In Penn-
Dixie, two counties sought to revise a confirmation order so that 
3 
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they could receive certain taxes from the sale of property owned by 
the debtor. ,Ig. at 175. The proceeds of the sale had been 
allocated in the confirmation order. The court ruled that the 
counties were barred by res judicata and estoppel from raising 
their claims because the counties had failed to raise any motion 
regarding this matter durinq the reorganization and failed to make 
_any appeal. ~. at 177-79. The court held that the counties could 
not contest this issue more than a year after the plan was 
confirmed even thouqh they may have been entitled to receive full 
payment had they objected earlier. ~. at 179. 
In Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F. 2d 1.046 (5th Cir. 
1987), the court of appeals ruled that a creditor who was a party 
to a confirmed plan could not collaterally attack provisions of the 
plan in a later action where the creditor had failed to object to 
the provisions of the plan at the hearinq held prior to the final 
confirmation and had failed to appeal the confirmation order. ~­
at 1048-1050. The creditor was claiminq that the confirmation plan 
.. 
erroneously released shareholders and officers of the debtor from 
personal quarantees they had executed for the creditor. zg. at 
1048. The court held that the creditor was barred from asking the 
court to review the confirmation plan on the merits even if the 
terms of the plan exceeded the authority of the court because the 
creditor chose not to appeal the confirmation plan directly. ~. 
at 1050. 
Similarly, in In Re Bowen, 174 B.R. 840, 847 (S.D. Ga. 1994), 
the court held that the bindinq effect of a confirmed plan of 
4 
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reorqanization _is such that res judicata applies even when the plan 
contains provisions which are arguably contrary to applicable law. 
Therefore, it dismissed the creditor's challenges to the content of 
the confirmed plan. ,Ig. 
In accordance with the applicable law set forth above, TNB is 
forever barred from contestinq the terms of Mr. Greever's Confirmed 
Plan. The cases it cites in its Memo at 3-4 support the principal 
that a confirmed plan in a Chapter 11 case is a final judgment on 
the merits. 1 The confirmation Plan specifically preserves all of 
Mr. Greever's causes of action. Thus, TNB cannot relitiqate the 
terms of the plan today, almost two years later. TNB did not 
object to the provisions of the plan at issue prior to the 
confirmation, nor did.it appeal the Confirmation Plan. It had 
notice of the provisions of the plan prior and subsequent to its 
confirmation. As such, TNB waived its riqhts to contest the plan, 
and it is estopped and forever barred from relitiqatinq the issues 
adjudicated in that forum. 
2. llr. ar .. ver has Standing for the Injuries Be has Suffered 
aa tJw aaault of ftlB'• Wrongful Aaticma. 
TNB souqht to injure Mr. Greever and BGC. It was successful 
in harminq both. As set forth in Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental 
Answers to TNB's First l:nterroqatories, Hr. Greever and BGC 
suffered different damages. Exhibit D. Therefore, both are 
entitled to recover. 
1 Hone of the confirmed plans at issue in the cases cited 
by TNB contained a provision preservinq the debtor's riqht to 
maintain actions. Therefore, they are inapposite. 
5 
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Keepe v. Shell Oil Co., 220 Va. 587, 591 (1979), is 
inapposite. In Eeepe stockholders of a corporation claimed they 
possessed legal standinq to assert claims, based upon their status 
as stockholders, for injuries done to the corporation and the 
corporation's property. The shareholders were trying to contend 
that the corporation could recover for its injuries and that they, 
_as shareholders, could also recover for those same injuries to the 
corporation. The court ruled that they lacked standing to recover 
for injuries to the corporation because the corporation was a 
distinct entity. The court also ruled that a guarantor could not 
have standing where there was no allegation that he personally 
incurred damages. Id. 
Mr. Greever filed this action as an individual for damaqes he 
suffered, as an individual, as a proximate result of TNB's wrongful 
actions which were desiqned to harm him. Be did not file this 
lawsuit as a shareholder of BGC for injuries to property of BGC. 
It is coincidental that he is a sha-reholder of BGC. Thus, there is 
no "double dipping, " as THB wronqfully asserts. If Mr. Greever 
sought to recover for damages TNB caused BGC, TNB' s argument might 
have some weight. However, Mr. Greever's damaqes are personal to 
him and separate from those of the corporation. Therefore, TNB's 
attempt to analogize JCeepe to the case at hand is unpersuasive and 
lacks merit. 
COBCI.U8%0B 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully 
request that the Court overrule T.NB's Second Motion for Summary 
6 
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Judgment and grant Plaintiffs such other relief as the Court may 
deem appropriate. 
BILL GREEVER CORPORATION 




DURRETTE I IRVIN & BRADS . I p. c. 
600 East Main Street, 20th Floor 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Telephone: (804) 780-0505 
CEBTIFICATE OF SEBVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Response to TNB's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Robert F. Brooks and Jack R. Wilson, III, Hunton & 
Williams, Riverfront Plaza, East_ Tower, 951 East Byrd Street, 
.. 
Richmond, Virqinia 23219-4074, and sent via facsimile and via hand 
delivery by overnight courier to stephen H. Hodges, Penn, Stuart, 
Eskridge & Jones, Post Office Box 2288, Abingdon, Virginia 24212-
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{ ABINGDON DIVISION · .' 
BILL GREEVER 
~ute 5, Box 368 








CASE NO. 7-92-01327-IPA-11 
ORDER APPROVlHO piSctOSURS STA;EMEN;;* 
FIXING TIM§ TOR FILING OBJECTIONS ~ CONFtRHATIOH 0~ PLAHr 
AMP NOTICI DP REARING ON CONltRMA;toN 
The Debtor (or proponent _______________________ ) having filad a Diaclos~re 
Statement herein, and upon haa~inq after due notice to all cradi~cra, equity security 
holders and intereeead partiQs, referring to a Plan filed herein by the Debtor (or 
proponent J or modification at such Plan, i~ any and it 
appearing ~a the Cou~ th&t the Disclosure Statement contains adequate information ae 
required by law, tha same is hereby 
OJ\D&RID 
approved *s~ject to fi~ing of amendment to personal b~dge~. It is further 
OKDIRBD 
that January 25. 1993 is hereDy fixed as the last date for filing and servinq pursuant 
to ~ule J020(b)Cl) wrietan Objee~ions to confirmaeion of tr.e Debtor's (or proponentrs) 
P!an re£er:ed to herein and February 2, 1993 at 11:00 a.m. at U. s •. eourthause and 
~ederal auilding, Pi;st ~loor, ~ingdon. yirginia is hereby fi~ed as the date, time and 
place of hearing upon con~irma~ion of said Pl4n and discharge heating as prov~ded ~y 11 
u.s.c. 551141 ~ S24(d} if the Debtor herein is an individual and not a corporation; and a 
copy of this Orcer along wieh a copy o~ the Plan o~ summary the=aof as approved by the 
Court, the Disclosure Statement and a ballot ccnfccming to OfficiAl For.m #30, unless 
heretofore mailed to all eraditars, equity aecurity holders L~d other parties in interest 
as provided in Rule 30l7(d), ~iving due ftotice to all said parties of the eaic 
confir.mation ~nd/or discharge hsa~in;s herein. 
Counsel fo~ th• Debtor (or propoQan~) shall traua~it a ~opy boreof aa direc~ed to 
all saLd creditorc, aqu~ty securi~y boldo~a 
ENTtR1 Pecember 10, 1992 
Tbe undarslqned ca~tifies 
mailed to &ll c~editcrz· equity 
s. !rustee on ehe day 
I 










UNITED S~ATES BANKRUPTC~ COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRict' OF VIRGINIA 
CHAPTER 11 
CASE NO. 92-01327-BPA-11 
QJBQLOBQBI S1aTJKJIT IJLATIBG TO IXLL GIIIVJB 
MP lUI( IQRSDJIT '1'0 CQI'l'IR 11 
This Disclosure Statement is provided by Bill Greever 
(sometimes hereinafter referred to as "Debtor"), to all known 
creditors and interest holders of the Debtor and all other parties 
in interest (collectively, •claimants") in order to inform 
claimants of the terms of the Plan pursuant to the Chapter 11 case 
filed by the Debtor in its case under Chapter 11 ot the United 
States Bankruptcy Code. 
~he purpose of this Disclosure statement is to enable 
claimants to make an informed judgment about the Debtor's Plan. 
The Plan, which is forwarded therefore, the Plan i~ part of this 
Disclosure Statement and the two should be read toqether. The 
terms defined in the Plan shall have the same meaning when used in 
the Disclosure Statement. The United States Bankruptcy court will 
set a hearing on the adequacy of the Disclcsura statement to be 
held in the division wherein the case is pendinq. It ia a 
requirement ot the United states Bankruptcy court for the Western 
District of Virqinia that a notice of a filinq of the Disclosure 
statement and Plan be •ailed to all creditors, which will be done 
prior to any hearinq on the Disclosure Statement. This Disclosure 
statement is required also hy law to be transmitted to the members 
59 
of the Creditors Committee, the u.s. Trustee, the Internal Revenue 
service, United states Attorney and any other creditor that should 
request one in writing. 
KICBAIJCS Ol CJAP~IB 11 JIORGAI;I&TIOJ 
Chapter 11 Reorganizations under the United statas Bankruptcy 
code require the sUbmission of a Plan of Reorg~nization or 
Liquidation of the; Debtor1 s business and debt structure, The 
Debtor has submitted a Plan of Reorganization to the Court and, in 
order for the Plan to become operative, it must be accepted by the 
creditors or deemed accepted by tbe Court and confirmed by the 
court. creditors and parties holdinq claims or interests that are 
impaired by the terms of the Plan may vote to accept or reject the 
Plan. Votes are tallied ):)y the classes desiqnated in the Plan, and 
a class ot claims will be considered to have accepted the Plan if 
members of the class votinq to approve the Plan hold at least two-
thirds (2/3) in amount and more than one-half (l/2) in number of 
allowed claims o-r the 1Dembers of the class who agtually yotg on the 
Plan. If the Plan is confirmed as described below, the provisions 
of the Plan will be binding upon all secured and unsecured 
creditors of the Debtor. 
As indicated above, vatinq on the Plan proceeds by c::lasses and 
only classes of creditors whcse cJ.aims are impaired by the 
provisions of the Plan may vote on the Plan. "Impaired" claims are 
claims that are not paid in full on the effective date, February 1, 
1993, of the Plan. Classes that are unimpaired are deemed to have 
aecepted the Plan. 
2 
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There is no assurance that, even though accepted, the Plan 
will be confi~ed by the Court. At the confirmation haarinq, 
the Court will determine, after hearinq the evidence presented 
in open Court, whether the Plan is in the best interest of 
creditors, whether it is feasi~le, whether it was proposed and 
accepted in good faith, and whether either the Plan or votes 
cast with respect to it were properly maae and procured. The 
court will also decide whether the debtor has complied with 
various provisions of the BankrUptcy Code, as well as other 
matters relevant to confirmation and to the proceedings. 
NO REPRES!NTATIONS CONCERNING TftE QEBTOR CPARTICJl'URI,Y AS TO ITS 
FOTQRE BUSINESS OPEBA1IONS. V)LUJ OF PROPERTY. OR THE VALUE OF 
Nrl PBOMISSORY NOTES TO BE ISSYED UNDO 'l'lU! PLAN I QR THE VALUI 
OF ANY STOCi( TO "BB ISSUED tJHQER THJ PUN) ARE AUTltORIZEP BY THE 
DEBTOR OTHER TJW! THOSE SE'l' FORTH :tN THI~ STATEMENT I AHY 
REPRESENTATIONS OR IHPucEMENTS HADE TO SECUB! YOUB ACCBPTANCE 
.. 
}iHICH ABE OTHER THAN AS COUTAIHEP Ilf THIS STATEMENT SBQULP HOT 
JE BJLIED QPOH BY YQU lM ABRIVING AT YOQR DECISIQN. AND SUCH 
APDITIONAL BEPRESENTATIONS AND IHPUCEMElfTS SHOULp BE REPQRTED TO 
£0"QNSJL FOR THE DEBTOR, WUO IN Tt1BN SHALL PELIVIB SUCH 
.. INFORMA1'ION TO THE BANJCBYPTCY COURT FOB SUCH ACTION AS MAY BE 
PEEMJQ APPROPRIATE. 
TUE XNFORJttATIOH CQNTA+NEP HQEIH HAS HOT BEEH StzBJEC'l' TO A 
CEBTiliEil AUDIT, THE UC:ORDS ISEPT BY 'l'HB QEBTOR ABE DEPENl)EN'l' 




DgBTOR, FOR THE FOREGOING RMSONS, THZ DEBTOR IS QH6aLE TO 
Wl\RRANT OR REPBESEUT THE INfORJQTIOH COH'l'AlHEI> HQ.EIN IS JfiTHOUT 
ANY INACCURACY, ALTHOUGH GREAT EFFORT Hl.S BEEN )lACE TO BE 
ACCJJRATE. 
DUl:Hif%0111: 
"Bankruptcy Code" shall mean Title 11 of the United states 
code. •Bankruptcy Court• shall mean the United States 
Bankruptcy Court !or the Western District ot Virginia, unless a 
specific reference is made to anotner bankruptcy court. 
"Chapter 11" shall mean Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
v.s.c. Sections 1101 At ~· 
•chapter 11 Petition11 1 as to a debtor, shall mean t.he petition 
for voluntary reorganization under Chapter 11 that such debtor 
fileCl in the Bankruptcy Court, thereby commencing the 
reorganization proceeding with respect to such debtor. 
•chapter 11 Petition Date•, as to a debtor, shall mean the 
date o~ filinq ot such debtor's Chapter 11 petition, to-wit: 
June 3, 1992. 
•claim(s)• shall mean each and every claim held by a creditor 
of the debtor, which claim shall have been either (1) tiled as. 
a proo~ o.t claim with the bankruptcy court, which proof ot claim 
is ultimately allowed; or, (2) allowed as a proof of claim 
arising out ot the rejection of an executory contract. Where 
there is a difference between the amount scheduled as undisputed 
by a debtor in its schedule and the amount set torth in the 
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in the proof of claim ahall govern for the purposes ot allowance 
unless objected to by the debtor, in which case the claim shall 
be the amount allowed by the bankruptcy court. If a creditor 
has a claiD arising out of the same transaction against mora 
than one debtor, the creditor's claaaification under the plan 
shall be based on ita claim aqainst the debtor principally 
liable to it as a matter o! fact and/or law. 
"Con:firmation" shall mean the entry of an order confirminq the 
plan in accordance with Chapter 11. 
IISTQBY or Tlll pBBTOB 
Bill B. Greever, is a resident of Bluefield, West Virginia, 
who 1 s principal place of business and principal assets are 
located in Tazewell County, Virqinia. He is married to 
Elizabeth L. Greever and they are the pa~anta of one child by 
their marriaqe. He is the step-father cf three children ot his 
wife: from a prior marriage. He is 70 years of age and is in 
excellent health. Currently, Mr. Greever is the president and 
sole shareholder of Bill Greever Corp,, a Virqinia corporation, 
who's principal business is the fabrication ot commercial 
buildinq primarily of steel and formerly in the ready 111ix 
concrete business. 
In addition to his duty as an officer, director, and 
shareholder at Bill Greever Corp., Mr. Greever is also a 
stockholder and director of BGX Corp. a Virqinia Corporation. 
Be ia not active in the day to clay waanaqetaent o1! that 
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·manufacture and r~caivas a royalty trom the manufacture from the 
corporation's prcducts. 
Mr. Greever has extensive real estate holdinqs located 
priDarily in both Virqinia and in West Virqinia as well as other 
items of personal property. 
Hr. Greever graduated from Beaver High School in Bluefield, 
west Virginia and then attended Bluefield College and then 
grad.uatar! frcm Virginia 'l'ech of Blacksburg, Vir.qinia with a 
decree in Jlechanical enqineerinq. Since his c;raduation from 
Virginia Tech, Mr. Greever has attended classes at Renssolaer 
Politechnical Institute in New York and additional classes at 
Virginia Tech and a three year enqineerinq management proq.raa at 
George Washington university in Washington D.e. 
BJASOHS lOB ZtLING CBAPTIR ELIVJM 
Mr. Greever as the scle shareholder and ctirector of Bill 
Greever Corp. has depended upon that corporation' a income in 
order to provide his inc:ome to pay his personal creditors. That 
corporation experienced a significant and severe down turn in 
it's ):)usiness during both 1990 and 1991. The sales cf Bill 
Greever corp. drcpped from 1989 to 1990 by $13, ooo·. oo, and then 
declined~ over $20o,ooo.oo during 1991, The decline in sales 
and profit by Bill Greaver eorp. affected Bill Greever's ability 
to orderly Danaqe the amortization of his personal debt. 
Even with the decline in the income of Bill Greever Corp., the 
debtor was able to maintain his debt obligationa with all of hia 
lenders in a satisfactory lllatter (the c!e~tor •iaaed 
' 
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approximately 2 or 3 principal payment• vith the consent of hil 
landers) In the debtor's opinion he was .meetinq the terms an4 
obliqations established by one of his creditors but for reasons 
unknown to him and tor reasons he can not discover, his largest 
creditor made a determination to call his loans in full. Il the 
foreclcsura was conclude by the lender, Bill Greever Corp. would 
have. been forced out ot business because ot the loss ot ita 
principal storage and manufacturing facilities in Tazewell 
County, Virginia. Therefore, the c!e))tor sought relief under 
Chapter 11 to prevent the forced liquidation ot his properties 
and the termination of his on qoinq construction business. 
IJDTS IJD) OPIAATIOH D];LI II 9QPTD ILIVIJ( 
During tha pendency of the Chapter 11 case, the debtor has 
focused upon returninq his wholly owned corporation Bill Greever 
Corp. to profitaDility. Toward ~~at end the debtor along with 
his son, Bill Greever, Jr, has been calling upon customers 
submittinq bids and proposals for additional work.~ and seekinq 
to obtain JDore work either as a sub contractor or prime 
contractor in the steel business. During 1992, Bill Greever 
corporation's cash flow has improved, as its sales improved and 
Bill Greever Corporation has reduced its outatandinq 
indebtedness to its ~ank lenders and others durinq the year. 
With the improvement cf its cash flow the debtor believes that 
hi• cash flow and income will improve as the fortunes of Bill 
Greaver Corporation are turned around. 




negotiatinq with all of his secured lenders in regards to a plan 
ot reorganization and repa'Ylllent. The debtor is also baLd some of 
his major assets appraised for purposes for propoainq 2l plan and 
has in his personal life attempted to eut his personal expenses 
so to increase and improve his cash flow. 
cx.uxs aJIP Ilf'l'JBIST IAB'UCIPUJ)JG 
'l'he debtor has the following claims and interest participating 
in this c:ase: 
(1) Administrative creditors The debtor ~·ill have 
administrative claims from his attorneys, his accountants and 
his appraisers for their services to the debtor and the1 debtor's 
estate durinq the pendency ot this case. The Debtor b.as paicf a. 
retainer of $5,000.00 to counsel, which is being billeel aqainst. 
It is hoped that the retainer paid will pay for all costs and 
expenses ot the Chapter 11. 
While there has been no CPA yet retained by thEt debtor'• 
estate it is anticipated that there will be an ~pplication to 
hire an CPA to work on the issues relating to confirma.tion. It. 
is anticipated that the CPA's fees will not excess the sum of 
$2,000.00. 
(2) Priority creditors - The debtor has no ou.tatandinq 
priority creditors at the present ti•e. 
(3) Secured creditors - 'l'he debtor has thre•a secured 
creditors. There are as follows: citizen• Bank of Tazewell, 
Virginia, the Citizens Bank is secured on four vehicles ana 
accordinq to the ~ank's proof ot claims the bank's sac\~ad clai• 
a 
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is $32,272.90 plus post petition interest and attorney'• fees, 
if any, The second secured creditor is the First National Bank 
of Bluefield, West Virqinia, this creditor is secured upon an 
10,000 square foot metal buildin; ~hich sits on one acre cf land 
lccatecl in approximately one mile outside the town limits of the 
town of Tazewell in Tazewell county, Virginia. The debtor'• 
cpinion is that the building has a tair market fair of 
$200,000.00 the bank is secured by a first and senior deed of 
trust upon the buildinq and at the time ot dratting this 
disclosure statement estimated that the bank's debt is 
approximately $85,000,00 plus any post petition interest and 
attorney's fees that the bank may have incurred. The third 
secured creditor is Tazewell National Bank of ~azewell, Virginia 
this creditor is secured upon various pieces ot real estate 
including an 11, ooo square foot building located on one acre 
which the debtor believes has a value of approximately 
$214,000.00, a A trame house- located on one acre with an 
approximate value of $72,200.00 and a five room frame bouse and 
lot with a11 approximate value $25 1 724.00. Accordinq to the 
bank's proof of claim filed on August 5, 1992 the bank's claim 
is $163,654.54 plus interest accruing on the promissory 
obligation and reasonable attorney's fees to ~e allowed under 
section 506. 
(~) 'Unsecured creditors - The debtor has 3 unsecured 
creditors. These are as follows: (1) Citizens Bank ot 




$31,865.42 fro• their proof of claim, (2) One Valley Bank in 
the amount of $43,ooo.oo and tinally Mr. Greever ia an granter 
on a line of credit tor Bill Greever Corporation, while Bill 
Greaver Corporation is primarily liable, Mr. Greaver recognizes 
that this ia his obligation and is treating this debt as an 
unsecured ohliqaticn in his bankruptcy estate. The line of 
credit is $100,000.00 and currently the entire line is due an4 
owinq to the bank. 
S1DDiltJlY 01 PLAJI 
DIS !S A [QIQIUY OI'LXJ 
lLJmll BJW) TD IFI'XBI PUB !BJCB tS 1TTJ.CIID TO J.BP tl !. 11\U 
01' 'l'J[X S D;[SCLOSUBI IDTIMJFI' 
1. 'l'he Plan of the Debtor divides the debtor's creditors into 
several classes based upon their respective interests in the 
debtor's property, 
2. Each secured creditor is placed in a separate class and 
the classes of creditors in the·claim, which is attached hereto 
and •ade a part hereof are a follows: 
A. Administrative creditors: These creditors shall be 
paid at time ot confirmation andjor thereafter as funds are 
available tc the debtor from the sale, liquidation of his 
property and the operation ot his insurance agency • 
. 
B. Priority creditors: There are no priority creditors, 
however, should there be any obliqations to the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Commonwealth ot Virg-inia created durinc; the 




priority. These obl.iqations shall be paid by the debtor durinq 
the course of the case in accordance with applicable Federal and 
State Law. 
c. Class III: Citizens Bank of Tazewell County. This 
claim ia secured on vehicles which tha debtor currently owe• and 
the obligation to the bank is evido.nced by ~ee promissory 
note•. 'rhe debtor proposes in his plan to consolidate all t.hree 
of the pro11issory notes into one promissory note bearinCJ 
interest at the rate ot 8% and amortized over a 15 year term. 
D. Class IV: First National Bank on their claim shall 
be paid as tollows: The bank shall retain its current 
collateral, the bank'• nota will be modified to lowar the 
interest rate to 8% and the amortization that the debtor is 
currently Dakinq payments on to the bank shall remain the same 
as currently beinq amortized, so that the debt ia paid out at 
the same ~ime as scheclulad. 
E. Class V: Tazeweli National Bank the outstanding 
obligation to the bank including past due interest principal and 
any attorney's tees allowed ~y the court shall he capitalized 
into a mo~ified note vhich shall ~e amortized at a term of 20 
yearu with interest at 8%. 'l'he collateral currently on the 
obliqation shall remain the same and shall bs no modification or 
deletion to the collateral currently being offered. 
All three secured cre4itors ghguld note th1t tho :;lan o( 
reorganization provides for liquidation ot the collatarol of the 





the teras of the Chapter 11 plan. 
F. Class VI: There are two unsecured creditor• in thil 
case and both of these creditors are beinq treated the same. 
Both creditors shall be paid in the followinq matter: the 
outstandinq obligation includinq interest shall be capitalized 
in a modified nota and repaid over a term ot 15 yeara with 
interest at 8%, Citizens Bank as set forth previously as to 
their secured claim, the unsecured note will capitalized as part 
ot the secured claim and be repaid along side and a part ot the 
secured claim. T.he One Valley Bank obliqation shall be 
recapitalized and the interest rate modified to pay the debt 
over 15 years with interest at st. 
G. Class VII: The contingent claim of First National 
Bank tor the line of credit to Bill Greever Corporation shall 
not be modified by this Chapter 11 plan and the line of credit 
tarms and obliqations by Bill Greever Corporation shall remain 
the same except that the bank has agreed that the· interest rate 
on the obligation shall be reduced to st. 
pBBTOJ' a 1ss:zws 
The debtor has attached to this disclosure statement a copy of 
schedule A showing the various pieces of real estate owed by the 
debtor and his opinion as to the valuations. In addition, ha 
haa attached copies ot the appraisals previously obtained on 
several of the pieces on the real estate. 
IJlTJJU JII.Qd1Jmr1' 




be no change in manaqemant tollovinq the contiraation of the 
Chapter 11 plan. What will occur however, is that Mr. Greaver 
will continue to conduct his construction bu~inesa and his other 
businesses •uhjact to the terms and conditions of the payments 
set f"orth under this plan. 
. DXSZD'J.'Q et.aiQ 
At the present time, the debtor does Jaot know of any di•putad 
claims that currently exist. The debtor however reserve• the 
right to review any proofs of claims that are tiled and file 
objection. to proofs of claims that may be necessary. 
!'U COBSZOtmJCJ8 
As indicated previously, the det.t.or intends to retain the 
services of the firm Robert '1'. Shepherd, CPA of ltichlands, 
Virqinia to advise hill on the tax consequences of this Chapter 
11 plan. However, inasmuch as the debtor does not propose to 
liquidate any properties except as necessary under the terms ot 
the plan •events occur in case -at default• there ~~11 not he any 
major significant tax consequences to this plan of 
recrqanization. This plan is simply a restructuring ot 
outstanding indebtedness and does not call for any mergers or 
reorganization with Should have any significant tax 
consequences. 
L%0QrQITJOK JIILllil 
-:he debtor beliavea that if all of his properties were 
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sale of all his properties to pay all of his creditors in full 
and that i• a reason that he is providing in his plan to pay all 
creditors in full with interest at the rate of at under the 
terms of the reorganization plan. 
IUJJIM'ID AJ)M:IIXIDJ.'XYI IDIBSII 
As stated previously, it is hoped that as a reeult of the 
rapid filing of this disclosure statement and plan, that 
attorneys tees c:an be minimized to theral:ainer previously paid. 
However, 1~ there is extensive litiqation in regards to 
confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan such as fair marke~ values, 
present va1ue, or other objections filed by any of the debtor's 
creditors than the attorneys fees obviously as a result of 
litigation could increase the administrative expenses due and 
owing by the estate to a auch larger amount then covered by the 
retainer previously paid. 
J«rriGATl:OI rmmnra 
There is not currently pending any litigatio~ in any court 
resolving the debtor and/or his businesses. However, nothinq in 
this plan would waive any and all of the debtors rights to bring 
in action against any party or parties which the debtor believes 
may be indebted to the debtor far any causes of action that may 
exist pre-petition. The purpose of this Chapter 11 plan is not 
to settle or waive any of those causes o~ action but to preserve 
all of those it bringinq the same is determined by the del»tor to 
be necessary in the future. 









T.he Plan of Reorganization specifically seta forth that the 
u.s. TrUatee'• fees shall he paid in full upon the effect data 
of the plan. 
~XTJOU or !ltxp'l'l '1'0 QBIDifQBS 
Ro creditors &hall receive any payment under the plan until 
its claila shall 1M~ finally approved and allowed by the 
BankrUptcy Court. The debtor reserves the right to object to 
any proof of clailll filed and set the o~je"Ction for hearinq upon 
notice to the creditor. 
The debtor believes the intonaation contained herein is 
accurate and will enable all holders of claims of interest in 
the chapter 11 proceeding to make an informed judgement 
concerning the bankruptcy proceedinq. 
This Disclosure statement is prepared and distributed to the 
creditors, pursuant of 51125 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code, with the approval of the Untied States BaftkruP.tcy Court 
for the Western District of Virginia by order a~~erad the __ 
day of ----------' 1992. 
BILL GREEVER 
- by counsel -
State B I 14575 
Copeland. Holinary. Biegar ' Leonard, p.c. 
P.O. Box 1296 
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~TED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VXRGIHIA 
CHAPTER 11 
CASE NO. 92-01327-BPA-11 
1\11 Ql IIOBqlllllTIOB 01 I!LL GIIIJII 
9LASSIS 01 CLI!MS 
Now comes the Debtor and for its Plan of Repayment states as 
follows: 
His classes are divided as follows: 
CLASS I - Administrative Claims. 
CLASS ~I - Priority Claims. 
CLASS !~I - Citizens Bank of Tazewell. 
CLASS IV - First National Bank. 
CLASS V - Tazewell National Bank. 
CLASS vz - Unsecured creditors. 
-CLASS V~~ - First National Sank, contingent liquidated 
creditor. 
CLASS ~I - The Debtor. 
J'RIADJH'!' OP CLASSBS tnmp THI ZLM 
CLASS I: Administrative creditors: 'l'hese creditors shall be 
paid at time of ccnfirlllation and/ or thereafter as funds are 
available to the debtor from the sale, liquidate of his property 
and the operation of his construction business. U.S, Trustee shall 
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CLASS II: Priority creditors: There are no priority 
creditors, however, should there by any obligation• to the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Commonwealth of Virginia created durinq the 
pendency ot the case, it would be administrative and/or priority. 
These ocli~~tion• shall ~e paid by the debtor during the course ot 
the case in accordance with applicable Federal and State Law, 
CLASS IXI: eitizens Bank of Tazewell. This is a claim that 
is secured on four vehi~les which the debtor currently uses. The 
o);)liqation is evidenced by two promissory notes on the 1ecured 
claim. In addition, the debtor has an unsecured promissory note 
with citizens Bank, Citizens Bank shall be paid by a restructurinq 
ot the ~eDtor's loan as follows: the three obligations ot the 
secured and unsecured shall be combined into one obligation bearing 
interest at at with an amortization term of 15 years. The 
collateral on the loan shall remain the same and the creditors 
shall be paid in full with interest ~~der this plan. The debtor 
-does not believe that Class III is impaired by .. this plan or 
reorganization. 
CLASS IV: First Rational Bank ol Bluefield. This creditor is 
secured upon a commercial building owed by the debtor. 'l'ha current 
pay off is approximately $85, 000. DO, the payments are approximately 
$8 oo. 00 per month. The promissory obli9ation shall be moe! it ied and 
amended so in respect to reduce the interest rata to at, the 
amortization term shall remain the same. The debtor intends to pa.y 





CLASS V: Tazewell National Bank. The Tazewell National Bank 
debt would be treated in the tollowinq aattar: The debtor shall 
take the outstanding principal balance aa the time ot the filing of 
the chapter 11 plus shall allow to the creditor interest on its 
secured claim at the rate of at fro• the ti11e ot the filing ot the 
Chapter 11 to the effective date ot tha chapter 11 plan. Ae of the 
effective date, all past due principal, pre-petition interest, post 
petition interaat, and reasonable attorneys fees shall be 
Qapitalized 1n a new modified nota secured by the same collateral 
which currently secures the loan to wit the commercial buildinq and 
two houses. This new modi~ied loan amount ahall be amortized at 8% 
ever a 20 year ten with equal monthly installments with the first 
monthly installment to ))e paic:S to the bank on or about February 1, 
1993 and or within ten daya of the time the parties can calculate 
the new amount of the payment after the effective data. 'fbe debtor 
reserves the rights to pre-pay this loan at any time. Durinq the 
pendency of this Chapter 11 case, the debtor has been attemptinq to 
ma%'ket tha A tru:ae house With one acre. . .. 
The debtor reserves the right to continue to attempt to urket 
this properTy for the hishest and beat possible price and the net 
sales proceeds after the sale of this property shall be paid over 
to Tazewell National Bank to reduce the outstandinq debt durinCJ the 
pendency of this Chapter 11 plan. Additionally, the debtor shall 
have the right upon the payment of the principal sum of $50,000.00 
to the bank, with no other default existing in the loan at the time 
3 
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of payment, to require the release of the A frame house and one 
acre from the lien of the deed of trust. 
CLASS VI: unsecured creditors. This class ia composed of two 
credito~s, citizens Bank and one Valley Bank. Aa statacl 
previously, these creditors shall be paid in full with interest at 
S% amortized over a period of 15 years. Citizens Bank is going to 
add ita unsecured claim to its two secured claims in the new 
modified note and be paid under the provisions of Class III, where 
One Valley Bank will provide the debtor with a new promissory note 
evidencing the outstanding obligation and any accrued interest at 
at from the ti~e of the filinq of the Chapter 11 to the effective 
data of the plan and the debtar will pay cff the One Valley Sank 
with interest ever 15 years with interest of at. 
CLASS VII: First National Bank of Bluetield has a line of 
credit with the debtor's business, Bill Greever Corporation, which 
the debtor is an guarantor. The debtor shall remain obligated on 
the line of credit with Pirst National Bank ot Bluefield and the 
line of credit shall not be impaired or affected by the Chapter 11 
case. Interest on this line of credit loan will be reduced to at. 
CLASS V:t::II: As a result payment of his creai tors in full, the 
debtor, Bill Greever shall be entitled to retain his equity 
interest in his various corporations. 
MBMJS OJ' ID'IC'l'Ua'l'Dr(J ftB pt.)V 
The Plan shall ~e effectuated as follows: 
1. As to the clai11s of the secured creditors either the 




to tha creditors in Class ZII, IV, and V. As to the payment of 
Class VI, \m&ecured c:reditors, Citizens Bank will prepare its 
modified nota for its payment and one Valley Bank will either 
prepare its note and/or del>tor's counsel will prepare that note for 
repayment of that obligation. First National Sant will not be 
require to take any step1 except to fins the intereat rate on both 
loans to 8' in order to effectuate the plan nor will the debtor and 
the debtor ~ill not ~e required tc take any additional steps in 
reqard to the ralease of hi• property. 
BE:JHTIQI or JVBISDIOTIOK 
Notwithstandinq contirmation of the this Plan, the court will 
retain jurisdiction for the following purposes and each ot them: 
The court 'A'ill retain jurisdiction to detenine the 
allocability and payment of any clai~ upon any objection thereto 
(or other appropriate proceedings) by the debtor or by any other 
party in interest entitled to proceeds in that mannar. As part ot 
such retained jurisdiction, the court will continue ··to determine 
the allocability cf administrative claims and any request(s) for 
payment (s) thereof, including professional fees and costs which are 
administrative clai~s classified in Class I claims. 
The court will retain jurisdiction to determine any disput~s 
which may arise regardinq the interpretation of any provision(s) ot 
the Plan. 
The ~curt will retain jurisdiction to facilitate the 
consummation of this plan by entarinq consistent with the 




order(s) ragardinq the enfor~ement of this plan and any 
provision(s) thereof. 
The court will retain jurisdiction to adjudicate any cause(a) 
of action or other proceeding(s) presently pending or otherwise 
refere.n~ed hera or elsewhere in this plan, including but not 
limited to the adjudication of any and all "core proc:eedings 11 under. 
28 u.s.c. S157(b) which may be pertinent to this raorqanization 
case 1 and which the debtor may deem it appropriate to initiate and 
prosecute in aid of its reorganization. 
The court will retain jurisdiction to enter an appropriate 
final decree in this reorganization case. 
SJ]BORJ)IHA'l'J:O!I or CUtMS 
The debtor and creditors vis-a-vis each other (whether or not 
by and through the Committee), will be entitled to assert and 
prosecute before the court any and all subordination claims that 
they may have, including but not limited to, contractual cr 
equitable sUbordination claims available under·· 5510 ot the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 tJ. S.c. 5510, and further specifically includinq 
but not limited to, any such claims which the debtor may assert or 
prosecute (and hereby expressly reserves) aqainst any person or 
entity, buying- the elaim(s) for speculation and profit in the 
reorqanizatian case, to subordinate the claim(s)" brought by any 
such person or entity, wholly or in part and with respect to 







doinq so 1 such holder(s) chanqes its pr.avioua acceptance(•) or 
rejection ( s) • 
Every modification of this Plan will supersede the previous 
version(s) of the Plan as and whenever each such modification is 
etfective "s provided in this Section. When superseded, the 
previous version(s) of the Plan will be in the natura of withdrawn 
or rejected settlement proposal(s) 1 and will be null, void an4 
unusable by the debtor or any other party for any purpose(l) 
whatsoever with respect to any of the contents of such version(s) 
ot the Plan. 
PISCIARGB AND STAY COITIJUATIOB 
Confirmation ana perfo~ance of this Plan will discharge the 
debtor from any and all debts dischargeable under S4ction 1141(d) 
of the Bankruptcy Code and Chapter 11, 11 u.s.c. S114l(d), and will 
otherwise have all effects provided in such section 1141, 11 u.s.c. 
-51141, which are not expressly inconsistent ~ith the-provisions ot 
this Plan. Pending execution of this Plan ana nnless: (a) the 
Court has otherwise expressly ordered; or (b) this Plan otherwise 
expressly provides, all creditors will continue to he stayed from 
proceeding aqainst the debtor or its assets. 
P:tiQLOSURI S!!'MJHJm'll 
When the debtor solicits the requisite accaptance(s) of thi• 
Plan, it will be acoompanie4 by a Disclosure Statement that will 
have been approved by the Court prior tc such solicitation. The 
8 
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debtor requests that, at that time, all parties ~hose acgeptance(a) 
ot this Plan are solicited should direct their attention to the 
Disclosure Statement. 
IIO!l:SlOHS lOB Til RI'1'DJTIOI. DlORCIMElft, lft'l:LJ!JI!U 
QB Al)JVS'liJIDT OZ QUJXS IILOIIGIICI TO TQ QIBTOBS 
Any adversary proceedinq presently pending or to be commenced 
in the future against various individuals or entities shall remain 
as a property right of the debtor and •hall in no way be waived or 
affected ~y the Plan or Disclosure Statement filed herewith. 
Any net proceeds received froa such adversary proceedings 
after payment of all costs, expenses and fees incurred by the 
debtor shall become a part of the operatinq funds under the Plan to 
be used in furtherance of said Plan. 
IRO!lltONS lOR THJ BITBHT~OJ, 
AMP ASSVMPT!OH or IX!CUTOBY CONTRACTS 
All contracts with attorneys, accountants, employees, and/or 
any other persons is hereby assumed. The payment-. as set forth 
under those agreements shall continue to be 11ade and theses 
contracts shall not be affected at all by the bankruptcy, except 
that if any leases are in default, the debtor shall have a 
reasonable time to cure any detaul ts, as may be agreed between the 
persons and the debtors • 
IDFI'I TO XB<:UB Jl CUB or ppapy 
The debtor's plan provides to pay to all of his creditor one 
hundred• cants on tha dollar with interest at ''· 
9 
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The debtor, recognizing that aa a re•ult of his age an~ the 
uncertain nature of the national economy, that it may be necessary 
for him to liquidate his real esta.te. The debtor theretore, 
proposes that in the event of a default in the making of any 
payment of principal or interest required by this Chapter 11 plan 
that the default provisions of any such promissory obligation or 
note be modified to incorporate the following provisions: (1) 
should the debtor default in the makinq of any payment to Class 
III, rv, v creditors in this case then upon notice of default the 
debtor shall have ~~e option either to (a) cure any defaults that 
exist within 60 days without the note beinq accelerated and/or (b) 
declare that he is unable to pay the debt according to the terms 
and obligations and tmpose the liquidation of the properties under 
this section of his plan. Under these provisions the debtor shall 
be required to make no further payments of either principal andjor 
interest under the plan provided that within forty-tive days of the 
date of default the debtor shall provide to the creditor a listinq 
contract and/or other contract making provision for the sale or 
disposition of the collateral securing the Class III, IV1 or v 
creditors claims. That the said listinq contract shall be for an 
initial term of no longer than 6 months and liatin9 contra~t shall 
cover all the properties listed as collateral upon the Class III, 
IV, or V creditors claims. 
And that the debtor shall promptly execute such an listi~q 




During the said initial 6 montlua liquidation period, the 
~ebtor shall provide to the Class III, IV, and V creditors 
statements of his cash flow and income and should his disposable 
income permit the payment of interest on the Class III, IV1 an4 V 
obligations during this initial period of (6 •onths) liquidation 
then the de~tor shall pay interest to the creditors, it his income 
aleo shows sufficient income for payment of principal he shall pay 
it. The terms ttsufficient. income• shall be that income which 
exceeds the amount necessary for the payment cf the debtor's 
monthly living ana financial obligations includi~g an allowance for 
food, housing, shelter, insurance, medical care, and the other 
necessities of life, 
Should there be any dispute in reqards to what excess cash 
flow the debtor 111ay have during the 6 month period then the dispute 
shall be submitted to a Arbitrator appointed by the United States 
District court for the Western District ot Virginia to determine 
the amount it any the debtor shall be required to pay durinq the 
initial (6 months) liquidation period. 
After the conclusion of the 6 months initial liquidation 
period, should the properties be unsold, then the debtor proposes 
that the !ollowi~q steps be taken in regard to the subjected 
properties: First, that a markatinq colllllli ttee be established 
compoac4 of A rcprcocnto~ive o~ the de»tor as well. D5 o 
representative cf the creditor along with a third representative 
appointed. by the United states Bankruptcy Court of the Western 
District ot Virginia. This marketing committee then shall remove 
11 
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from the degtor's control the liquidation of the subject 
properties. This marketing coliiDlittea shall be empowered to aet tha 
prices to which the properties will be sold and to set terms and 
conditions for the sale of the property.. Should the properties not 
he sold within the period of 90 days followinq the establishment of 
the marketinq coiiLlllittee, then the marketinq committee shall be 
empowered to employ auctioneers anci others as nec:essary to conduct 
a auction of the 8Ubject property to brinq the hi~hest and beat 
price for tho property. 
Should any disputes arise durinq the period of liquidation any 
and all disputes (with the exception ot the appointment ot the 
members of the marketinq committee) shall be resolved by the 
Arbitrator to ~e appointed by the United States District Court for 
the Western District ot Virginia. Any cost ot arbitration shall be. 
shared equally between all parties to the dispute. 
In the event of default of p~yment ot the Class VI creditors 
they shall be paid as follows: Tbe amount ot the unsecured claim 
of citizens Bank that has been rea~ortized and recapitalized in the 
new Class III claim shall be broken out, and shall be given along 
with One Valley Bank a junior and shared second deed ot trust on 
all ot the debtor's property that is currently enoumbered to First 
National Bank ot Bluefield and Tazewell National Bank, beinq two 
industrial metal buildings, a A frame house, and a five roo• 
dwellinq house. T.ne unsecured creditors shall •hare pro-rata the 








Tazewell National Bank from the sale and/or liquidation of these 
properties. 
pn UStDIP'r10B Or IDCJm!Rr COftRAC!'.rS 
All contracts with attorneys, accountants, employees, andfor 
any other persons is hereby assumed. The payments as set forth 
under those agreements shall continue to be made and theses 
contracts shall not be affected at all by the bankruptcy, except 
that if any leases are in default, the debtor shall have a 
reasonable time to cure any defaults, as may be agreed between the 
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CASE NO. 92-01327-HPA-11 
AMENDED PLAN OF REORQANIZATIOH 
OP BILL GRBIYIR 
NOW COMES the debtor and for his amended plan of repayment in 
accordance with the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court 
entered on the 16th day of December, 1993, the debtor proposes the 
followinq am~ndments and changes to his plan: 
1. Treatment of Classes under the Plan. Class V beinq 
Tazewell National Bank, it is hereby a~ended to read as follows: 
Tazewell National Bank debt shall be treated in the follo~ing 
manner. The current note outstandinq issued by Bill Greever 
Corporation to Tazewell National Bank and secured by the collateral 
of the debtor and by the endorsement of the debtor shall be repaid 
as follows: 
The outstanding principal balance and accrued interest as of 
the time of the filing of the Chapter ll plus post petition 
interest at the rate of a.s% and reasonable attorney fees shall be 
calculated and capitalized in a new modified note. The Modified 
note shall bear the same terms and conditions of the prior note 
entered into between the parties and shall remain secured upon the 
same collater~l which currently secures the loan, to-wit: the 
commercial building and the two houses. The modified loan shall be 
amortized with interest at 9. 5% on the followinq a.TDortization 
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schedule: March, 1994 interest cnly. April, 1994 interest only. 
May, 1994 interest only. June, 1994, interest only. July, 1994 the 
debtor shall make a ~inimum principal reduction in the amount of 
$45,000.00 plus interest from the sale of the A-Frame house. lf 
the A-Frame house sells for more ~~an $45,ooo.oo net to the debtor, 
then all of the net proceeds from the sale of the A-Frame house 
shall be applied to the loan. If, however, the A-Frame house sells 
for less than $4S,ooo.oo on or before July 1, 1994, the debtor 
guarantees to pay a minimum principal reduction of $45, ooo. oo 
during the month of July, 1994. The debtor shall then amortize the 
remaining balance, paying interest and principal for the months of 
August and September, 1994, based upon a twenty (20) year 
amortization and then on October 1, 1994, the deDtor shall pay a 
further principal reduction of $20,000.00 at a •inimum from the 
sale of the rental house. If the rental house sells for an excess 
of $20,000.00 net to the seller, then all of the net sales proceeds 
. 
from the sale of the rental house shall be paid over to Tazewell 
National Bank. If the sales price, however, is less than 
$20,000.00 then the debtor agrees that he shall pay a minimum of 
$20,000.00 to Tazewell National Bank. Then, commencing in 
November, 1994, the debtor \llill commence making interest and 
principal payments again based upon a twenty (20) year amortization 
but in all events the loan will balloon and become due at the end 
of seveh and one-halt years from the date of confirmation of his 
Chapter 11 plan. 
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2. Eyents to Occur in Case of pefault as found beginning on 
page g of the original plan shall be amended to read as follows; 
The debtors plan provides to pay all of his creditors 100 cents on 
the dollar with interest at a to 8.5% depending upon the creditors. 
The debtor recognizing that as a result of his aqe and the 
uncertain nature of the national economy that it may be necessary 
for him to liquidate his real estate. The debtor therefore 
proposes that in the event of a default in the making of any 
payment ot principal or interest required by this Chapter 11 plan, 
that the default provisions of any such promissory obligation or 
note be modified to incorporate the following provisions: 
Should the debtor default in the making of any payment to any 
secured creditor under this plan, then upon notice of default, the 
debtor shall have the right to liquidate any real estate secured en 
the said obliqation wi~hin a period of ninety (90) days of the time 
of the notice of default. During this ninety (90) day period, the 
debtor shall be required to clean up the properti~~ in order to 
comply with EPA and other qovernment regulations relating to the 
presence of hazardous chelllicals which might impair the property and 
shall in all other respects work toward making the property 
marketable for the hiqhest and best possible price. Durinq this 
ninety {90) day.period of liquidation, the debtor shall have the 
riqht to market the properties, but that any price to be paid by 
the prospective purchaser must be approved by the secured lender 
and/or be in an amount in excess of the appraisal as shown in the 
lenders loan files. If the sales price is not in excess of the 
appraisal price or if the lender does not approve of the said sale, 
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it it is under the appraisal price, then the lender shall be 
entitled to exercise all of its riqhts under its deed of trust or 
the security instruments to foreclose upon the subject property at 
the conclusion of the ninety (90) day period, 
3. All other provisions of the original plan of 
reorganization, previously filed by the debtor, shall remain in 
full force and effect, save and except these modifications to this 
Chapter 11 plan. 
Robert T. Copeland 
State Bar # 14575 
BILL GREEVER 
- By Counsel -
Copeland, Molinary, & Bieger, P.C. 
P.o. Box 1296 
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Case No, 7-92-01327 
Chapter ll 
______________________ ) 
IOH MaTJI!AL Mop!ZXC&TXOI 
ar MEJmED CQPTEB 11 PLA!f 
NOW COMES the debtor and proposes that the non-material 
moditication to his plan as follows: 
1 • That the paragraph ot the plan entitled means ot 
effectuate plan, be amended to include the additional sen~ence, 
as it rela~es to the payment of Tazewell National Bank. In all 
events the A-FrQme bouse will be sold within a period of five (5) 
years from the eftective date of confirmation and a minimum payment 
of $50. ooo, 00 will be paid from the bank from the proceeds. Should 
the house not sell for at least $50,000,00 net to the bank then the 
debtor shall ba required.to pay to the bank any such shortfall so 
the Bank will receive a net of $50,000.00. By way of example, 
should the house sell for a net payment to the bank a~ $48,000.00 
the debtor shall be obliqated to pay an additional $2 1 000.00 to the 
banx at the time cr the sa~e ot the house. 
11M7CI TO TAI'BULL D'l':%9DL BNJI 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICB that the debtor has f1le4 a non-material 
lDoclificatian o! this Chapter ll plan. Inasmuch as you are the only 
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creditor effected by the non-material aoditication and its intent 
and purpose is to clarify that tha requirement on the debtor to 
sell a certain A frame house within five (5) years, this notice and 
non-material modification is being provided to you and to your 
counsel only. 
Robert 
State ar # 14575 
Copeland, Molinary, Sieger 
& Leonard, P.C. 
P.o. Box 1296 




CEBTIFICAT2 OF SEBVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoinq has been mailed by United States First Class 
Mail to the Debtor, Tazewell National Bank at P. o. Box 9 09, 
Tazewell, VA 24651 and to David Altizer, Esquire 1 P. o. Box 30 1 
Tazewell, VA 24651 and to Dav!9;!~ton, 188 East Mail\ St., 
Abingdon, VA 24210 on this the ~ay of March, 1993. 
~~d~--------------
91. 
1D re; BILL GREEVER 
RO'L'TE s. BOX l68 
TAZE\VELL, VA 24630 
UNITED STATES BA..~~UPrCY COt.lllT 




CO?tfPANION' ORDER CONFIRMING AME~'DED Pl..AN· DISCHARGE AND INJJJNcriON 
Upon bearing of the Atnended Plan after notle6t it appearing that th6 Amended Plan has been accepted and Chapter 
11 eompllcd whh. it is accordingly, 
ADJUDGED AND ORDERED 
that the Amended Plan be and the same is hereby coufinned; that the above named Debtor is released from all dischargeable 
debts; that any judgment heretofore or hereafter obtained in any court other than this Court is null and void as a determiDatjon 
of the personill. liability of the Debtor with respect to debts discharged under Section 1141 llllless otherwise adjudged 
nondischargeable under Section 523; that an creditors whose debts are discharged by this Order or judgmentS declared null 
and void are enjoined from pursumg atJY suil, actio~ or process to eollect, reeover, or offset such debts as pe~sonalliabilities 
of the Debtor. 
Jurisdiction is retained for ooe year, or such shorter period as tbe Amended Plan may provide, to resolve claixns and 
other necessuy matters. The Debtor shall make an required reports and file a fmal report with motion for a final decree 
within one year from this date pursus.nt to Rule 201S(a)(6) It (7), Rule 3022 and Sections 1106(a)(7) and 1107(a); or prior 
to the expiration thereof. file a motion for an extension of time to so do wilh grounds as to why final decree should not be 
entered. 
AD individual debtor is entitled to a discharge hearing under S~lion 524 iC requested within ten (10) days from date 
hereof; if not requested, the.n debtor will be deemed to have waived such hearing. 
The Clerk shall make serlice of a copy of this Order by mail1o the Debtor, counsel for 1he Debtor, and all c:reditors 
and Interested parties. -......._ y--- ~ 
ENTER: March 21, 1994 ~ ~-------
EXHIBIT ~.r.Wo:.JlJDGE 
I· c -·~···· 
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VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 
BILL GREEVER CORPORATION, 
et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. AT LAW 
No. CL94000100 
TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK'S RESPONSE TO 
BILL GREEVER CORPORATION AND BILL B. GREEVER, SR.'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The defendant, Tazewell National Bank ("TNB"), responds 
to the plaintiffs' ("Greever") memorandum in opposition to TNB's 
second motion for summary judgment as follows: 
Argument and Authorities 
All claims are barred by res judicata and 
es'toppel. 
Greever does not deny the authority of the numerous cases 
cited by TNB holding that all lender liability claims that could 
have been raised during the pendency of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
case, but were not, are barred under principles of res judicata. 
Sure-Snap Corp. v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869 
(2nd Cir. 1991); Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 
1 
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848 F.2d 414 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 967 (1988}; 
Eubanks v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 977 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 
1992); In re Howe, 913 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1990); Southmark 
Properties v. Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Sanders Confectionery Products, Inc. v. Heller Financial, Inc., 973 
F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); 
Heritage Hotel Limited Partnership I v. Valley Bank of Nevada, 160 
B.R. 374 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993), aff'd 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15600 
(9th Cir. 1995); and, Hay v. First Interstate _Bank of ~alispe~, 
N .A., 978 F. 2d 555 (9th Cir. 1992} . As pointed out in TNB' s 
opening memorandum, this doctrine would apply to bar the claims of 
both plaintiffs under principles of privity. Greever has not 
contested this point. 
Greever simply contends that res judicata does not apply 
here because his disclosure statement and the plan of 
reorganization included a provision ~preserving the debtor's right 
to maintain actions." He argues that the plans in the cases cited 
by TNB contained no such provision. This issue was not discussed 
by the respective courts because it is irrelevant. The claims were 
barred because they were never mentioned in the first place. That 
which is neve~ put on the table cannot be taken off of it. 
The question addressed by the courts is whether the 
debtor disclosed the claims against the financial institutions as 
assets on its schedules of assets. In Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. 
2 
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V. United Jersev Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied 
488 U.S. 967 {1988), Oneida acknowledged the debt owed to a bank in 
its required schedules, but did not list the lender liability 
claims it later brought against the bank in its list of "contingent 
and unliquidated claims of every nature . . . " 
In holding that the lender liability claims were barred 
by equitable estoppel, the Third Circuit noted that "[a] long-
standing tenet of bankruptcy law requires one seeking benefits 
under its terms to satisfy a companion duty to schedule, ~Qr the 
benefit of creditors, all his interests and property rights." 
Oneida, 848 F.2d at 416. The court also noted that the "importance 
of full disclosure is underlaid by the reliance placed upon the 
disclosure statement by the creditors and the court." Oneida, 848 
F.2d at 417. 
In Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A., 978 
F. 2d 555 (9th Cir. 1992) , Hay.. knew the potential for lender 
liabili~y claims against the bank before the reorganization plan 
was confirmed, yet .. ·he did not list the claims as an asset. The 
Ninth Circuit noted that all of the facts relating to the potential 
claims were not known at confirmation, "but enough was known to 
require notification of the existence of the asset to the 
bankruptcy court." ~, 978 F.2d at 557. Hay's failure to give 
the bankruptcy court notice of the lender liability claims estopped 
him from later pursing the claims against the bank. 
3 
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The Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Eubanks 
v. Federal Deposition Insurance Corporation, 977 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 
1992) . Lender liability claims brought against a bank after 
confirmation were neither listed on Eubanks' schedule of assets, 
nor set forth in a disclosure statement, nor brought to the 
attention of the bankruptcy court. Eubanks "knew of the claims 
prior to confirmation of his plan, yet failed to bring the claims, 
perhaps the most significant assets of his estate, to the attention 
of the bankruptcy court or the creditors as mandated by the 
Bankruptcy Code and Rules." The Fifth Circuit ruled that the order 
confirming Eubanks' plan was res judicata and barred the claims. 
Eubanks, 977 F.2d at 174. 
In Sure-Snap Corp. v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 
948 F.2d 869 (2nd Cir. 1991), sure-Snap filed a post-confirmation 
amendment to its repayment schedule that listed a claim of unknown 
value against two banks. The eyidence showed that Sure-Snap had 
knowledge of the claims prior to the entry of the order confirming 
the plan, yet did -not raise or assert the claims in the bankr.upt.cy 
proceeding. 
The Second Circuit stated that had the bankruptcy court 
found merit in appellants' lender liability claims, it probably 
would have structured a different disposition of Sure-Snap's assets 
or schedule of payments." Sure-Snap, 948 F.2d at 876. The Second 
4 
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Circuit held that Sure-Snap was barred from later asserting the 
claims. 
Greever not only failed to assert the claims in the 
bankruptcy court, he failed to even disclose them and in fact 
affirmatively asserted "under penalty of perjury" that they did not 
exist. If there was ever a case for an estoppel, this is it. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the court should grant TNB's 
second motion for summary judgment and dismiss all claims ~9ainst 
TNB. 
PENN, STUART, ESKRIDGE & JONES 
P.O. Box 2288 
Abing 
TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK 
By Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing has 
been mailed to Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr., Esq. and Jack R. Wilson, 
III, Esq., this ~day of May, 1996. 
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* * "* I of the act. And that demand is not in violation of the act. 
2 Thank you. 
3 MR DIIRRETTE: Your Honor, may I make one comment on 
4 that? And again, Mr. Hodges has the last word. But we're 
5 dealing ... we're not dealing with a contract that comes before 
6 the Court on rules of parole evidence or anything like that 
7 with this letter. But the pleading alleges that the 
8 requirement was to sign the note. The letter is one piece of 
9 evidence along with the other two letters that that was the 
10 demand. We're also entitled to produce whatever testimony we 
11 have that that was the demand. We're not here with rules of 
12 construction for contracts and parole evidence and all of 
13 that. This is simply, did they require it or didn't they and 
14 we're entitled to put on evidence, and right now there isn't 
15 any evidence. And what their argument is, is that you ought 
16 to just take that letter and interpret it in a vacuum and 
17 give it the interpretation that the bank argues that it ought 
18 to have. But it's just one piece of evidence. The pleading 
19 says that the signature was required. And so I'll let you 
20 rebut it. But that's the point that I want to make is we 
21 don't have a contract which is before the Court for 
22 interpretation. 
23 MR HODGES: I think it's all been said, Your Honor, 
24 I'll move on to my next point if you're ready to hear that. 
25 57 
98 
I THE COURT: Let's see. And you have the res 
2 ~djudicata---? 
3 MR HODGES: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: ---issue? 
5 MR HODGES: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COIIR!: Are you ready to proceed with that? I 
7 just ... I believe I received that today and the certificate 
8 indicated it was mailed, maybe, yesterday. 
9 MR DIIRRETTE: Actually it was faxed, but I wasn't in 
10 the office. And I have yet to read it, but I talked to Mr. 
II Hodges about it. And to the extent that it deals with res 
12 adjudicata, I'm prepared to argue that today because it 
13 doesn't raise anything new and it doesn't cite any new cases. 
14 But it might introduce, and I'll wait, I guess, till I hear 
15 the argument, but it might.introduce an argument on equitable 
16 estoppel. And if it does introduce an argument on equitable 
17 estoppel, I will need to deal with that after today because I 
18 don't know what it is yet. 
19 MR HODGES; The second motion for summary judgment 
20 actually has two issues. One is what we're calling res 
21 adjudicata, to put a name on it, and the second one is the 
22 question of the double dip on the damages. Addressing first 
23 the res adjudicata, the facts are again teed up nice and high 
24 for the Court to hit the ball, as a legal matter. The facts 
25 58 
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I are that all of the events of which he complains, the torts, 
2 the breaches and a lot of other things, the Equal Credit 
3 Opportunity Act had occurred by the end of May, certainly, in 
4 1992. In early June 1992, Mr. Greever filed a Chapter Eleven 
5 bankruptcy proceeding. And as you may know, in connection 
6 with those proceedings, he is prepared to give elaborate and 
7 detailed information to the Court that is eventually 
8 available to his creditors about all manner of assets, 
9 including unliquidated claims against third-parties. So Mr. 
10 Greever went into the bankruptcy court and he listed the 
II balance due. There was a big balance due on this note that 
I2 hasn't been mentioned yet. But he listed that as an 
I3 undisputed claim, along with a lot of other things. He 
I4 specifically answered the question of whether he had any 
IS unliquidated, contested claims against third-parties in the 
16 negative, under oath. He went through twenty-one months of 
17 proceedings in the bankruptcy in which there was some 
I8 litigation with Tazewell National Bank but only over how its 
I9 debt was going to be paid. He admits that he never mentioned 
20 any of the claims in this suit, any of them at anytime during 
2I this bankruptcy. And we have cited the Court to a laundry 
22 list of Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions that have 
23 held, frequently characterizing it as a res adjudicata issue, 
24 that you can't do this. If a debtor goes into bankruptcy 
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1 court and takes all the advantages of the procedures allowed 
2 to him there and he ... especially these lender liability 
3 claims, some of which are the very things he is saying in 
4 this suit 11 drove him into bankruptcy11 • This is the very 
5 reason that he went into bankruptcy, he says. He is sitting 
6 on these claims. He goes through twenty-one months of 
7 bankruptcy. He eventually files a disclosure statement and 
8 plan. And again, not mentioning any of these claims, but 
9 putting in some language in the disclosure statement and 
10 plan. And I have no hesitation about calling it border 
11 plate, but it is language in a legal document and it cannot 
12 be ... I'm not suggesting that it has no effect. Put in some 
13 language preserving all claims to that effect. Again, never 
14 mentioning these claims throughout this proceeding. And, 
15 Your Honor, one month after the confirmation of this claim, 
16 this suit was filed in this court setting forth ten counts of 
17 lender liability claims against two banks, both of which have 
18 been participating in this bankruptcy. Not a word of it to 
19 any of his creditors. Not a word of it anytime throughout 
20 his bankruptcy. Just this generic statement at the end of 
21 his, I don't know if it was at the end, but somewhere in this 
22 plan, and these plans are involved documents as you know, and 
23 somewhere in his disclosure statement to the effect that he 
24 was preserving these claims. So as this issue is now joined 
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I before Your Honor, they're putting it all on this language. 
2 They're saying that you can have specific claims against the 
3 very people who are participating in your bankruptcy. In 
4 fact, you can have claims that caused you to go bankrupt 
5 worth, he is saying, millions of dollars. He is putting real 
6 big numbers up on the board in this case, yet he never has to 
7 mention them to anyone in his bankruptcy case. He can take a 
8 discharge, which is a result of a Chapter Eleven proceeding, 
9 get a confirmed plan, walk away, go across the street to his 
10 friendly State Court and start the million dollar lawsuit 
II pending. The cases say he can't do it. It doesn't even have 
I2 a good aroma to it at all. And the cases say he can't do it. 
I3 And this Court should not allow him to do it. Now the 
14 interesting thing is this seems to be very clear with respect 
15 to Mr. Greever's personal 9laim. See, he is joining in all 
I6 of these claims. He puts some different dollars up, minor 
17 differences, but he is joining in all of these claims along 
18 with the corporation. The corporation did not file 
19 bankruptcy, but several of these cases that we've cited to 
20 Your Honor hold that it applies to other parties as well who 
21 are not in the bankrupt, but who are in privity with the 
22 bankrupt . 
23 MR rnmRETTE: Steve, let me interrupt just to save 





MR HODGES: Yeah. 
MR ptmRET!E: We researched that as carefully as we 
3 could and tried to come up with an argument that would defeat 
4 the privity part, but we can't. 
5 
6 
MR HODGES: Okay. 
MR PIIRRET!E: We're not going to argue that there is 
7 lack of privity here. 
8 
9 
MR HODGES: So this issue would---? 
MR PURRETTE: It's the same for both of them. 
IO MR HODGES: It goes ... all right. Very well. I won't 
II belabor that. 
12 Now, Your Honor, our last point, and as far as I know 
13 this is the last point of the day, the last substantive 
I4 point, is the question of the double dip, or attempt at 
I5 double recovery. As YourBonor knows, in litigation of this 
16 sort it's very common for double dip claims to be asserted 
17 and they're sometimes a little difficult to spot, not too 
18 difficult in this case, but they come in many different 
19 permutations. And all the Court can do is look at the 
20 economics of the claim and look what happened and ask 
21 yourself if this is not an attempt at a double dip. And to 
22 slightly simplify the damages claims and just get to the 
23 heart of it, the Greever Corporation claims as a result of 
24 all of these activities, it's interesting, all of the 
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* * * 1 its own behalf, the second motion for summary judgment on the 
2 same grounds as already argued. 
3 MR DURRETXE: On the first point that has to do with 
4 the effect of the bankruptcy on the lawsuit, as I indicated, 
5 we do agree that there is privity between Mr. Greever and the 
6 Greever Corporation, so your rulings would apply to both. We 
7 set forth in our brief the argument as to why the rationale 
8 advanced by Tazewell National Bank doesn't apply to this 
9 particular case. We do not disagree that the ... in fact, we 
10 assert affirmatively, that the confirmation of the plan is an 
11 order with res adjudicata effect. However, as we point out 
12 on page five of our brief, none of the confirmed plans in any 
13 of the cases cited by National Bank contain a provision 
14 preserving the debtor's right to maintain actions, and 
15 therefore, none of them apply. The fundamental difference 
16 here, and it was obviously done for a reason, is that the 
17 disclosure statement filed by Mr. Greever says this, "Nothing 
18 in this plan would waive any and all of the debtor's rights 
19 to bring an action against any party or parties which the 
20 debtor believes may be indebted to the debtor for any causes 
21 of action that may exist pre-petition. The purpose of this 
22 Chapter Eleven plan is not to settle or waive any of those 
23 causes of action, but to preserve all of those if bringing 
24 the same is determined by the debtor to be necessary in the 
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I future. 11 And we've attached a copy of that disclosure to our 
2 reply brief. The plan itself, which was confirmed by the 
3 Court, and we've attached a copy of the plan and a copy of 
4 the order, says this, "Any adversary proceeding presently 
5 pending or to be commenced in the future against various 
6 individuals or entities shall remain as a property right of 
7 the debtor and shall in no way be waived or affected by the 
8 plan or disclosure statement filed herewith. 11 Now 
9 those ... that reservation in the plan, forecasted by the 
10 disclosure statement, is res adjudicata. It is binding on 
11 everybody in that proceeding, that all of the future causes 
12 of action against any entity remain as a property right of 
13 the debtor. That's been adjudicated. Now Tazewell National 
14 Bank wants to come in and say to the Court, well, we don't 
IS like the effect of that adjudication. We think it's unfair, 
16 so you should ignore it. Now it either has res adjudicata 
17 effect or it doesn't. Now they argue it has res adjudicata 
18 effect, that the order itself is res adjudicata. But they 
19 want to say in all the cases that they cited, which don•t 
20 have this reservation that Mr. Greever has, they want to say 
21 that because Mr. Greever could have brought that claim as an 
22 adversary proceeding in his Chapter Eleven and didn't, that 
23 this order has res adjudicata effect and bars it. But for 
24 the Court to rule that way you would have to ignore the very 
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I plain reservation of all causes of action against any entity 
2 as a property right of a debtor, so that has res adjudicata 
3 effect, too. Now we've cited cases to the Court that discuss 
4 this whole issue. They say that even if the plan is beyond 
5 the power of the bankruptcy court to confirm, even if it 
6 contains provisions that were outside the bankruptcy court's 
7 jurisdiction, it's still binding. Why? Because everybody 
8 had the disclosure statement. Everybody, including Tazewell 
9 National Bank, had an opportunity to say Mr. Greever, what 
IO causes of action are you talking about. Your Honor, we 
II object to the disclosure statement because Mr. Greever hasn't 
I2 listed the causes of action and we want to know whether or 
I3 not there are any causes of action pending against us. We 
14 want those disclosed. Didn't do it. They could have 
15 objected to the order, didn't do it. And now they want the 
I6 Court to apply a principle of res adjudicata familiar in 
17 civil litigation, which is if you don't bring a cause of 
I8 action when you have it and you go to verdict on an order on 
19 a case, you're barred because you could have brought it and 
20 didn't. It doesn't apply here. The plain language in the 
2I order indicates that it doesn't apply. It ... this is not in 
22 our brief, but it's almost like turning a dismissal without 
23 prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice. If you bring 
24 a ... if you brought a lawsuit and you pled three causes of 
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1 action and you had a fourth but you didn't plead it and you 
2 took a nonsuit, dismissed it without prejudice, then the next 
3 time you filed it you filed the fourth one, too, clearly 
4 you're entitled to do so. Now if you get a dismissal with 
5 prejudice, you're not. It's the same thing here. The 
6 language and the order is in effect without prejudice. It's 
7 saying I reserve all of my causes of action against any 
8 entity, it's my property right. And the Court has ordered 
9 that. The Court has ordered the retention of these causes of 
10 action by Mr. Greever. Now as far as the double dipping and 
11 damages are concerned, if the ... I don't remember what was put 
12 before the Court, but I don't think the ... I don't know 
13 whether Tazewell National Bank filed the interrogatory 
14 answers and whether they filed Carl Puckett's report or not, 
15 but if you're going ... if the Court is going to rule on a 
16 summary judgment motion that these damages are identical, 
17 then I suggest that the Court ... that the record is not 
18 complete for the Court to do that. I believe that you need 
19 testimony from Mr. Puckett and from Mr. Greever in order to 
20 analyze these damages and determine whether or not they're 
21 duplicative. We don't think they are. But if they are, we 
22 concede we can't recover them. But that's going to take 
23 testimony and it's going to take an analysis of Mr. Puckett 
24 as to how a business valuation is done. If this damage had 
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* * * 1 think they're duplicative. But, the analysis of whether they 
2 are or not is a factual question to be decided at trial. And 
3 we concede that if they are, we can•t recover them. But the 
4 whole Keepe analysis, which was part of the brief which 
5 hadn•t been raised today, is ... and we concede Keepe is right, 
6 but it just doesn't apply to the facts of this case. 
7 MR HODGES: Your Honor, it's now crystal clear, if 
8 there was any doubt at the end of this briefing, that the 
9 only salvation that Mr. Greever and Greever Corporation can 
10 even try to bring to bear to save any of the claims in this 
II case as I understand their position, certainly TNB's, is this 
I2 language that they say they put two places in the bankruptcy 
I3 papers. And that's a given fact for the purposes of what 
I4 you're deciding here. And Mr. Durrette read that language 
15 for you. And when he got down to the ultimate language in 
16 the plan, which is the real critical document. The 
I7 disclosure statement is sort of a warm up to the plan to give 
I8 information. When he read it to you he read ... what it says 
I9 is that they are preserving adversary proceedings. And Your 
20 Honor may know or may not know, but an adversary proceeding 
2I is a term of art, a very specific thing in bankruptcy court. 
22 And it is by definition an action brought in bankruptcy 
23 court. It is within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
24 court. In a term such as that used in a bankruptcy paper, 
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I even taking the most literal and broadest view of this issue 
2 would not apply to a civil action, a law action brought in 
3 the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, or Tazewell County, 
4 Virginia in this particular case. So even the language they 
5 argued for doesn't do it. Now the statement was made that 
6 the cases that we have cited, in those cases there was no 
7 such language as this in the bankruptcy proceeding. That's 
8 quite an overstatement. It is true that none of those cases 
9 talked about or mentioned as part of the factual predicate 
IO anything about any language like this. So this particular 
II point has not been decided in anybody's cases. But when you 
I2 read the cases, I believe what you see is if the debtor went 
I3 into bankruptcy court and had these lender liability claims 
I4 that he was sitting on and he didn't assert, some of them say 
I5 assert them, but at least disclose them, those claims, he is 
I6 out of here when he tries to come back to court. And that's 
I7 the rule of law and that's the whole rule of law. We think 
18 these courts are saying that's the end of the inquiry. It's 
19 admittedly this particularly issue about some generic attempt 
20 to save claims in these papers is not specifically addressed 
21 in any of these cases one way or the other. I don't think 
22 either party has a case on that. If they have, it hasn't 
23 been cited to the Court. Just think about this, Your Honor. 
24 What possible could justify what has gone on in this case? 
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1 It's not just us, there is the whole other world of creditors 
2 out there of Mr. Greever and they're tied up in this 
3 proceeding. And he is filing list after list of all of these 
4 things about his financial affairs and debts and assets and 
5 personal things and goes on and on page after page never a 
6 whisper, never a whisper. He is signing these things 
7 personally through the threat of perjury. He has went 
8 through the entire proceeding, closed the deal, got his plan 
9 confirmed, and was in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County 
10 within one month, about thirty-one days, and filed this suit. 
11 So it's a compelling thing. The case law is there. The very 
12 precise issue that they've decided to hang their case on is 
13 not in those opinions, I grant you that, but the decision is 
14 compelling. How could the Court justify paying Mr. Greever 
15 to do something like this having gone through bankruptcy and 
16 not disclosed any of this to his other creditors, much less 
17 us? We should have had the opportunity too, when we're in 
18 there talking about our claim and litigating over how our 
19 claim is going to be paid off over what period of time or 
20 what interest rates. Having suits of the things within the 
21 bankruptcy case. I mentioned ... I'll mention them to you. So 
22 this is the Plaintiff's thing. Maybe the single most 
23 compelling thing of the case, it practically takes care of 
24 all of it, certainly TNB, and we think Your Honor might be 
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1 justified in just deciding the case on this point alone. 
2 Thank you. 
3 MF WILSON: Having joined in on the motion, just one 
4 point on that. You know, what Mr. Hodges has alluded to is 
5 the public policy, the policy behind the bankruptcy 
6 proceeding, is identification of debts that you want to get 
7 discharged and offsetting those with the assets that you have 
8 and you put that whole thing into the pot and the Court sorts 
9 it out. Well, what we•ve got here is a situation where 
10 allegedly a valuable asset of the bankrupt party was not 
11 included, not put into the mix of bankruptcy proceeding. And 
12 it's because of that action that the public policy would be 
13 that you can't later on try to keep that for yourself because 
14 that asset should have been given to those parties in the 
15 bankruptcy proceeding that didn't get a hundred cents on the 
16 dollar of what they were owed. The bankruptcy proceedings 
17 allow for this action itself to have been brought within the 
18 bankruptcy court adjudicated to a judgment and if a judgment 
19 was rendered, that pot of money that was recovered 
20 distributed to other creditors. And so the bankruptcy 
21 philosophy prevents exactly what we've got here, an asset 
22 undisclosed, allegedly valuable, kept out of the hands of 
23 creditors who are owed money. And it's for that public 
24 policy reason that bankruptcy courts in these cases have said 
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1 you can't bring that claim later. That claim belonged 
2 rightfully to the creditors who were in your bankruptcy 
3 proceeding and you can't now keep it for yourself and try to 
4 gain money from it after the bankruptcy proceedings. And so 
5 for those reasons we would agree that that issue alone 
6 disposes of this entire case. And for that reason, we've 
7 joined in on a motion for summary judgment. 
8 MR ntmRETTE: Your Honor, let me comment briefly on 
9 that recognizing again I didn't know that Mr. Wilson was 
10 going to join in on this one, too. But, they'll get the last 
11 word. But they're competing public policies here and you'll 
12 see this when you read the cases. The bankruptcy court is 
13 not primarily a forum for adversarial litigation. It becomes 
14 one from time to time for major commercial disputes and the 
15 assertion of adversary proceedings as offsets. But Tazewell 
16 National Bank here got its debt reorganized, so did everyone 
17 else. There is a ... and you'll see this again in the cases, 
18 there is a public policy that, and it's stated in the 
19 disclosure plan, that this was not ... this proceeding was not 
20 primarily to decide, let me just point that to you again, 
21 "Nothing in this claim would waive any rights", et cetera, et 
22 cetera. "The purpose of this Chapter Eleven plan is not to 
23 settle or waive any of those causes of action, but to 
24 preserve all of those if bringing the same is determined by 
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1 the debtor to be necessary in the future. 11 Now if there is a 
2 public policy that these things ought to be done in 
3 bankruptcy court, then that public policy was served by this 
4 debtor unlike anybody else in any of those cases, at least so 
5 far as we know. Mr. Hodges is right, I don't know what's in 
6 the record that wasn't in the cases. But all I meant to say 
7 was that in none of the cases cited by TNB is there a 
8 disclosure like this or a reservation like this. This put 
9 the creditors on notice. This let them know that this debtor 
10 was reorganizing, but that he was preserving whatever else he 
11 had generically, and how many times, I would be really 
12 curious to know how many times these banks have asserted as a 
13 defense a release that they got a borrower to sign during a 
14 workout agreement where he released all causes of action 
15 known and unknown and he came in later on and said gee, I 
16 didn't know I had this cause of action, I didn't know about 
17 this, sorry. You signed the release, you waived any and all. 
18 And there is a public policy that says we enforce that. 
19 People are charged with what they sign. They are to read. 
20 They know what they sign. And whether they know they have 
21 the cause of action or not, they've released it, whether 
22 known or unknown, and we're going to enforce that release. 




I THE cotmT: Are you suggesting that Mr. Greever didn't 
2 know he had these causes of action? 
3 MR ptmRETTE: No, sir. I'm not suggesting that. I 
4 do not intend to suggest that. There is no evidence one way 
5 or the other here. But, I do not want to mislead the Court. 
6 That's not my point. My point is that in a release document 
7 where someone reads it and signs it, and where there is a 
8 language that they are releasing all causes of action, 
9 whether known or unknown, even if they come in later and 
10 com~lain, they're going to be held to that release document. 
11 My point by analogy is that Mr. Greever in his disclosure 
12 statement informed all of his creditors that nothing in this 
13 plan would waive any of my rights. The purpose of this 
14 Chapter Eleven plan is not to settle or waive any of those 
15 causes of action, but to preserve all of those if bringing 
16 the same is determined by the debtor to be necessary in the 
17 future. So he told his creditors what the purpose of his 
18 reorganization was. He told them that it wasn't to 
19 adjudicate these and that I'm saving them. And then he 
20 affirmed that in the plan itself, which was affirmed by the 
21 Court. 
22 THE cmmT: But you would concede it's apparently 
23 inequitable if Mr. Greever knew that he had these "lucrative" 
24 causes of action at the time he was in bankruptcy and just 
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1 kind of said, well, as soon as I can get this plan confirmed, 
2 I'll fill my pocket, you would concede that? 
3 MR mmHE'M'E: Without this disclosure I might concede 
4 that, Your Honor. If he had gone through the plan, had not 
5 in his disclosure statement said what he said and had not in 
6 the confirmation order said what he said, then I would agree 
1 with t·he Court that that would be inequitable. But he chose 
8 to deal with ..• to reorganize without litigating these things 
9 in the bankruptcy court. He alerted everyone that that is 
10 what he was doing. Now that's the purpose of the disclosure 
11 statement. He said not only, I am reserving these to myself, 
12 but he went further and said the purpose of this Chapter 
13 Eleven is not to litigate any causes of action that I may 
14 have, but it's to just to reorganize, and I'll bring those 
15 later on if I decide to. Now any creditor could have said, 
16 what are you talking about. They could have gone to the 
17 Judge and said, Your Honor, we see this statement, does this 
18 mean that there is more wealth out there, does he have any 
19 causes of action? We want to put Mr. Greever under oath and 
20 ask him. Nobody did that. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR HQOGES: Your Honor, obviously this paper that 
23 they're hangi~g it all on has gone into a court file where 
24 the whole_ process was started with a document, an extensive 
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1 document signed by Mr. Greever in which he effectively, 
2 affirmatively stated that no such thing existed. And he went 
3 through litigation with certain parties, including Tazewell 
4 National Bank, why in the world would they ever come in when 
5 he filed this plan and say, what claims are you talking 
6 about? That's certainly a legal possibility, I guess they 
7 would have had that right. But why would they ever come in 
8 and do that in the context of this case? The disclosure 
9 statement itself is supposed to set out what the assets are. 
10 The schedules that are filed at the beginning of the case 
11 requires specific line by line answers about what the assets 
12 are. And this is a debtor who said he didn't have this 
13 particular asset and he had it the whole time. 
14 THE cotmT: It probably has some bearing on whether 
15 the creditor would accept or reject the plan, or join in the 
16 plan, or deny the plan. 
17 MR HODGES: Sure. If the debtor is sitting on a 
18 million dollar asset or even a fifty thousand dollar asset in 
19 a case of this type, it might make a tremendous difference to 
20 how the creditors react to the plan as a whole. 
21 THE cmmT: As a practical matter, with that 
22 reorganization, are all of these parties being paid? 
23 MR HODGES: Tazewell National is being paid or at 
24 least was the last time I checked. 
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1 THE CffiiRT: Okay. Well---. 
2 MR HODGES: Your Honor, I have a score card here. I 
3 don't know. I hope ... this is just a list of what our points 
4 are count by count. It's just an aid if it would be useful 
5 to the Court---. 
6 THE CffiiRT: Well, I---. 
7 MR HODGES: ---I can offer it. 
8 THE COURT: ---welcome any aid. 
9 MR HODGES: I struck out the one I've abandoned. 
10 MR DimB.Eri:E: Your Honor, I would like to bring out a 
11 matter that we•ve all talked about. And I think we bring our 
12 calendars today. This case has been pending for a very long 
13 time for lots of reasons. I'm not assigning any blame on 
14 anybody, it's just been sitting there. We've been 
15 responsible for it sitting as well as anybody else. I had 
16 tried to get a trial date this summer and that didn't work 
17 out. And I have ... I'm pushing to get depositions. And I was 
18 unable to get Mr. Wilson to agree to depositions because his 
19 motions were dispositive. And the ... I did persuade, well, I 
20 don't know that I persuaded anybody, but Steve and I agreed 
21 that ... well, first of all, Jack said that he didn't feel the 
22 need to attend the depositions of the Tazewell National Bank 
23 people, so that left it free for Steve and I to work out a 
24 schedule. And we couldn't agree to do anything before the 
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June 13, 1996 
The Honorable K. R. Williams 
Buchanan County Circuit Court 
Buchanan County Courthouse 
Main Street, Second Floor 
Grundy, Virginia 24614 
V~A FEDERAL EXPRESS 
THE FEDERAl. HOUSE 
1011 CHARLES STREET 
P.O. BOX 7536 
FREDERICKSBURG, VIRGINIA 22401 
TELEPHONE (540) 371•3900 
FACSIMILE (5o40) 371·1412 
Re: Bill Greever Corporation et. al. v. Tazewell National 
Bank, et. al. - Tazewell County Circuit Court 
Case No: CL94000100 
Dear Judge Williams: 
I felt obliged to contact the Court to direct its attention to 
a recent decision of the Third Circuit that distinguishes the cases 
cited by Tazewell National Bank ("TNB11 ) in support of its Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, particularly Oneida Motor Freight, 
Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848_ F.2d 414 (3rd Cir. 1988). That 
case is Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 
355 (3rd Cir. 1996), a copy is attached. 
Although the basis of TNB' s Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
was premised on the doctrine of ~ judicata, TNB virtually 
abandoned the doctrine at the last moment when Plaintiffs pointed 
out that TNB was trying to relitiqate the terms of a confirmed plan 
and that pyramid of case law states that a party in TNB's position 
can not relitiqate the terms of a confirmed plan where it failed to 
appeal the terms of the plan (even if the terms of the plan are 
contrary to law). Therefore, Plaintiffs should prevail on this 
issue. 
However, TNB made an attempt to save its claim by trying to 
disguise its motion as an argument premised upon estoppel. The 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment specifies that it is based only 
upon res judicata (and standing - not applicable here). Thus, res 
judicata is the only issue properly before the Court. The day 
before the hearing, TNB filed a response based wholly upon the 
doctrine of estoppel - not~ judicata. Plaintiffs have never had 
the opportunity to brief that issue and do not intend to do so now. 
1.1.8 
DURRETTE. IRVIN & BRAnsHA w, P.C. 
The Honorable K. R. Williams 
Page 2 
June 13, 1996 
But, Plaintiffs have been concerned that the -actions of TNB might 
lead the Court to rule prematurely on a claim of estoppel that has 
not been properly placed before it. 
The Third Circuit's decision in Ryan will make a claim for 
estoppel very difficult for TNB. If TNB raises estoppel in a 
subsequent motion, that motion will fail because it can not prove 
that Plaintiffs asserted a position inconstant with a previous 
position and because there has been no bad faith. Additionally, 
for any other type of estoppel TNB might raise, TNB would be 
required to prove ~easonable reliance with resulting detriment -
which it cannot do. See Princess Anne Hills Civic League v. susan 
Constant Real Estate Trust, 243 Va. 53, 59 (1992). 
I appreciate the Court's attention to this matter. If you 
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Hen. Keary R. Williams, Judge 
Circuit Court of Buchanan County 
P.O. Box 606 
Grundy, VA 24614 
Re: Bill Greever Corporation, et al v. 
Tazewell National Bank, et al 
Law No. CL94000100 
PSE&J File No.: 2273-3 
Dear Judge Williams: 
PENN. STIJART, ESKRIDGE & JOr-..'ES 
ATIORNEYS AT LAW 
POST OFFIO: BOX 2288 
ABINGDON, VIRGINIA 24212·2288 
208 E. MAIN STREET 
ABINGDON. VIRCL~IA 24.210·2904 
TE.L.EPHONE 540 /628·5151 
FAX 540 /628·5621 
OOices in Abingdon 
and Bristol. Virginia 
Please accept this as TNB's reply to Greever's counsel's 
letter of June 13, 1996, in which he attempts to further argue 
against Tazewell National Bank's ("TNB") Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Greever cites a new Third Circuit case, Ryan, which he 
says diminishes the authority of Oneida, an earlier Third Circuit 
case cited by TNB. Greever misstates TNB's positions, misreads 
Ryan, and pointedly ignores the wealth of other authorities 
supporting TNB's motion. 
First, let me assure the court that TNB has not "aban-
doned the doctrine" of Dlli iudicata, as Greever asserts. There is 
no basis for Greever's making such a statement. second, the Ryan 
cuse dccs not overrule or weak~n the authority of Cneid~. In fact, 
Ryan discusses Oneida at length and revalidates the holding. In 
Oneida (as in this case) unlike Ryan, the claims not disclosed in 
bankruptcy were claimed to have arisen from the very events which 
caused the bankruptcy filing. Just as in this case, in Oneida, the 
defendant/creditor's claim was disclosed in the bankruptcy as a 
liability with no mention of the existence of any claim by the 
debtor against the creditor. In short, the specific features of 
the Oneida case which the court used to distinguish it from Ryan 
are present in the current case. oneida is on point. Ryan is not. 
Even if Ryan were helpful to Greever, which it is not, 
Greever has nothing to say about the seven other decisions from 
courts across the country cited in TNB's memorandum, all of which 
hold that ~ judicata bars previously undisclosed lender liability 
claims. 
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Greever's attempt to portray Ryan as something it is not 
and to ignore the other authorities is his last ditch effort to 
avoid the legally prescribed consequences of his actions. TNB's 
second motion for summary judgment should be granted, resulting in 
the dismissal of all counts. 
SMH/jth 
cc: Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr., Esq. 
Jack R. Wilson, III, Esq. 
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Gentlemen: 
Re: Bill Greever Corporation and 
Bill B. Greever, Sr., v. 
Tazewell National Bank and 
Citizens Bank of Tazewell 
Tazewell County Circuit Court 
Case No. Law CL94000100 
(703) 988-5998 
First of all, let me apologize for taking the extended period 
of time that it has taken in order to conclude the opinion that the 
Court is now ready to deliver. I can say without any hesitation 
that this is the most complicated single piece of litigation that 
I to date have been called upon to adjudicate. I think it would be 
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fair to say that one could easily teach a semester's course in 
civil litigation on the issues raised in this file alone. 
I have now read and re-read the pleadings, responsive 
pleadings, motions, memorandum, and responding memorandum, as well 
as the transcript and argument previously conducted in my chambers 
some time ago and render my opinion as follows: 
A Motion for Summary Judgment will fail if there is a genuine 
issue of material fact. Piland Corp. v.League Construction Co .. 
Inc .. 238 Va. 187, 380 S.E. 2d 652 (1989). "Upon considering a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must rule, as a matter of 
law, on the sufficiency of the evidence; it does not weigh the 
evidence as a finder of fact. Accordingly, the Court must draw 
those inferences most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. at 
189. 
Defendant Tazewell National Bank's ( "TNB") Motion for Summary 
Judgment rests upon three arguments: that the Plaintiffs' claims 
are barred by the Statute of Limitations; the claims are barred by 
res judicata; and the claims are barred because the Plaintiff, Bill 
Greever, has no standing to sue. 
Defendant TNB's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon res 
judicata will be sustained as to the Plaintiffs, Bill Greever and 
Bill Greever Corporation ( 11 BGC 11 ) • The Court finds that the Chapter 
11 bankruptcy action instituted by Bill Greever culminating in the 
confirmation of his bankruptcy plan and his release of his 
dischargeable debts on March 21, 1994, serves as a res judicata -
bar to the present actions by Bill Greever and BGC. 
"The doctrine of res judicata is that a point once adjudicated 
by a court of competent jurisdiction may be relied upon as 
conclusive upon the same matter as between the parties or their 
privies, in any subsequent suit, in the same court or any other 
court ... ". Patterson v. Saunders, 194 Va. 607, 74 S.E.2d 204 
(1953) citing Hedlund v. Miner, 395 Ill. 217, 170 A.L.R. 1306, 69 
N. E. 2d 862. (Emphasis added) . Bankruptcy Courts sitting in 
Virginia have previously declined 11 ••• to interpret the doctrine of 
res judicata in the bankruptcy context differently from the 
traditional interpretation of res judicata in law." Colonial Auto 
Center. Inc. v. Shirley Mae Tomlin, 184 Bankr. 720 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
The Tomlin Court emphatically held that 11 [t] he doctrine of res 
judicata [does apply] in the bankruptcy context." Id. The 
elements of res judicata in Virginia are 11 (1) identity of the 
remedies sought; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity 
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of the parties; and (4) identity of the quality of the person for 
or against whom the claim is made. 11 Wright v. Castles. et al., 232 
Va. 218, 349 S.E.2d 125 (1986) citing Mowry v. City of Virginia 
Beach, 198 Va. 205, 93 S.E.2d 323 (1956). 
First, the Court will look at the identity of the parties 
involved. Plaintiff Bill Greever filed the bankruptcy action and 
listed TNB as one of his creditors. While there is no Virginia 
state case directly on point, this Court's reasoning is based 
mainly upon the rationale found within In Re Grimm, 168 Bankr. 102 
(E.D. Bankr. Va. 1994). There, the Court held that 11 an order 
confirming a plan of reorganization is a final judgment on the 
merits for the purposes of res judicata." Id. Accordingly, any 
claim by Bill Greever with TNB is considered as a final judgment on 
the merits. 
Dealing with the third and fourth elements of res judicata 
secondly, it becomes apparent from looking at the supporting 
bankruptcy paperwork, supplied through discovery, that Bill Greever 
and TNB were parties to the bankruptcy action. Therefore, the 
inclusion of both of these parties satisfy the third and fourth 
elements of res judicata. 
In determining the second element, which is the similarity of 
the two causes of action, "the eourt of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has adopted a transactional approach ... [saying] that the 
appropriate inquiry is whether the new claim arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the 
prior judgment." Id. In determining "whether a confirmed plan 
precludes a suit that is filed after confirmation", other courts of 
appeals have applied this 11 transaction-based approach 11 as well. Id. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled "that res judicata 
preclude [s] ... lender liability suits that the debtor and its 
principals had brought against two banks after plan confirmation. 11 
In Re Grimm, 168 Bankr. 102 (E.D. Bankr. Va. 1994) citing Sure-Snap 
Corp. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. , 94 8 F. 2d 8 6 9 ( 2d Cir. 
1991) . In Sure-Snap, the debtor brought suit against a bank after 
it "called a loan early and terminated a line of credit to the 
debtor". Id. at 875. The Debtor claimed that the conduct of one of 
the defendant banks "[had] forced [him] into bankruptcy ... Id. at 
875. The Second Circuit said that 11 [the debtor's] very allegation 
that the bank's tortious conduct negatively influenced their 
business health, makes it hard-pressed to explain how the two 
causes of action -- the plan of reorganization and the lender 
liability claims --did not comprise the same essential matter." 
Id. at 875. (Emphasis added). The facts in Sure-Snap largely 
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mirror the facts in this present case. Therefore, this Court 
adopts the logic utilized by the Second Circuit, and acknowledged 
by the Court in In Re Grimm. 
In the present case, the Plaintiffs state emphatically in 
paragraphs 11, 21, 36 and 43 of their Second Amended Motion for 
Judgment {hereinafter "Motion for Judgment") that the actions of 
the Defendant TNB played a part in forcing the Plaintiff Bill 
Greever to seek bankruptcy protection. The Plaintiffs also 
plainly state in paragraph 36 that the n ••• subsequent bankruptcy of 
Mr. Greever injured the credit and business of Mr. Greever and 
BGC ... " thereby forming a basis for part of their claim. The main 
difference between the case at hand and Sure-Snap is the 
involvement of an additional Plaintiff -- Bill Greever Corporation. 
Two tenets of Virginia law support this Court's application of 
res judicata to the claims of both Plaintiffs. Those tenets are 
virtual representation and privity of parties. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "nonparties 
may be bound by a judgment under the doctrine of virtual 
representation ... ". Bates, et al. v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 202 
S.E.2d 917 {1974) noting Klugh v. u.s., 818 F.2d 294 {4th Cir. 
1987) . This doctrine holds that "a nonparty to an action may be 
bound by a judgment under res judicata if one of the parties to the 
action is so closely aligned to the interests of the nonparty as to 
be his virtual representative." Id. at 673. Here, the interests 
of Bill Greever and BGC are closely aligned. Bill Greever is the 
President of BGC and its sole shareholder. Bill Greever sought to 
file bankruptcy so that he could protect his interests, but in 
doing so, he sought to protect the interests of BGC as well. In 
fact, the Motion for Judgment states that the interests of both 
Bill Greever and BGC were injured by the actions of the Defendant 
TNB, and that those actions hindered the Plaintiffs from acquiring 
loans in any other bank. The Motion for Judgment specifically 
states that Bill Greever filed bankruptcy due to the actions of the 
Defendant TNB, and this allegation forms part of the basis for the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment. The loans obtained through TNB 
were for the benefit of Bill Greever and BGC. Bill Greever executed 
the applicable loan "notes" as a principal of the corporation and 
in his n individual capacity". Bill Greever and BGC paid the 
interest on the loan together. Bill Greever used his personal 
property to secure the loan made to BGC and Bill Greever. Both 
Plaintiffs claim the same injuries. In short, the claims of BGC and 
Bill Greever are intertwined. The Motion for Judgment implies that 
the harm done to one Plaintiff could not have occurred without the 
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harm done to the other and that both Plaintiffs suffered equally 
due to the Defendants' actions. Therefore, the Court finds that 
the interest of BGC were virtually represented by Bill Greever in 
his personal bankruptcy. 
The Virginia Supreme Court has said that 11 [t]here is no fixed 
definition of privity that automatically can be applied to all 
cases involving res judicata issues. 11 Nero v. Ferris, 222 Va. 807, 
284 S.E.2d 828 (1981). However, 11 privity generally involves a 
party so identical in interest with another that he represent the 
same legal right [and] a determination of just who are privies 
requires a careful examination into the circumstances of each 
case. 11 Id. When determining whether privity exists, a Court will 
look to circumstances such as the "relationship, interests and 
legal rights of the ... " two parties. Race Fork Coal, et al . v. 
Mack Turner. et al., 5 Va. App. 350, 363 S.E.2d 423 (1987) reversed 
on other grounds, 237 Va. 639, 379 S.E.2d 341 {1989). Bill Greever 
and BGC share a close relationship as evidenced by the fact that 
Bill Greever is the President of the Corporation and is the sole 
shareholder. As discussed above, Bill Greever and BGC' s claims are 
intertwined and they possess identical interests in the case at 
hand. Both Plaintiffs were signatories to the subject loans o the 
controversy, and each possessed equal legal and contractual rights. 
Both Plaintiffs suffered alleged financial injury due to the 
actions of Defendant TNB. Significantly 1 both Plaintiffs claim the 
bankruptcy somewhat harmed their credit reputation which, in turn, 
harmed them financially. When looking at the relationship between 
Bill Greever and BGC and the similarity of interests and legal 
rights involved, it is clear that privity existed between them. 
Accordingly, under the principles of "virtual representation" 
and "privity of parties" 1 this Court considers the interests of BGC 
to be adequately represented by Bill Greever in his personal 
bankruptcy action. In light of this holding, the claims by Bill 
Greever and BGC against TNB are barred by the res judicata effect 
of the bankruptcy. The Court sustains Defendant TNB's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in regard to Counts I, II, III, IV and V, and 
hereby dismisses Count X dealing with a joint claim against TNB and 
Citizens Bank of Tazewell ("CBT"). 
The Court declines to address the other bases of the Defendant 
TNB's Motion for ·Summary judgment due to its decision based upon 
res judicata. 
The Court's ruling in TNB's Motion for Summary Judgment does 
not affect the Plaintiffs' Counts against Defendant CBT. Although 
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these Counts mirror those against TNB, the claims against CBT are 
based upon different facts. Also, CBT has not moved for summary 
judgment, but has only demurred to the Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Judgment. 
Defendant Citizens Bank of Tazewell has demurred to the claims 
specifically made against them. "A demurrer ... tests the 
sufficiency of the factual allegations to determine whether the 
pleading states a cause of action." Concerned Taxpayers of 
Brunswick County. et al. v. County of Brunswick. et al., 249 Va. 
320, 455 S.E.2d 712 (1995). In order for the Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Judgment to survive a demurrer, it must only state the 
essential elements of the cause of action which it alleges. 11 [T] he 
sufficiency of a Motion for Judgment is whether it states the 
essential element of a cause of action, not whether evidence might 
be adduced to defeat it. " Commonwealth of Virginia. ex rel, 
Vincent Pross. Comptroller v. Board of Supervisors of Spotsylvania 
County. et al., 225 Va. 492, 303 S.E.2d 887 {1983}. 11 In reviewing 
the sufficiency of a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer, the Trial 
Court is required to consider as true all material facts that are 
properly pleaded, facts which are impliedly alleged, and facts 
which may be fairly and justly inferred from the facts alleged. 
Luckett v. Jennings. et al., 246 Va. 303, 435 S.E.2d 400 {1993}. 
Virginia's Commercial Code, under Section 8.1-203, states that 
"[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of 
good faith in its performance or enforcement. 11 Virginia Code 
Section 8.1-203 (Michie, 1950} . "Good faith" is defined by 
Virginia Code Section 8.1-201 (19), as "honesty in fact in the 
conduct or transaction concerned". Virginia Code Section 8.1-201 
(Michie, 1950) . As stated above, the purpose of a Demurrer is to 
test the sufficiency of a Motion for Judgment and to determine 
whether a Plaintiff has stated all of the elements of a cause of 
action. Concerned Taxpayers of Brunswick County. et al. v. County 
of Brunswick. et al., 249 Va. 320, 455 S.E.2d 712 (1995}. In this 
instance, the Court finds that there is no cause of action 
recognized in Virginia for the tort of "Breach of Duty of Good 
Faith". Although the Plaintiffs are not suing in tort on this 
cause of action, for the reasons discussed below, this Court 
sustains the Demurrer as to this Count. 
After much legal discourse on the subject, the Virginia 
Supreme Court pointedly addressed this area of law early this year 
in its Charles E. Brauer Co. . Inc. . et al. v. Nat ionsbank of 
Virginia. N.A .. et al. decision. There, the Court said that 
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while a duty of good faith and fair dealing exists under 
the U.C.C. as part of every commercial contract, we hold 
that the failure to act in good faith under Section 8.1-
203 does not amount to an independent tort. 
Charles E. Brauer Co .. Inc .. et al. v. Nationsbank of Virginia, 
N.A. et al., 1996 Va. LEXIS 5 (1996). Plaintiff's argument that 
the Brauer decision's effect only preempted 11 tort 11 actions based 
upon a breach of duty of good faith is correct, but this argument 
is shortsighted. The Virginia Supreme Court also said that when 
there is a breach of the implied duty of good faith under the 
U.C.C., such a breach 11 gives rise only to a cause of action for 
breach of contract" . Id. at 3. (Emphasis added) . Based upon this 
statement, the Plaintiffs' would have a cause of action, but it 
must be brought under a breach of contract theory. 
Wrongful dishonor is a statutorily created cause of action 
found in Virginia Code Section 8.4-402. The statute provides that 
"a payor bank wrongfully dishonors an item if it dishonors an item 
that is properly payable". Virginia Code Section 8.4-402 (Michie, 
1950) . In testing the sufficiency of a pleading alleging wrongful 
dishonor, the Court must determine if the Plaintiff has plead facts 
alleging that properly payable checks were wrongfully dishonored. 
From looking at the fact of the complaint, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiffs have plead sufficient ~acts to state a cause of action 
for wrongful dishonor. While the Plaintiffs cannot move forward 
with an action based upon breach of duty of good faith, they 
nonetheless can rely on the allegations that CBT didn't exercise 
good faith in maintaining a cause of action based upon wrongful 
dishonor. The Plaintiffs imply in their Motion for Judgment that 
they viewed the dishonored checks as being "properly payable" in 
light of the oral discussions with CBT regarding the loan 
restructuring and the sending of notices of interest payments due. 
The Plaintiffs considered the substance of the oral discussion as 
being an affirmation that they remained in good standing with CBT, 
and therefore gained assurance from those oral discussions that no 
unfavorable action would be taken by CBT in the wake of the 
personal bankruptcy of Mr. Greever. The Plaintiffs have 
sufficiently pled a cause of action for wrongful dishonor and CBT's 
Demurrer to this Count is overruled. 
The Plaintiffs' claim based upon promissory estoppel presents 
the Court with the question as to whether Virginia provides for 
such a cause of action. The Court finds no law that flatly denies 
the existence of a cause of action based upon promissory estoppel. 
The Virginia Supreme Court has addressed this contractual remedy 
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before without explicitly stating whether it was a viable cause of 
action in Virginia. In The Stone Printing and Manufacturing 
Company v. Dogan, the Court did state that it "assume[d] without 
deciding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applie [d] in 
Virginia", and then went on to discuss the doctrine's elements 
before ruling that the evidence failed to support the application 
of the doctrine. The Stone Printing and Manufacturing Company v. 
Dogan, 234 Va. 163, 360 S.E.2d 210 (1987). For the purposes of 
dealing with the Defendant CBT' s Demurrer, this Court likewise 
assumes that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies in 
Virginia. The Court gains support for this assumption from the 
decision in In re: MBA. v. VNU Amvest Inc. and Disclosure Inc., 
where the bankruptcy court sitting in Virginia, said that recovery 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel "would not be prohibited 
under ... Virginia law" . In re: MBA, Inc. v. VNU Amvest Inc. and 
Disclosure Inc., 51 Bankr. 966 (E.D. Va. 1985). The elements for 
promissory estoppel are: 
(1) a promise, (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance on 
the promise, {3) resulting detrimental action or 
forbearance by the promisee, {4) injustice avoidable only 
by enforcement of the promise. 
In re: MBA. Inc. v. VNU Amvest Inc. and Disclosure Inc., 51 Bankr. 
966 {E.D. Va. 1985) citing Granfield v. Catholic University of 
America, 530 F.2d 1035 {D.C. Cir.) oert denied, 429 U.S. 821 
{1976). The definition of promissory estoppel is succinctly stated 
in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts where it says that the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel 
provides that a promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement 
of the promise. 
The Stone Printing and Manufacturing Company v. Dogan, 234 Va. 163, 
360 S.E.2d 210 (1987). The Plaintiffs have alleged that an oral 
discussion took place where CBT gave its assurances that the loan 
would be restructured once the "bankruptcy case was closed", and 
would also send notices to Plaintiffs as interest became due on the 
loan notes. The Court deems those assurances enough to warrant a 
"promise" for purposes of promissory estoppel. The Plaintiffs go 
on to state that they relied on CBT's promise as they continued to 
use the bank's services and continued to conduct business. The 
Plaintiffs then allege that they suffered in their forbearance from 
paying any interest on the loan notes when CBT seized their account 
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and caused some checks to be dishonored. The Plaintiffs finally 
state that they have suffered and will continue to suffer because 
of the actions by CBT and ask to be compensated in light of tho·se 
actions. 
Defendant CBT' s argument based upon their right to set-off the 
Plaintiffs' account is misplaced when they have demurred to the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment. When dealing with a Demurrer, the 
Court must only determine whether the Plaintiff has plead 
sufficient facts to constitute a viable cause of action. The 
Court cannot consider whether those allegations will withstand a 
trial on the merits or 11 whether evidence might be adduced to defeat 
[the Motion for Judgment]"· Commonwealth of Virginia. ex rel. 
Vincent Pross. Comptroller v. Board of Supervisors of Spotsylvania 
County. et al., 225 Va. 492, 303 S.E.2d 887 (1983). 
Accordingly, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have plead 
a sufficient cause of action of promissory estoppel, and CBT' s 
Demurrer as to this Count is overruled. 
Defendant CBT has demurred to Counts IX and X of the Motion 
for Judgment alleging tortious interference with a business 
expectancy. The Court has already previously disposed of Count X 
and here addresses only Count IX. The tort of tortious 
interference with a business expectancy has four elements as 
recognized in Virginia. They are 
(1) the existence of a business relationship or 
expectancy, with a probability of future economic benefit 
to plaintiff; (2) defendant's knowledge of the 
relationship or expectancy; (3) a reasonably certainty 
that absent defendant's intentional misconduct, plaintiff 
would have continued in the relationship or realized the 
expectancy; and (4) damage to plaintiff. 
Glass v. Glass, 228 Va. 39, 321 S.E.2d 69 (1984). 
The Court looks to the fact of the Motion for Judgment to see if 
the Plaintiff has sufficiently pled elements that make up a cause 
of action for a tortious interference with a business expectancy. 
From the complaint, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has pled 
11 the existence of a business relationship or expectancy, with a 
probability of future economic benefit to plaintiff" by alluding to 
the fact that BGC makes bids for jobs in order to conduct business 
and relies upon bid solicitations in order to remain economically 
viable. 
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In regard to the second element, Plaintiff has alleged in 
paragraph 78 that CBT knew of the bids that BGC had qualified for 
in the past and that CBT knew that BGC 11 expected to continue to 
obtain bids". Such an allegation, if true, meets the substance of 
the second element here. The loan agreements themselves served to 
alert Defendant to the purpose of the loan as being that for the 
business. [The loans made by CBT are evidenced by various loan 
applications which include "Bill Greever Corporation 11 as the name 
of the borrower, and under the section listing the purpose of the 
loan are the words 'business renewal' or 'business'. The Court 
finds adequate evidence from the pleadings that Defendants had 
knowledge that the loan proceeds were to be used for the 
Plaintiffs' business.] By reason of Plaintiffs' responses to CBT' s 
Motion for Crave Oyer, I have considered the notes as part of 
Plaintiffs' pleading since in Plaintiffs' response to Crave Oyer, 
the loan documents, 11 notes 11 , were included as a collective exhibit 
as if set out in its Motion for Judgment and Amended Motion for 
Judgment. 
As part of the third element, the Plaintiff alleges that CBT's 
intentional seizing of its accounts inhibited it from obtaining 
credit elsewhere and deprived Plaintiffs of working capital. The 
Plaintiffs's characterization of the seizing of its account as 
"wrongful 11 is based upon its reliance on the alleged oral 
discussion with CBT regarding the restructuring of the loans and 
giving of notices. The Court must consider the facts alleged as 
true,and therefore finds that the Plaintiffs have properly alleged 
11 intentional misconduct 11 as required by Virginia Law. 
Finally, the Plaintiff has laid out in detail as part of its 
Motion for Judgment the amount of damages sustained as to each 
Count alleged. In order to defeat a Demurrer, a Plaintiff must 
plead all of the elements constituting a cause of action. 
Commonwealth of Virginia. ex rel. Vincent Pross. Comptroller v. 
Board of Supervisors of Spotsylvania County, et al., 225 Va. 492, 
303 S.E. 2d 887 (1983). The Court finds that the Plaintiff has 
successfully pleaded the requisite elements for tortious 
interference with a business expectancy in its Motion for Judgment. 
The Curt has reviewed CBT' s Memorandum in Support of its 
Demurrer in regards to this cause of action, and finds the 
arguments put forth by CBT as well grounded in law, but the Motion 
for Judgment alleges more than just a tortious interference with a 
business expectancy. The Court 11 ••• is required to consider as true 
all material facts that are properly pleaded, facts which are 
impliedly alleged, and facts which may be fairly and justly 
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inferred from the facts alleged. Luckett v. Jennings. et al., 246 
Va. 303, 435 S.E.2d 400 (1993). If the facts alleged in the Motion 
for Judgment are taken together as true, then CBT's setting off the 
Plaintiff's bank accounts and seizing the Plaintiff's vehicles 
would have appeared questionable and could be viewed as 
"misconduct". These allegations taken together with the claim for 
tortious interference serve to defeat CBT's argument as to whether 
it committed any 11 intentional misconduct". The Court finds that 
the law cited by CBT in its supporting memorandum is 
distinguishable in light of the other allegations put forth by the 
Plaintiff. In Taylor's Auto Body Shop. Inc. v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12271 (W.D. Va. 1993) 1 
the only claim addressed by that Court was one for tortious 
interference. Had the District Court had before it allegations of 
lack of good faith on the part of the Defendant, then its ruling 
would most assuredly have been affected. 
CBT 1 S argument regarding the requirement that Plaintiff plead 
particular expectancies is misplaced as well. In American Tel. & 
Tel. v. Eastern Pay Phones, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 1335 (E.D. Va. 1991) I 
the District Court responded to a Motion to Dismiss, not a 
Demurrer. In ruling upon a Demurrer, the Trial Court can infer 
facts from the allegations contained in the pleadings. See Luckett 
v. Jennings. et al. 1 246 Va. 303, 435 S.E. 2d 400 (1993). The 
Court finds the facts in the present case distinguishable from the 
facts in Eastern Pay Phones. Plaintiff sought loans from the 
Defendants here for the very purpose of remaining a viable 
business 1 capable of making and receiving bids for employment. 
Plaintiff's "reasonable certainty" rested in its ability to make 
and receive those bids as is the custom in its particular business. 
The cross-complainant in Eastern Pay Phones had no such 
relationship with the cross-defendant. Moreover, the portion of 
the Court's decision in Eastern Pay Phones that is relied upon by 
CBT has been vacated, and this Court is reluctant to base its 
ruling upon such a case. 
"A Demurrer does not permit the Trial Court to evaluate and 
decide the merits of the claim set forth in a ... Motion for 
Judgment ... ". Concerned Taxpayers of Brunswick County, et al .. v. 
County of Brunswick. et al., 249 Va. 320 455 S.E.2d 712 (1995). In 
ruling upon Defendant's Demurrer, the Court must only determine 
"the sufficiencyof a Motion for Judgment [and] whether it states 
the essential elements of a cause of action ... ". Commonwealth of 
Virginia. ex rel. Vincent Pross, Comptroller v. Board of 
Supervisors of Spotsylvania County. et al., 225 Va. 4921 303 S.E.2d 
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887 (1983). The Court hereby overrules CBT' s Demurrer as to Counts 
VI, VII, VIII and IX. 
The Court, finding that Counts I, II, III, IV and V of the 
Second Amended Motion for Judgment do not contain allegations 
against Defendant CBT, does hereby sustain CBT's Demurrer as to 
those Counts. 
I would recommend that (in accordance with this opinion) 
Counsel proceed with depositions as scheduled and, thereby, enable 
the Court to proceed with the trial date now scheduled for March 
31, 1997, through April 4, 1997, in the Tazewell County Virginia 
Circuit Court. 
Counsel for Tazewell National Bank should prepare an Order in 
accord with the Court's written opinion and forward same to Counsel 
for Citizens Bank of Tazewell, Bill Greever Corporation and Bill B. 
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At Law No. CL94000100 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERAT70N 
Bill Greever Corporation ( "BGC") and Bill B. Greever Sr. ("Mr. 
Greever") (collectively, "Plaintiffs11 ), by counsel, respectfully 
request that this Court reconsiaer its letter opinion dated 
January 17, 1997 with respect to its decision to grant the Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Tazewell National Bank ("TNB") 
against BGC and Mr. Greever. As set forth in Terrebonne Fuel & 
Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 666 So. 2d 624 (La. 1996), 
Restatement (Second> of Judaments, § 26 (1982), and 18 Wright 
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, Judgments § 4413 
(1981), res judicata is inapplicable to the matter at hand. 
Plaintiffs also request that the Court note that Count VI against 
Citizens Bank of Tazewell ("CBT") was a plea for relief based upon 
breach of contract, not tort. 
1.34 
FACTS 
The Disclosure statement Relating to Bill Greever and Plan 
Pursuant to Chapter 11 states: 
fNJothing in this plan would waive any and all 
of the debtors rights to bring in (sic] action 
against any party or parties which the debtor 
believes may be indebted to the debtor for any 
causes of action that may exist pre-petition. 
The purpose of this Chapter 11 plan is not to 
settle or waive any of those causes of action 
but to preserve all of those if bringing the 
same is determined by the debtor to be 
necessary in the future. 
at 14-15. (emphasis added) 
The Plan of Reorganization of Bill Greever ("Confirmation 
Plan") states: 
Any adversary proceeding presently pending or 
to be commenced in the future against various 
individuals or entities shall remain as a 
property right of the debtor and shall in no 
way be waived or affected by the Plan or 
Disclosure Statement filed herewith. 
Id. at 9. 1 (emphasis added) The Confirmation Plan was confirmed by 
order of the bankruptcy court dated March 21, 1994. Thus, the 
provision of the Plan are the provisions of the order from which 
1 At the hearing on its motion, TNB claimed that "adversary 
proceeding" is a unique term of art which only relates to actions 
in bankruptcy. That assertion is simply untrue. The phrase is not 
and has never been limited to bankruptcy. Black's Law Dictionary, 
5th Ed. (1979), defines "adversary proceeding" as: "One having 
opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte 
hearing or proceeding. One of which the party seeking relief has 
given legal notice to the other party, and afforded the latter an 
opportunity to contest it. 11 The definition does not even mention 
bankruptcy. Moreover, since the Confirmation Plan contemplates 
actions to be commenced "in the future, 11 which must mean after the 
confirmation Plan is entered as an order, the phrase "adversary 




any res judicata effect must arise. 
ARGUMEN'l' 
Mr. Greever's Claims Against TNB are Not Barred by Res 
Judicata. 
The Confirmation Plan and the disclosure statement 
specifically provide that Mr. Greever's causes of action are 
preserved. TNB's claim of res judicata is simply erroneous. TNB 
is trying to assert that Mr. Greever's causes of action are barred 
by the very documents that state that the causes of action are 
preserved. 
In a recent case virtually identical to the one at hand, 
Terrebonne Fuel & Lube. Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 666 So. 2d 624 
(La. 1996), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that res judicata 
is inapplicable where language in a confirmation plan expressly 
preserves all causes of action. In so doing, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court's decision flatly reversed that of the Louisiana Court of 
Appeals, which held res judicata:, applied based upon Sure-Snap 
Corp .. v. State Street Bank & Trust co., 948 F.2d 869 (2nd Cir. 
1991), and the other cases in the line upon which TNB relies. 
In Terrebonne, the debtor had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. The plan did not specifically mention any claim 
against Placid, one of the debtor's suppliers to whom the debtor 
owed money, or other creditors. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. 
Placid Refining Co., 649 So. 2d 86, 87 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1994). 
Instead, the confirmation plan contained a general provision 
reserving all claims the debtor might have that is similar in 
3 
operation to that of Mr. Greever's Confirmation Plan: 
the Debtor reserves all claims, demands, 
causes of action, and powers that it may have 
under the Bankruptcy Code and reserves the 
rights, absent Liquidation, to have 
Reorganized Terrebonne enforce the same at all 
times and on terms and conditions as 
Reorganized Terrebonne, in its sole 
discretion, deems fit, including making 
objections to same. 
666 So. 2d at 627. 
After the plan was confirmed, the debtor initiated a suit 
against Placid for actions taken by Placid prior to the filing of 
the bankruptcy -- which the debtor alleged caused the bankruptcy. 
Based upon Sure-Snap Corp., v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 948 
F.2d 869 (2nd Cir. 1991), and that line of cases, the lower court 
held that the debtor's action was barred notwithstanding the 
language in the confirmation plan preserving all causes of action. 
Id. at 88-89. 
The Supreme Court of Louisia~a reversed the appellate court 
stating that the appellate court was "simply wrong'' in opining that 
the confirmation plan did not mention or provide for any claims to 
be made by Terrebonne against Placid. 666 So. 2d at 634. The 
supreme court ruled that the plan of reorganization "expressly made 
such a reservation of claims11 by virtue of the language in the 
confirmation plan mentioned above and that "the parties and the 
court were aware that these claims would be asserted later." Id. 
As the supreme court correctly pointed out there, and as is 
obviously true here, too, "not one of the cases cited by (the 
4 
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appellate court] contained reservations of claims by the debtor or 
involved exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata." Id. 
The supreme court held that res judicata did not apply 
because: the confirmation plan contained an express reservation of 
claims; the creditor did not appeal the confirmation of the 
confirmation plan, thus acquiescing in the debtor's reservation of 
claims; the plan was confirmed by a court order with the court 
inherently acknowledging such reservation of claims; and that it 
would be against the public policies of fairness, justice and 
judicial economy to bar the claims by res judicata. Id. at 634-35. 
It stated that while res judicata is a useful tool, it should not 
be used as a scythe applied mechanically or blindly. Id. at 635. 
The decision of the Terrebonne Court was based upon well-
established and sound authorities such as Restatement CSecondl of 
Judgments and Wright Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure. 
As stated in the Restatement <second) of Judgments, § 26 (1982), 
res judicata does not apply where: (a) the parties have agreed 
that the plaintiff may split his claim, or the defendant has 
acquiesced therein; (b) the court in the first action has 
expressly reserved the plaintiff's right to maintain the second 
action; or (e) for policy reasons. Similarly, 18 Wright Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, Jurisdiction § 4413 at 106 
(1981), states: "A judgment that expressly leaves open the 
opportunity to bring a second action on specified parts of the 
claim or cause of action that was advanced in the first action 
should be effective to forestall preclusion." 
5 
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As in Terrebonne, the bankruptcy court's order explicitly 
reserved Mr. Greever's claims; TNB acquiesced in the reservation of 
claims in that it had notice of the reservation of claims prior to 
the hearing on the Confirmation Plan, it did not object to it and 
did not appeal the confirmation Plan; the plan was confirmed by a 
court order with the court inherently acknowledging such 
reservations of claims; and it would be against the public policies 
of fairness, justice and judicial economy to bar the claims by res 
judicata. 
Because res judicata for purposes of bankruptcy is no 
different than res judicata outside of bankruptcy, TNB's claim can 
best be analogized to the following scenario: A plaintiff brings 
an action against several defendants which the court dismisses 
without prejudice. The plaintiff then brings a second action 
against one of the defendants. That defendant argues that the 
second action is barred because the first action was dismissed and 
tries to convince the court that it should not pay attention to the 
contents of the order dismissing the first action. The defendant 
does not want the court to realize that the contents of the order 
state that the dismissal was without prejudice. The defendant 
argues that the fact of dismissal, not the contents of the order, 
creates claim preclusion. 
As in the analogy above, one must look to the contents of the 
Confirmation Plan because the fact that an order is entered does 
not give rise to claim preclusion. In this case, the Confirmation 
Plan is the order which is binding on the debtor and its creditors. 
6 
11 u.s.c. § 1141(a); In re Grimm, 168 B.R. 102, 110-111 (Bankr. 
E. D. Va. 19 9 4) . It determines all issues. To find out whether Mr. 
Greever must make payments to TNB, one must look to the 
Confirmation Plan. To find out whether Mr. Greever must make 
payments to First National Bank of Bluefield, one must look to the 
Confirmation Plan. To find out whether Mr. Greever's causes of 
action were preserved, one must look to the Confirmation Plan. 
With respect to Mr. Greever's causes of action, the 
Confirmation Plan provides that such claims: "shall remain as a 
property right of the debtor and shall in no wav be waived or 
affected by the Plan or Disclosure Statement filed herewith." Id. 
at 9. The disclosure statement also provides the purpose of the 
plan "is not to settle or waive any of [the debtor's) causes of 
action but to preserve all of those." 
TNB has no authority for its position. Sure-Snap Corp., v. 
State Street Bank & Trust co., 948 F.2d 869 (2nd Cir. 1991), is 
distinguishable and inapposite. · In that case, there was no 
provision in the disclosure plan or the confirmation plan 
explicitly preserving any claims of the debtor. Moreover, not one 
. 
of the other cases cited by TNB contains a provision in a 
confirmation plan preserving the debtor's claims. 2 
In this action, TNB is erroneously attempting to relitigate 
2In Matter of Howe, 913 F.2d 1138, 1146 n. 26 (5th Cir. 1990), 
the debtor's confirmation plan did contain a provision preserving 
all of his claims, but the debtor did not rely upon the provision 
so it was never addressed by the court (except the court noted it 
was "curious" that the debtor did not rely upon it). 
7 
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the order of the bankruptcy court. To accept TNB's argument would 
mean that this Court would have to find that the provisions in the 
bankruptcy order are meaningless, which it lacks authority do. or, 
this court would have to overrule the order of the bankruptcy 
court, which it lacks authority to do. TNB cannot relitiqate a 
confirmation plan. In Re Penn-Dixie Industries, Inc., 32 B.R. 173 
(S.D.N. Y 1983) (res judicata and estoppel bar a creditor from trying 
to relitigate issues in a later action where it failed to object to 
the provisions of the plan addressing the issues and failed to 
appeal the confirmation order); Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 
F.2d 1046, 1048-50 (5th Cir. 1987) (creditor who was a party to a 
confirmed plan could not collaterally attack provisions of the plan 
in a later action where the creditor had failed to object to the 
provisions of the plan at the hearing held prior to the final 
confirmation and had failed to appeal the confirmation order) ; In 
Re Bowen, 174 B.R. 840, 847 (S.D. Ga. 1994)(dismissing creditor's 
challenges to the content of the confirmed plan and holding that 
the binding effect of a confirmed plan of reorganization is such 
that res judicata applies even when the plan contains provisions 
which are arguably contrary to applicable law). Presumably, TNB 
hoped that any causes of action Mr. Greever might assert would be 
against other corporations and that Mr. Greever could use the 
proceeds to pay TNB. 
TNB did not object to the provisions of the Confirmation Plan 
or disclosure plan at issue prior to the confirmation, nor did it 
appeal the Confirmation Plan. It had notice of the provisions of 
8 
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the plan prior and subsequent to its confirmation. As such, TNB 
waived its rights to contest the plan, and it is estopped and 
forever barred from relitigating the issues adjudicated in that 
forum according to a wealth of uncontradicted authority. 
TNB has actually benefited from the fact that Mr. Greever 
never filed an action until after his bankruptcy plan was 
.confirmed. If Mr. Greever had brought his claims against TNB right 
after filing for bankruptcy, he could have claimed that TNB 
destroyed his ability to repay the bank, and as such, he did not 
owe TNB anything. However, since Mr. Greever did not bring these 
claims until after his Confirmation Plan was entered, any money he 
recovers in this lawsuit must first go to repaying his creditors, 
including TNB, in accordance with the Confirmation Plan. 
If TNB escapes liability for its wrongful acts, Mr. Greever 
and his other creditors will be deprived of the money to which they 
are entitled. TNB has made some misleading accusations to divert 
the Court's attention from its wrongful misconduct set forth in the 
Second Amended Motion for Judgment. There has never been any bad 
faith on Mr. Greever's part. Since the filing of this suit, Mr. 
Greever has always acknowledged that he must use the proceeds of 
any recovery to pay TNB and his other creditors in accordance with 
the Confirmation Plan. If TNB really believed that Mr. Greever had 
obtained an unfair advantage, it had 180 days to petition the 
bankruptcy court to revoke the confirmation Plan based upon fraud, 
pursuant to 11 U.S. c. § 1144. TNB knows this. But the fact of the 
matter is that Mr. Greever has not obtained any unfair advantage. 
9 
·1.42 
Thus, TNB is screaming foul where the only person committing a foul 
is TNB--which is trying to renounce its approval of the 
Confirmation Plan several years after the fact in the face of 
overwhelming case authority which states it cannot relitigate a 
confirmation plan. Without res judicata as to the claims of Mr. 
Greever, there is no res judicata as to the claims of BGC. 
Count VX of the Second Amended Motion for Judgment was Pled as 
a Breach of contract. 
The Court's opinion states that the Uniform Commercial Code 
sets forth a duty of good faith and that a breach of that duty 
gives rise to a cause of action under a breach of contract theory. 
Slip op. at 7. The Court's opinion overrules CBT's demurrer to 
Count VI. Slip op. at 12. That count is based upon breach of the 
contractual duty of good faith. Paragraph 66 of Plaintiff's Second 
Amended Motion for Judgment states: 
66. As a direct and proximate result of CBT's breach of 
its contractual duty of good faith, plaintiffs have and 
will continue to suffer damages. 
(emphasis added). The other allegations in Count VI merely set 
forth the contractual duties and the ways in which the obligations 
were breached. In accordance with the breach of contract claim, 
Plaintiffs request compensatory damages, but not punitive damages 
in the ad damnum to Count VI. 
Plaintiffs interpret the Court's opinion as overruling the 
demurrer to Plaintiffs' claim for breach of a contractual duty and 
stating that a demurrer would be upheld for a claim in tort. They 
intend to sign an order to that affect. If plaintiffs have 
10 
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misinterpreted the court's opinion, please instruct us accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully 
request that the Court overrule TNB's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment and g~ant Plaintiffs such other relief as the Court may 
deem appropriate. 
BILL GREEVER CORPORATION 
BILL B. GREEVER, SR. 
By Counsel 
, Jr. (VSB #047 
Moore, Jr. (VSB #367 
DURRETTE, IRVIN & BRADSHAW, 
600 East Main street, 20th 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Telephone: (804) 780-050 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration 
was mailed first-class, postage prepaid, to Robert F. Brooks and 
Jack R. Wilson, III, Hunton & Williams, Riverfront Plaza, East 
Tower, 951 East Byrd Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219-4074, and 
sent via facsimile and mailed first class, postage prepaid, to 
Stephen M. Hodges, Penn, Stuart, Eskridge & Jones, Post Office Box 
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TNB'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
statement of the Case 
On or about April 25, 1996, the defendant Tazewell 
National Bank ("TNB") filed its Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
on grounds that Greever's prior Chapter 11 bankruptcy, in which he 
never mentioned the claims he now asserts against TNB, bars him 
from now asserting th~se claims ln this action. 
Both sides briefed the issue thoroughly. The court heard 
extensive oral argument on the motion on May 23, 1996 and took the 
issue under advisement. After the argument, Greever supplemented 
his argument by letter. TNB responded. 
Several months passed while the court considered the 
numerous issues and authorities submitted to it. During this 
period Greever had a trial date set and wrote the court requesting 
a ruling upon the pending motions. 
By letter to counsel dated January 16, 1997, the court 
thoroughly analyzed TNB's second motion for summary judgment in 
145 
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light of the numerous authorities cited by the parties and 
announced that TNB's motion would be granted. The court also 
announced other rulings and directed TNB's counsel to prepare and 
circulate an order formalizing the court's rulings. TNB's counsel 
did so, but Greever's counsel declined to endorse and, on 
February 1, 1997, served a Motion for Reconsideration based upon a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, 
Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 666 So.2d 624 (La. 1996). 
The court should not entertain additional argument at 
this point in the litigation, but even if it does, this case is 
easily distinguished from Terrebonne. Moreover, Terrebonne 
addresses only one of several grounds supporting TNB's motion, and, 
to the extent the decision gives support to Greever's arguments, is 
against the heavy weight of authority across the country. 
~qument and Authorities 
1. The court should not entertain the motion as 
it is untimely. 
As shown above, Greever now attempts to upset a carefully 
considered ruling of the court based upon authorities available to 
him during the prior extensive briefing and argument, but never 
cited. 
The Terrebonne case was decided January 16, 1996. 
Greever filed a brief on May 20, 1996, argued the point on May 23, 
1996 and supplemented his argument by letter dated June 13, 1996, 
but has not explained why he did not cite the case at the proper 
1.46 
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time. The court did not announce its decision until January 16, 
1996, a full year after Terrebonne was decided. Neither the court 
nor opposing parties should be subject to piecemeal litigation 
wherein parties cite what they claim are significant authorities, 
after the issues have been thoroughly briefed, argued, analyzed and 
decided by the court. 
The court should exercise its discretion against 
reconsideration as the parties have had a full opportunity to 
state, argue, and support their positions. 
2 • Terrebone is factually and legally distin-
guishable from the current case. 
As Greever points out, the Chapter 11 plan in Terrebonne 
had a catch-all reservation of claims similar to Mr. Greever's in 
that it did not identify the specific claims preserved. However, 
in Terrebonne unlike Greever, the specific claim was not only 
disclosed in the bankruptcy proceedings, it was asserted as a claim 
for relief, but rejected by the bankruptcy court on procedural 
grounds. Thus in Terrebonne, unlike Greever, the claim was 
disclosed and understood by all dqring the bankruptcy proceedings. 
The distinction is critical to the outcome of Terrebonne. 
The court summarized its ruling in these terms: 
We conclude that under the circumstances 
presented in this case - particularly where 
the plan contains an express reservationlOf 
claims of which the court and all parties were 
aware and where the · bankruptcy court 
specifically declined to exercise its 
jurisdiction over the state law claim - the 
·:147 
confirmation of the Plan of Reorganization 
does not operate as a res judicata bar to the 
subsequent assertion of the state law breach 
of contract claim in state court. [Emphasis 
added.) 
666 So.2d at 626. 
-4-
Obviously, the Greever case is not like Terrebonne. 
Greever never disclosed his claims against TNB in any fashion in 
his bankruptcy. It is not just that the reservation language in 
the disclosure statement and plan did not specify what claims were 
reserved. The important point is that Greever's claims were never 
disclosed in the bankruptcy. Effectively, Greever claims to have 
reserved that which his creditors never knew existed, because he 
did not tell them. 
The Terrebonne opinion does not relate whether the debtor 
disclosed the claim in its disclosure statement and schedules. 
Here we know that Greever did not. In fact, Greever specifically 
stated in his bankruptcy filings that he had no contingent or 
I 
contested claims. 
As TNB has consistently argued, the fact that the claim 
was not disclosed in Greever's schedules or statement of personal 
affairs is critical. If Greever had disclosed the existence of his 
claim against TNB at anytime in his bankruptcy case, his argument 
that the catch-all reservation in his plan and disclosure statement 
saves the claims, although still debatable, would begin to make 
sense. As it is, however, he attempted to except something that he 
never disclosed to begin with. How could the creditors object to 
1.48 
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a reservation of claims which the debtor was obligated to disclose 
but kept secret? See Cleasby v. Security Federal,794 P.2d 697 
(Mont. 1990) (uthe Bankruptcy Code and courts have placed the 
obligation to ensure full disclosure on the debtor-in-possession, 
not the creditors." 794 P.2d at 701). 
Terrebonne simply does not address this issue. For all 
we know, the debtor's claims in Terrebonne were disclosed in the 
schedules. We know for sure that they were clearly disclosed, in 
fact asserted, in the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Beyond the factual distinctions between Terrebonne and 
the current case, there is an important legal distinction. 
Terrebonne addresses only the issue of res judicata. The court did 
not even consider any of the other legal theories relied upon by 
numerous courts in the decisions cited by TNB in its earlier briefs 
and herein. 1 
The numerous cases which bar "lender liability" claims not 
disclosed in bankruptcy, such as Greever's, do so on a n~er_of 
theories in addition to ~ judicata, principally judicial estoppel 
and equitable estoppel. In addition to the many cases already 
cited and discussed by TNB in its earlier briefs, the following 
decisions bar post bankruptcy claims such as Greever's on the basis 
1. At one point Greever erroneously accused TNB of 
"virtually abandoning" its ~ judicata defense in· favor of 
estoppel. Durrette letter to court dated June 13, 1996. 
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of res judicata, equitable estoppel and/or judicial estoppel: 
Zwemer v. Production Credit Ass'n, 792 P.2d 245 (Wyo. 1990); 
Caplener v. u.s. National Bank, 831 P.2d 22 (Or. App. 1992); 
Cleasby v. Security Federal, 794 P.2d 697 (Mont. 1990); Littlefield 
v. Union State Bank, 500 N.W.2d 881 (N.D. 1993); In re Hoffman, 99 
B.R. 929 (N.D. Iowa, 1989) (copies attached). 2 Several of these 
cases point out that bankruptcy law imposes an affirmative duty on 
the debtor to disclose his assets, including claims. When he files 
a schedule with the court which fails to disclose claims, he is 
effectively stating to the court that there are none. He cannot 
later assert in another court that which he has effectively told 
the bankruptcy court does not exist. See for example, Zwemer and 
Hoffman. 
Greever now tries to elevate the Terrebonne case to the 
status of compelling authority to undo the court's well-considered 
decision. Terrebonne simply does not address estoppel, which 
justifies the court's ruling apart from res judicata. 
2. In some of the cited cases, unlike the current case, 
there was at least some disclosure of the potential lender 
liability claims in the bankruptcy case, but the courts held the 
attempts were insufficient to avoid the application of ~ judicata 
and estoppel. See, for example, Zwemer and Cleasby. 
·150 
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3. Terrebonne is in the minority. 
If Terrebonne supports Greever's arguments, which TNB 
denies, it is a distinctly minority view. In its previous briefs 
and in this brief, TNB has cited 14 cases from state and federal 
courts across the country, including several federal courts of 
appeal and several state supreme courts, all holding that a debtor 
who does not disclose his lender liability claims in his bankruptcy 
is out of court when he later tries to assert them. Terrebonne is 
a narrow decision, factually and legally, easily distinguished from 
the current case. Even if it were not so, Terrebonne is contrary 
to the overwhelming weight of authority across the country. 
conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons the court should decline to 
reconsider the granting of TNB's second motion for summary judgment. 
In the alternative, the court should overrule the motion on the 
merits. 
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filed on February 21, 1997, the Court renders its opinion as 
follows: 
At issue in the Motion to Reconsider is whether a Confirmed 
Plan in a Bankruptcy action acts as a res judicata bar to 
subsequent suits relating to bankruptcy creditors. As counsel 
know, this is an issue that has not been directly addressed by any 
Virginia Court. However, some Courts sitting in Virginia, have 
addressed the periphery issues at hand. 
The Plaintiffs rely on two arguments to support their Motion 
to Reconsider. The Court will consider each one in ruling upon the 
motion. 
i. Terrebonne Fuel and Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Company 
The Plaintiffs place great weight upon the Louisiana case of 
Terrebonne Fuel and Lube. Inc. v. Placid Refining Company. In 
Terrebonne, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a confirmed plan 
of a bankruptcy did not act as a res judicata bar to a subsequent 
breach of contract action by the plaintiff-debtor against the 
defendant-creditor. 666 So.2d 624, 626 (1996). The Court looked 
to two things in reaching that decision. The Court first 
acknowledged the logic behind a res judicata claim by the creditor-
defendant Placid. Id. The Court then proceeded to discuss the 
exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 632. Among 
those exceptions discussed included (1) the defendant's 
acquiescence in the splitting of claims by the plaintiff and (2) a 
Court involved in the first action expressly reserving a 
plaintiff's right to maintain a second action. Id. The Louisiana 
Supreme Court found that some of the exceptions were met by the 
facts before them. Id. First, the Court placed great weight on 
the fact that the debtor's plan of reorganization contained a 
reservation of claims clause. Id. at 634. The Court reasoned that 
Placid knew of this clause, and their failure to appeal the plan 
served as an acquiescence to the provisions of the plan. Id. 
Secondly, the Court placed repeated emphasis on the fact that the 
plaintiff-debtor attempted to adjudicate the breach of contract 
action within the bankruptcy court. Id. The bankruptcy court did 
not allow the plaintiff to proceed on the contract action and 
suggested that the plaintiff pursue the claim in State Court. Id. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court read the bankruptcy court's action as 
an acknowledgement of the existence and post-bankruptcy viability 
of the debtor's claims against the creditor. Id. 
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Analysis 
While the facts and issue of Terrebonne somewhat mirror the 
facts and issue presented here, that case remains largely 
inapposite. The Court in Terrebonne did place great weight on the 
existence of the reservation of claims clause contained within the 
debtor's plan of reorganization. However, the Terrebonne Court 
also placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the debtor-
plaintiff attempted to adjudicate their breach of contract action 
within the bankruptcy court. The Court also repeatedly made 
reference to the fact that the bankruptcy court and the parties 
involved were aware of the claims that the plaintiff-debtor wished 
to pursue against the defendant. Id. at 626. More significantly, 
the Court pointed to the fact that 11 the bankruptcy court 
specifically declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the state 
law claim". Id. at 626. As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, 
the plaintiff in Terrebonne "had no choice but to file its claim in 
state court" . Id. The Court therefore reasoned that the doctrine 
of res judicata was inapplicable because 11 [i] nherent in the concept 
of res judicata is the principle that a party had the opportunity 
to raise the [its] claim in the first adjudication". Id. The 
Court also stated that the application of res judicata exceptions 
were predicated upon the existence of 11 exceptional circumstances 11 • 
Id. at 632. As discussed above, the Court determined that the 
circumstances and facts before them warranted application of the 
exceptions. Id. at 634. This Court finds no facts that are 
similar to Terrebonne in the case at hand, and finds no existence 
of "exceptional circumstances 11 • 
The defendant Tazewell National Bank ( 11 TNB") had no knowledge 
of any claims or potential claims against them by the Plaintiffs 
Bill Greever and Bill Greever Corporation ("BGC") at the time the 
confirmed plan was approved. Moreover, the Plaintiffs here did not 
attempt to adjudicate their claims in the bankruptcy court against 
the defendant TNB. While the Plaintiffs' reorganization plan does 
contain a reservation of claims clause, it is notable that the same 
plan contains provisions for the bankruptcy court's exercise of 
jurisdiction over such claims. The reorganization plan provides 
for the bankruptcy court's retention of jurisdiction over disputes 
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arising "regarding the interpretation of any provision(s) of the 
Plan". {P.S} The Plan also states that the bankruptcy court 
"will retain jurisdiction to adjudicate any "cause (s) of 
action or other proceeding(s) presently pending or 
otherwise referenced here or elsewhere in this plan ... " 
(P. 6} (Emphasis added} . The reservation of claims clause is 
contained within the Plaintiffs' Disclosure Statement which states 
that "· .. the Plan is part of this Disclosure Statement and the two 
should be read together". {P.l) Therefore, the "retention of 
jurisdiction" provisions cover the mechanics of the reorganization 
plan and the disclosure statement that contains the reservation of 
claims clause. 
XX. Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans as Res Judicata 
Even without the discussion of Terrebonne above, that case 
still serves only as persuasive, not binding, authority on this 
Court. This Court is inclined to give greater weight to the 
decisions of those Courts sitting in Virginia. 
While dealing with dissimilar facts from the case at bar, the 
bankruptcy court in In Re Grimm offered guidance regarding when to 
treat bankruptcy reorganization- plans as res judicata. The 
bankruptcy court there said that "an order confirming a plan of 
reorganization is a final judgment on the merits for purposes of 
res judicata". In Re Grimm. 168 Bankr. 102 (E.D. Va. Bankr. 1994). 
As discussed in this Court's opinion of January 16, 1997, the facts 
of this case meet the requisite elements of res judicata. 
IXX. Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Section 26 
In their Motion to Reconsider, the Plaintiffs' also rely on 
the persuasive authority of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 
Section 26, which lists exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court relied on this authority in rendering 
its decision in Terrebonne. Therefore, in light of the above 
analysis with regard to the Terrebonne case, to analyze this 
persuasive authority as applied to the case at bar would be 
duplicative. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The Court denies the Motion to Reconsider. The Court finds 
that the doctrine of res judicata bars the subject suit by the 
Plaintiffs against the Defendant TNB. The Court finds the facts of 
this case and those found in Terrebonne as inapposite and finds no 
basis in the facts before the Court for the application of any 
exceptions to the res judicata doctrine. Moreover, this ruling is 
supported by the jurisdictional provisions found within the 
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BILL B. GREEVER, SR., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. At Law No. CL94000100 
TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ADJUDICATING TAZEWELL NATIONAL BANK'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
CITIZENS BANK OF TAZEWELL'S DEMURRER 
AND SEVERING THE CASES 
For the reasons set forth in detail in the Court's letter 
opinions to counsel dated January 17, and May 22, 1997, and upon 
agreement of the parties to ~ever the plaintiffs' claims against 
the defendants, it is ADJUDGED and ORDERED as follows: 
1. Tazewell National Bank's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
3. Counts I, II, III, IV, V and X are dismissed with 
prejudice as to Tazewell National Bank. 
4. Citizens Bank of Tazewell's demurrer is overruled as 
to Counts VII, VIII and IX. 
5. Plaintiffs' cases against Tazewell National Bank and 
Citizens Bank of Tazewell are hereby severed, and the case against 
Citizens Bank of Tazewell will be assigned a new docket number. 
·1.58 
~-
6. Tazewell National Bank hereby nonsuits its 
counterclaim against Bill Greever Corporation without prejudice. 
7. The case against citizens Bank of Tazewell under its 
new docket number is continued generally, and the issue regarding 
Count VI will be determined at a later date. 
8. Upon the severance, the severed law action No. 
CL94000100 is dismissed with prejudice and stricken from the 
docket. 
The plaintiffs and Citizens Bank of Tazewell objected to 
the Court's rulings to the extent adverse to them. 
The clerk is directed 1) to assign a separate docket 
number to the case of Bill Greever Corporation and Bill B. Greever, 
Sr. vs. Citizens Bank of Tazewell, 2) assess the appropriate costs 
of severance against plaintiffs, and 3) send a copy of this order 
to all counsel. 
Enter, this 
Requested: 
PENN, STUART & ESKRIDGE 
P. o. Box 2288 






\. ___ _ 
Seen, Objection to the Extent Adverse: 
DURRETTE, IRVIN & BRADSHAW, P.C. 
600 East Main Street 
20th Floor 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Seen, Objection to the tent Adverse: 
HUNTON & WILLIAMS 
951 East Byrd Street 




ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Assignment of Error No. 1 : The trial court erred in opining that 
appellants Bill Greever Corporation ("BGC11) and Mr. Bill B. Greever ("Mr. 
Greever") (collectively, "Appellants1? were barred by res judicata from 
bringing their common law causes of action against appellee Tazewell 
National Bank ('7NB") based upon the fact that a Confirmed Plan had been 
entered in Mr. Greever's Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Confirmed Plan and 
the Disclosure Statement expressly state that all causes of action of Mr. 
Greever are preserved and that the Confirmed Plan does not waive or affect 
causes of action belonging to Mr. Greever. Because TNB agreed or 
acquiesced to these provisions which split the claims of Appellants, res 
judicata cannot apply against Appellants. 
Assignment of Error No. 2: The trial court erred in opining that BGC 
and Mr. Greever were barred by res judicata from litigating their claims 
against TNB on the basis that a final order had been entered in Mr. 
Greever's Chapter 11 bankruptcy because that verv final order of the 
bankruptcy court expressly reserved all Mr. Greever's causes of action and 
stated that the final order does not waive or affect causes of action of Mr. 
Greever. The trial court should have ruled that TNB was barred by res 
judicata from relitigating in this lawsuit the provisions of the final order in the 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. 
161.· 
Assignment of Error No. 3: The trial court erred in opining that BGC 
and Mr. Greever were barred by the doctrine of res judicata from litigating 
their claims against TNB in this action because to apply res judicata against 
BGC and Mr. Greever in this case defeats the public policies of fairness. 
justice and judicial economy. 
162 
